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ABSTRACT 
Banking sector reforms is an important element of over all economic reforms 
of our country. Before 1991, the balance sheet of the performance of banking sector in 
India was a mixed one, i.e. strong in widening the credit coverage, but weak as far as 
viability and sustainability were concerned. The low productivity, low efficiency and 
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erosion of profitability of the banking sector were diagnosed to be caused due to 
following reasons: 
• In directed investment and credit programme areas, banks were earning 
much less than what they could do by alternate deployment of funds. 
• Administered mterest rates for both deposits and advances, which meant 
banks, had little control over their profitability. 
• Contammation of the loan portfolio, much of which are conceited due to 
lack of standard yardsticks for identification and provisioning of impaired 
debts. 
• Banks suffered fi-om excessive administrative and political interference in 
their internal management and credit decision. 
Hence by 1990, there was cause for serious concern on account of poor 
financial condition of banks. The crisis faced by the Indian banking sector paved the 
way for extensive banking sector reforms. Despite the impressive widening of 
banking sector in last three decades, there was a general consensus that it had not 
actually become sound and vibrant as it needed to be. So the deficiencies of Indian 
banking sector and the world - wide trend towards economic liberali2ation promoted 
the Indian authorities also to go in for banking sector reforms as part of general 
economic structural adjustment programme. The philosophy behind the banking 
sector reforms was claimed to be to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive 
banking sector with the ultimate objective of improving the allocative efficiency of 
available resotirces, increasing the return on investments and promoting an 
accelerated growth of the real sector of the economy. More specifically, there are 
following reasons which bring out the rationale of banking sector reforms in India. 
• The development in banking sector needed to support the progressive changes 
taking place in industry, trade and fiscal sector. 
• Before the reforms, the priority sector lending created imbalances in the 
sectoral distribution of bank credit. So there was a need to transform the 
system of priority sector lending into a more selective and focused 
arrangement taking into account the unperatives of societal concerns for 
assisting the truly weaker sections and tiny units. 
• A genuinely competitive banking sector called for review of interest rate 
structure in areas where it stood regulated, so that individual rates are allowed 
to reflect liquidity, maturity and risk of different instruments and the structure 
is attuned to achieving a more efficient mobilization and also deployment of 
scarce resources. 
• Inefficiencies in the banking system tended to make the cost of intermediation 
unduly high, the changing environment of competition, called for a different 
work and management ethos, much more professionally oriented and goal and 
performance determined. 
• These reforms were required to seek greater competition between banks, with 
a move towards level playing fields as between public and private sector 
banks. This increased competition would provide an efficient system of 
fmancial intermediation, with diversified banks catering to the varied needs of 
various sectors of the economy. 
Thus, to put Indian banking on a sound footing, against the background of 
increasing global integration of the Indian economy, some major reforms were 
required to be undertaken. 
With the nationalization of banks in 1969 and 1980, impressive quantitative 
achievements were made in the resource mobilization and extending credit reach. 
However, certain weaknesses such as decline in productivity and efficiency and 
erosion in profitability had developed in systems which were to be addressed to 
enable the financial system to play an effective role in a competitive environment. 
Keeping in view this objective the Narasunham Committee on financial system was 
set up. The Committee made a number of recommendations aimed at improving 
productivity, efficiency and profitability of the banking system on the one hand and 
providing it greater operational flexibility and functional autonomy in decision-
making on the other. Some of the major steps taken in the direction of banking sector 
reforms are progressive reduction of reserve reqiiirements to correct the impact of 
directed investment on the profitability of banks, deregulation of complex and 
administered interest rate structure to move to market determined rates and 
introduction of prudential norms for assets classification, income recognition and 
provisioning in order to remove subjectivity etc. The government implemented major 
reforms as envisaged by benchmark Report of Narasimham Committee, which have 
revolutionized the banking sector being the heart line of financial markets and 
moreover facilitated the much awaited paradigm shift fi*om a highly regulated one to 
market-oriented one. 
In the post-liberalization era, the Reserve Bank has initiated several measures 
to ensure safety and soundness of the banking system and at the same time 
encouraging banks to play an effective role in accelerating the, growth process. It has 
been recognized that the Indian banking system should be in tune with well laid down 
international standards of capital adequacy and prudential norms. Banks have also 
been encouraged to adopt appropriate internal control system and corporate 
governance procedures to foresee and manage all .types of risks. 
In the present study entitled "Banking Sector Reforms in India -An 
Evaluation" an attempt has been made to analyze the banking sector reforms with 
following objectives: 
i. To give a brief historical background on the origin and growth of the 
banking system in India; 
ii. To examine various policy measures of banking sector reforms; 
iii. To analyze the effect of reforms on operational autonomy and the 
performance of the banking sector; 
iv. To find out the major problems and challenges of banking sector; and 
v. To suggest measures for improving efficiency and profitability of the 
commercial banks in India. 
The study is exclusively based on the secondary data. The relevant data have 
been collected fi-omithe various issues of Economic Survey, Government of India, 
Report on Money and Baking, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), RBI 
Report on Trend and Progress in Banking in India, RBI Report on Currency and 
Finance, RBI Bulletin, Statistical Outline of India, Tata Services Ltd., and Report on 
Development Banking India, IDBI. Data have.also been collected from Handbook 
of Statistics, Economic Political Weekly, and various websites such as 
www.rbi.org.in, www.iba.org.in, www.iibf.org.in, and Indiastat.com. 
The methodology used for evaluating banking sector reforms is based on 
different statistical tools. Student t-test and ANOVA are used to test whether there is 
any significant difference between the variables over different periods. Student t-test 
has been used to check the hypothesis as to whether there is any significant difference 
in the variables imder study before the banking sector reforms based on Narshimhan 
Committee recommendations, that is, before and after 1992-93. It measiires as to 
whether there is any significant difference between the means of the two samples. In 
this study ANOVA has been used to check the hypothesis as to whether there is any 
significant difference between three periods. The first period relates to the period 
before the Narasimham Committee (I) recommendation, that is, from 1980-81 to 
1991-92. The second period is between the first Narasimham Committee 
recommendation and the second Narasimham Committee recommendations, that is 
from 1992-93 to 1998-99. And the third period relates to the post-Narasimham 
Committee (II) recommendations, that is, after 1999-00 to 2007-08. In order to study 
the year-wise growth in the variables percentage growth rates and compound annual 
growth rates (CAGR) have been calculated. 
The study is limited for the period from 1980-81 to 2007-08. The study period 
has been divided into three sub-periods namely: 
• First Phase (P1) -1980-81 to 1991 -92 (Prior Reforms Period); 
• Second Phase (P2) -1992-93 to 1998-99 (First Reforms Period); and 
• Third Phase (P3) -1999-00 to 2007-08 (Second Reforms Period). 
The major limitation of the study is that the impacts of banking sector reforms 
on the private sector banks have not been incorporated. The scope of the study is 
limited to the scheduled commercial banks in general and public sector banks in 
particular. 
The whole study is organized into six chapters. Chapter first introduces the 
main theme of the study, explaining about statement of the problems along with 
review of literatures, objective of the study, methodology, sources of data, and 
limitations of the study. 
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Chapter second presents the evolution of the banking system in India during 
pre and post-nationalization era, and liberali2ation era as well as structure, and types 
of banking system in India. It also deals with the "changing scenario of Indian banking 
system. It also incorporates the role of banking sector in growth performance of the 
economy. 
Chapter third explains rationale as well as objective, and policy measures of 
banking sector reforms in India. This section also explains recommendations and 
implementation of Narasimham Committee Report-I and II. It also describes about 
banking development in India during post- reforms period. 
Chapter four analyses performance of banking sector reforms in India which 
includes scheduled commercial banks and public sector banks. For evaluating the 
performance of the scheduled commercial banks the parameters such as branch 
expansion, term deposits, area-wise bank deposits, bank deposit by types, bank credit, 
state-wise distribution of credit, food and non-food credit etc. have been undertaken. 
Likewise, the parameters such as interest expended as percentage of total assets of 
public sector banks, interest income as percentage of total assets, return on assets, 
business per employee etc. have been undertaken for analyzing performance of 
public sector banks in India. 
Chapter five focuses on the issues and problems of banking sector reforms in 
India. It examines the priority sector lending and its social objectives. The problem of 
NPAs and its classification, incidence, consequences, reasons, measures as well as 
management has also been incorporated. It also describes Basel norms and challenges 
for India as well as capital adequacy standard in India. This section also explains the 
role of WTO in Indian banking system along with reforms initiated by the Indian 
government to strengthen the banking services at the international level. 
Chapter six of the thesis provides summary and conclusion of the study and 
some suggestions regarding banking sector reforms in India. 
Major findings of the study can be summarized as follows: 
1. The business per employee for all PSBs taken together increased from Rs. 
1203.95 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 15637.76 lakhs in 2007-08, an improvement 
of about 11 times. On the other hand, SBI and its associate banks have been 
able to improve average business per employee from Rs. 144.63 lakhs to Rs. 
232.82 Idkhs over the given.period. 
2. State-wise distribution of credits by the PSBs reveal that the highest average 
credit is observed in Maharashtra (Rs. 149424.43 crores) during 1990-91 to 
2006-07 followed by Delhi (Rs. 93218.27 crores), Tamil Nadu (Rs. 59884.95 
crores), Kamataka (Rs. 43588 crores), Andhra Pradesh (Rs. 39829.35 crores), 
West Bengal (Rs. 33523.72 crores), Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 31730.50 crores) etc; 
and the lowest average of credit is provided by Lakshadeweep (Rs. 15.87 
crores). 
3. The average profit per branch of SBI and its associate banks has been positive 
through out the period. However, when the SBI is compared with its associate 
banks, the growth rate of profit per branch is higher in the case of associate 
banks. During the entire period, SBI and its associate banks generated profits, 
and their total profits per employee increased from Rs. 79.94 lakhs in 1992-93 
to Rs. 88.19 lakhs in 2007-08. Nationalized banks, on the other hand, show 
somewhat different picture. They faced loss of Rs. 0.63 lakhs in 1992-93, Rs. 
0.81 lakhs in 1993-94, and Rs. 0.2 lakhs per employee while other years show 
positive gain per employee. Average net / profit loss as percentage of total 
assets of public sector banks aggregate is 0.4 percent. 
4. It is found that interest expended as percentage of total assets of pubUc sector 
banks in 1991-92 was 6.96 percent which declined to 4.24 percent in 2006-07. 
5. The analysis of public sector banks at branch level reveals that the business 
operating expenses and profit as an average have increased at a faster rate 
during the period under study. Inter-group analysis shows that the 
performance of SBI & its associate banks on average is better than that of 
Nationalized banks in business and profit but they could not control their 
operating expenses. 
6. Average of capital adequacy ratio in SCBs is 12.34 percent, in public sector 
bank it is 12.32 percent, while in Nationalized Banks it is 12.03 percent. They 
show the same trend in the case of capital adequacy ratio over the given 
period. In Corporation Bank of India, the average of capital adequacy ratio is 
14.85 percent which is the highest among given banks. On the other hand, 
Indian Banks has the lowest average of capital adequacy ratio of 6.18 percent. 
7. The incidence of NPAs is higher in the case of public sector banks than other 
groups, and it is the lowest in the case of foreign banks (FBs). The mean of 
public sector total NPAs is Rs. 49646,4 crores which is greater than Rs. 
2554.1 crores of foreign banks. 
8. Finally, it appears that all PSBs have not responded to the process of reforms 
in the same degree and spirit. Some of them, for instance. Oriental Bank of 
Commerce, State Bank of Hyderabad and State Bank of Patiala, etc. receded a 
marked improvement, while other banks like UCO Bank, United Bank of 
India, Central Bank of India, Indian Over Seas Bank and Punjab & Sind Bank 
failed to show any significant improvement. 
For present banking scenario on the basis-of banking sector reforms, following 
suggestions can be given for improving the banking sector: 
1. One of the challenges faced by the banking sector is the high level of NPAs. To 
tackle these critical problems, different options are available, which are: 
• reducing the existing NPAs and curving their future build up; 
• organizing lok adalats for recovering small loans; 
• increasing the number of debt recovery tribunals; 
• eliminating interference of the political parties to waive-up the loans; and 
• setting up of the asset reconstruction fund (ARE) as recommended by 
Narasimham Committee in its first and second Reports. A strategic action plan 
should be initiated for reducing NPAs. 
2. For improving share of banks' low cost deposited action plans should be 
prepared for those centres where there is a potential for deposit mobilization. 
3. In order to involve all members in business development and build team spirits 
at the branch level, regular staff meeting must be organized at least fortnightly 
or monthly. 
4. Indian banking sector should stop copying the western banking models and 
should take special care to understand the local ethos and cultural backdrop. 
Indian banker should try to promote innovations and creativity taking into 
account the local ethos. 
5. Strategies of foreign banks and new private sector banks should be created 
among the public sector banks to make them competitive in the global age. 
6. With increasing competition among the bank's customer expectations, banks 
should offer a broader range of deposits, investment and credit products through 
diverse distributional channels like ATMs, Debt & Credit Cards, 1-Banking, M-
banking and Tele-banking. The banks should: 
• become more customer-centric, offering a wider range of products through 
multiple e-delivery channels. 
• become proficient in managing assets and liabilities according to risk and 
return. 
• pay greater attention to profitability including cost reduction and 
increasingly fee-based income. 
7. Domestic banks should be made as competitive as possible. They should also 
increase their productivity and profitability, because at the present day context, 
size is no longer a key indicator in the banking industry. 
8. The banks must look into wider issues and reap the overall economic benefits of 
firee-trade environment. 
9. Branch rationalization policy should look into the aspect of bringing down the 
number of loss making branches along with the objective of improving overall 
efficiency of the branches. The loss making branches should mainly focus their 
attention to the recovery of NPAs. 
10. VRS should continue and it should not be one-line affair. 
11. Autonomy in HRM areas such as deciding categorization of branches, 
vacancies, placements should be given to banks. 
12. New private sector banks should allow entering the banking industry to intensify 
the competition. 
13. Transforming the work culture to make banking really a service industry. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem: 
Banking system is an important constituent of overall economic system. It plays 
a crucial role in the attainment of macro-economic objectives. It acts as a vehicle for 
socio-economic transformation and also a catalyst to economic growth. It plays an 
important role in mobilizing the nation's savings and in canalizing them into high 
investment priorities and better utilization of available resources. Hence, banking 
system is described as the key player of the chariot of economic progress. In 
developing coimtries where the banking habit of people are not developed, the task of 
creating and spreading the banking habits and of mobilizing the country's resources 
become a challenging one, the role of banks is more creative and purposeful. 
Indian banking continues to remain in the forefront of the financial system. 
During the last three decades, the Indian banking sector had achieved substantial 
progress on many fronts. By transforming class-banking to mass-banking, from 
wholesale banking to retail banking and from macro-banking to micro-banking, the 
Indian banking system had become a potent tool of socio-economic development of the 
economy. 
The evolution of banking sector reforms can be categorized into two distinct 
phases: pre-reform phase and reform phase. The pre-reform phase consists of 3 phases; 
foundation phase, expansion phase, and consolidation phase. The reform period of 
banking sector is further, divided into two generations: first generation reforms and 
second generation reforms. The first phase of pre-reform phase, foimdation phase, 
covers the period from 1948 to 1969. The first step of the Government was the 
enactment of the Banking Regulation Act in 1948 which came into force in March 
1949. The Act defined bankiag and outlined functions of banks and prohibited the use 
of the word 'Bank' by financial companies, which are not satisfying minimum 
requirement with regard to paid-up capital and reserves. At the time of independence 
banking system was largely urban-oriented and remained out of reach of rural 
population. Commercial banks mostly confined their lending to trade, commerce and 
industry and treated agriculture as an outcaste. Moreover, security-oriented lending was 
the order of day. Since banks did not pay any attention to the farming community, the 
agriculturist was forced to borrow from the village money lenders who charged higher 
rates of interest and imposed burdensome conditions. To correct this defect, the 
'Imperia Bank of Indi8'(1921) was nationalized and renamed as the 'State Bank of 
India' on July 1, 1955, as part of re-organization of rural credit structure. The second 
phase, expansion, includes the early sixties in which 14 major banks were nationalized 
in 1969. The main objectives of nationalization were: provision of adequate credit for 
agriculture, small industry and exports which were considered as priority sectors, 
reduction in regional disparities and to meet the credit needs of the small man, the 
weaker section of the society. On April 15, 1980 six more private sector banks were 
nationalized. Though the bank was spreaded into rural areas, it was found that the 
credit gaps still existed in rural lending. It was felt that to cater the needs of small and 
marginal farmers, agriculture labourers, rural attains, SC and ST a separate credit 
agency was needed. Total number of banks branches increased eight-fold between 1969 
to 1991 and the bulk of the increase was on account of rural branches. The impact of 
this phenomenal growth was bringing down the population per branch from 60,000 in 
1969 to about 14,000 in 1991. 
Alter nationalization of banks, the more emphasis had been given in lending 
according to national priorities particidarly in favour of neglected and weaker section of 
the community so as to help them in their productive endeavours. Further, with greater 
emphasis on agriculture, integrated rural development programmer and development of 
small and tiny industries, the banking system is playing a crucial role by redirecting the 
flow of credit on priority basis towards the rural areas. Also, the banks accepted the 
challenges of spreading banking to difiScult areas of the country and bridging the gap 
between backward and non-backward regions by introducing innovative programmes 
like the Service Area Approach and the Lead Bank Scheme. Thus, strong and sustained 
efforts were made by banks in discharging their social responsibilities in other sector 
too. On the whole, the Indian banking system during the entire period of last two and a 
half decades had made an impressive and creditable progress. 
The third phase which is regarded as period of consolidation began in 1985 with 
a series of policy initiatives taken by the Central Bank. Relaxation of controls over the 
banks was initiated. During this period, there was marked slow down in the branch 
expansion. The process of consolidation called for action on several fronts. Individual 
banks had to pay attention to the preparation of action plan covering organization and 
structure, housekeeping, training, customer service, credit management, recovwy of 
loans, productivity and profitability. The banks were asked to introduce in a phased 
manner modem technology in operation following the recommendations of Rangarajan 
Committee on computerization in banks. 
The consequences of nationalization of banks ware that the number of banking 
companies came down drastically from 620 in 1949 to 89 in 1969. The nationalized 
banks accompanied by massive branch expansion gave fillip to deposit mobilization. 
The total deposits which stood a Rs, 908 crores in 1951 increased to Rs. 4646 crores by 
1969. In the subsequent eight years till 1987, the deposits increased by Rs. 1,02,699 
crores. They stood at Rs. 2,01,199 crores in 1991. Correspondingly, bank credit had 
also increased from Rs. 547 crores in 1951 to Rs. 3599 crores in 1969 and to Rs. 
121,865 crores in 1991. Similarly, there has been massive improvement in the 
'Financial Ratio', Ratio of finance claims to the national income, as also the Financial 
Intermediation Ratio-ratio of financial assets to physical assets. The Financial ratio 
which was less than 0.05 during 1951-55 reached 0.14 around the time of bank 
nationalization, crossed 0.45 by the end of 1980s. The Financial Intermediation ratio 
increased from a low 0.08 percent in 1951-55 to about 1.18 in the years immediately 
after nationalization and touched 2.5 by tiie end of eighties. Despite the commendable 
progress serious problems was emerged as a decline in productivity and efficiency and 
erosion of the profitability of the banking sector. 
The decline in the interest income available to banks on the one hand and the 
deterioration in the quality of loan portfolio both of the priority sector and traditional 
sector resulted in accumulation of non-performing assets on the other. The public sector 
banks, although have a large number of rural branches, only a small proportion of their 
business is generated by these branches. It is estimated that 41 percent of PSBs 
branches handle only 10 percent of total advances and the contribution of rural 
branches to deposit mobilization is only 14 percent. It is labour-intensive process to 
handle a large number of small deposit accounts and this has resulted in low average 
business per employee in rural branches. These branches have to service 39 percent of 
small borrowing accounts, a major number of which are less revenue generating. In the 
case of nationalized banks, other than State Bank group, profitability was quite low 
during 1991-92 and 1992-93. This posted huge losses to Rs. 3648 crores. In the case of 
private sector banks too the net profits have declined from Rs. 77 crores in 1991-92 to 
Rs. 60 crores in 1992-93, the foreign banks too had sustained losses in 1992-93. These 
losses in 1992-93 resulted in non-performing assets. 
Until the early 1990s, the bankmg sector suffered from lack of competition, low 
capital base, low productivity and high intermediation cost. After the nationalization of 
large banks in 1969 and 1980, government-owned banks have dominated the banking 
sector. The role of technology was minimal and the quality of service was not given 
adequate importance. Banks also did not follow proper risk management system and 
the prudential standards were week. All these result in poor asset quality and low 
profitability (Bhasin, Niti 2006)'. 
The initiation of financial sector reforms in the early 1990s was essentially to 
bring about a transformation in the structure, efficiency and stability of financial 
markets, as also an integration of the markets. Some of the important structural changes 
enable by financial sector reforms related to introduction of free pricing of financial 
assets in almost all segments, relaxation of quantitative restrictions, removal of barriers 
to entry, new methods of flotation/issuance of securities, increase in the number of 
instruments and enlarge participation, improvement in tradmg clearing, and settlement 
practices, and improvement in information flows, transparency and disclosure practices. 
The key objective of reforms in the banking sector in India has been to enhance the 
stability and efficiency of banks. 
The first generation banking reforms resulted in establishment of new private 
banks and about 20 new foreign banks after 1993. The entry of modem, professional 
private sector banks and foreign banks has enhanced competition. With the 
deregulation of interest rates of both for advances as well as deposits, competition 
between different bank groups and between banks in the same group has become 
intense. What is more important is that apart from growth of banks and commercial 
banking, various other financial and hire-purchase companies, housing finance 
companies etc., which are sponsored by banks have cropped up. The gross and net 
NPAs of banking system as percentage of advances as well as of total assets have 
declined. 
In other words, in the post-nationalization period, the scale and scope of 
banking activities have undergone substantial changes due to growing needs of the 
economy in the context of changing business scenario in the increasing competitive 
environment. However, over the years it is found that the performance of banking 
sector has been in mixed one-strong in widening the business coverage but weak in 
terms of sustainability and viability. The Narasimham Committee and the process of 
financial sector reforms initiated by the government since 1991 have brought into a 
sharp focus the need to improve operational efficiency and profitability of banks. The 
Reserve Bank has modified the format of banks' balance sheets and profit and loss 
account since 1991-92. In other words, following the recommendation of Narasimham 
Committee Report, the Indian banking system has been passing through an interestmg 
phase. Reforms in banking sector are being implemented in a phased manner. 
In 1998, the Committee submitted its second Report regarding banking sector. 
It made wide-ranging recommendations recovering entire issues firom capital adequacy, 
asset quality, NPAs, prudential norms, asset-liability management, earnings and profit, 
mergers and acquisitions, reduction in government shareholders to 33 percent m public 
sector banks, the creation of global-sized banks, recasting banks boards to revamping 
banking legislation. The second generation reforms looked at three inter-related issues: 
• measures that need to be taken to strengthen the foundations of banking system, 
• streamlining procedures, upgrading technology and himian resource 
development, and 
• structural changes in the system. 
1.2 Review of Literature: 
A number of research studies have been conducted on various aspects of 
banking sector. Some studies relating to banking sector reforms are reviewed below. 
Angadi (1983)^ highlighted the extent of concentration of priority sector 
advances in general and ^ricultural advances in particular, in some selected states of 
India. A multiple regression technique, based on OLS (ordinary least square) method, 
was employed to assess the extent of the impact of explanatory variables on agriculture 
advances. The study revealed that degree of concentration both with respect to priority 
sector advances and agricultural advances in the selected states was less in 1979 as 
compared to those in the year 1969-70. The empirical evidence demonstrated that 
uneven banking facilities, total cropped area and certam other socio-economic factors 
like extent of irrigated and dry farms, size of the farms, area under high- yielding and 
low yielding varieties, cash and non-cash crops, mechanized and non-mechanized 
farms, use of chemicals and fertilizers have been the major factors responsible for 
unequal distribution of agriculture advances. 
Angadi and Dewraj (1983)^ measured productivity of Indian banks for the 
period 1970-80. They took total working funds (deposits and credits) as ou^ut 
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indicator while establishment expenses as input indicator. They calculated return per 
rupee of establishment expenses. The result indicated that the productivity of the 
banking system as a whole witnessed a considerable decline during the years 1970-75. 
Between the years 1975-78, the productivity improved but again in the year 1979 it 
declined. Among the bank groups, the productivity of public sector banks, v^^ch 
declined to 45.5 percent in 1975 from 53.3 percent in 1970 improved in 1977. 
However, it showed a sharp decline in 1980. The productivity of private sector banks, 
which had been mostly lower than that of other bank-groups, showed an improvement 
in 1979. In case of foreign banks the productivity was always higher than other bank 
groups. They concluded tiiat the rapid expansion in rural and semi-urban commercial 
banks in the initial period of nationaliaation, without corresponding growth in business 
of these offices, contributed to the deceleration in productivity of these banks. 
Chakravartee Committee (1985)'* was set up to review the working of the 
monetary system in hidia. It was of the view that there would be a controlled 
competition among the banks. It recommended for rationalization of concessional 
interest rates and revision in the yields on dated securities and in the discount rates of 
treasury bills. The removal of ceiling of inter-bank call money rates and a stricter credit 
discipline were also suggested. 
The focal point of the study made by Vashisht (1987)^ was to evaluate the 
trends and progress of commercial banks in India during the period 1971 to 1983. The 
ratio analysis is used to evaluate the performance of commercial banks with respect to 
different inchcators. However, overall performance of each bank is assessed with the 
help of Relative Growth Indices. The analysis revealed that commercial banks did very 
well with respect to branch expansions, deposit mobilization, credit disbursement and 
priority sector advances. However, it was observed that banks are plagued with the 
problem of declining profitability. Indian Overseas Bank secured the top position and 
Dena Bank was placed at the bottom with respect to overall performance indices. 
Naidu (1989)^ made an attempt to critically analyze the growth as well as role of 
banking in rural development in India. It was observed that after nationalization the 
banking system made rapid strides in branch expansion, in deposit mobilization and in 
credit deployment. It was concluded that regional rural banks have done well in 
achieving their targets in the past years, and have the potential to stand on their own, 
without any link to sponsored bank. 
Pandey (1989)' made a retrospection of the banking trends and analyzed the 
prospects of growth in the business of commercial banks in view of the multi-
dimensional problems, which they are facing in the fast changing economic scenario. It 
was observed that though the banks have been doing considerably well, yet in ftiture 
they would have to act as a supreme financial market and should invest in non-
traditional sectors to maintain their viability in view of the emerging challenges. 
Chakrabarty (1990)* studied the impact of credit policy on profitability and 
viability of Indian banking system. The analysis indicated that banks have become loss 
making units and whatever profit is recorded is at the cost of long- term viability of the 
banking system. It is suggested that the only alternative left is to make the necessary 
changes in the credit policy, in general, and interest rate structure in particular, which 
alone can improve the overall profitability of the banks. 
Goiporia Committee (1991)' made wide-ranging recommendations to improve 
the customer services in the commercial banking. It recommended for opening up of 
specialized branches focusing on international banking, industrial finance and small-
scale industries. It suggested for compensating the customers for delay in collection of 
cheques, payment of mail transfer, telegraphic transfer etc. The Conmiittee also 
recommended for the technological up-gradation, continuous review of working of the 
banking system, adherence of procedures in time, and making bank deposits more 
attractive by raising rates on saving bank deposits. 
Subrahmanyam (1991)'° observed that the liberalization measures of the late 
80's have not led to promote the efficiency and stability in the banking sector. In otdci 
to have better performance of banking sector, it is important that further doses of 
liberalization should be introduced in this sector. The problems relating to operatii^ 
expenses and interest rates structure are also reviewed in detail. It is suggested that the 
main focus of reforms should be the restoration of financial health of the banks but not 
privatization as such. 
Singh (1992)" carried out a comprehensive study to analyze the trends in the 
productivity of the Indian banking mdustry since nationalization of 14 major banks in 
1969. The State Bank of India and its subsidiaries along with the banks nationalized in 
1969 were considered for the analysis. He performed cross sectional and inter-temporal 
analysis on the basis of 17 indicators. The indicators were deposit per employee; credit 
per employee; business per employee; deposit per branch; credit per branch; business 
per branch; total expenditure per branch; establishment expenditure a percentage of 
total earnings; establishment expenditure as percentage of total earnings; volume of 
business per Rs. 100 of establishment expenses; volume of business per Rs. 100 of total 
expenditure. The results revealed that all the banks under study showed improvement in 
their productivity except the UCO bank, which showed decline in productivity from all 
angles. He suggested that banks should monitor the productivity and its growth on the 
basis of key indicators identified by hun. All banks should create productivity cells. 
These ceils should develop and implement productivity improvement programs. He 
further suggested that the information relating to productivity should become part of the 
annual reports of banks. 
Boovendran (1993)'^ suggested that the liberalization of the Indian economy 
would be more effective and meaningfiil if the complex rules and regulations relating to 
maintenance of cash reserve ratio/statutory ratio were simplified. The banks will be 
greatly benefited fiirther if time liabilities and statutory liquidity ratio are also 
redefined. 
Swami and Subrahmanyan (1993)'^  made a comparison between the level of 
efficiency in 28 public sector banks during the period 1971 to 1973, and 1987 to 1989. 
Compound aimual growth rates were calculated to analyze the increase in different 
banking indicators during this period. Taxonomic technique was used for driving a 
single measure of performance based on several indicators of banks' business activities. 
Amandeep (1993)''* studied the trends in profitability in commercial banks and 
examined the factors responsible for the erosion of bank profitability. He employed 
trend analysis and ratio analysis for this purpose. He observed that the banks needed to 
focus attention on the management of spread, burden, establishment expenditure, 
ancillary income and the post mobilization for improving their profitability. His results 
contradicted the traditional belief that in the post nationalization period, the profitability 
of Indian commercial banks declined mainly due to priority sector lending and rural 
banking. According to him, the social oWigations of banks were not major drag on the 
banks' profitability. Rather, default lied somewhere else, may be in the organizational 
structure, fimds management or overall efficiency of banking operations. 
Chidambaram and Alanielu (1994)'^  studied the problem of declining profit 
margin in Indian public sector banks as compared to their private sector counterparts. It 
was observed that in spite of similar social oWigations, ahnost all the private sector 
banks have been registering both high profits and high rate of growth, with respect to 
deposits, advances and reserves as compared to public sector banks. The regional 
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orientation, better customer services, proper monitoring of advances and appropriate 
marketing strategies are the secrets behind the success of private sector banks. 
Ghosh Committee (1995)'^ suggested number of precautions, which the banks 
should adopt to avoid the incidents of frauds and malpractice in them. It recommended 
the joint-custody, daai responsibility of cash and other valuable and reporting of 
transaction in currency chests and purchase and sales in full detail to the Reserve Bank 
of India. 
A study sponsored by the World Bank (1995)*^ and done by a private 
consultancy organization analyzed the problems of poor profitability of commercial 
banks and regional rural banks in India during early 1990's. The study revealed that on 
account of comparatively small operating income on the one hand, and high operating 
expenses on the other, the commercial banks have been incurring losses. It was 
si^gested that for commercial banks, minimum lending rate should be between 16.69 
and 17.6 percent. It was observed further, that the commercial banks can improve theu* 
financial health by reducing their operating cost as well as through decrease in loan loss 
provisions. Further, the study suggested that there should be a complete deregulation of 
interest rates in rural loans. The rural operations of the commercial banks can be self-
sustaining if loan appraisal and their repayment follow-up systems are tightened. 
Jadhav and Ajit (1996) analyzed the role of banks in economic development 
of India during the last five decades. It is observed that despite the overall progress 
made by banking system in terms of functional and geographical coverage doubts arise 
about the viability of the banking system in the coming period. Though financial sector 
reforms have enabled banks in India to clear their balance sheets and unprove their 
fimctioning yet they face challenges especially in the financial services like leasing, 
merchant banking, mutual funds, money market and in government securities. 
Joshi and Little (1996)'^ observed that on the eve of banking reforms Indian 
banking sector was financially unsound, unprofitable, and inefficient. They made a 
critical examination of the changes that have taken place in the banking sector after 
reforms. Further, what remains to be done with respect of pre-emption of bank 
resources, directed credit, deregulation of interest rates etc. in the field of banking 
sector were also elaborately discussed. 
Das (1997)^ ° in his study reviewed the overall efficiency (technical, allocation 
and scale) of public sector banks for the period 1990-96. The study found a decline in 
overall efficiency, due to fall in technical efficiency, which was not offset by an 
improvement in allocative efficiency. However, it pointed out that the deterioration in 
technical efficiency was mainly on account of few nationalized banks. 
Sarkar and Das (1997) '^ highlighted the performance of public, private and 
foreign banks by using measures of profitability, productivity and financial 
management for the year 1994-95. They found public sector banks competing poorly 
with the other two categories. However, they caution that no firm inference can be 
derived firom a comparison done for a single year. 
Athma and Srinivas (1997)^ ^ conducted a study to analyze the productivity in 
commercial banks group-wise i.e., public sector banks, private sector banks and foreign 
banks for the period 1982 to 1995. They measured two aspects of bank productivity. 
One aspect of productivity was the measurement of business (deposits plus advances) 
per branch and business per employee. The other aspect was the responsiveness 
(percentage variation in cost/percentage variation in earnings) and return on working 
funds. The results showed that the productivity-both per employee and per branch 
showed a rise for all the three bank groups it was relatively higher in the case of private 
sector and foreign banks. A high cost responsiveness resulted in a lower productivity 
and vice versa. An increase trend was noticed in the percentage of returns on the 
working funds over the period of study in case of private sector banks. A negative 
percentage for foreign banks in the year 1992-1993 was noticed, A^ diich was reversed in 
the very next year. All the three bank groups made efforts to improve their productivity 
in 1994-95 and succeeded in earning profits by recovering the operative costs fully. The 
study concluded that the efficient operations prompt recoveries, proper appraisal of 
credit risks and avoidance of risky investments were the key to profitability in banking. 
Sarkar and Das (1997)^ ^ examined the inter-bank performance differences in the 
efficiency of the banking sector with respect to various indicators of profitability, 
productivity and financial management for the year 1994-95. For each of the 
performance criteria, the area-specific efficiency index was worked out based on 15 
indicators using the principal component analysis. Fifteen indicators used were: net 
profit as percentage of total income, return on assets, return on equity, net profit as 
percentage to deposits, per employee, income per employee, spread per employee, 
number of accounts per employee, yield on assets, yield on advances, yield on 
investment, spread as percentage to establishment expenses, spread as percentage to 
total assets. The result showed that out of the top 25 banks, 22 banks were the foreign 
banks and remaining 3 banks belonged to the private sector bank group. Among the 
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nationalized banks, the Oriental Bank of Commerce showed a relatively better 
performance as compared to the other nationalized banks. They concluded that there 
were wide differences in efficiency among banks with different ownership patterns. 
The performance of public sector banks was relatively poor as compared to other 
categories of banks. This was due to their typical organizational culture, technological 
development, employment pattern, managerial skills etc. 
Shivpuje, C.R. and Kaveri, V. S. (1997)^ '* 'study was basically confined to 
identifying the factor influencmg NPAs, suggesting measures that would prevent the 
growth of NPAs and affect their speedy recovery. The emphasis was laid on internal 
factor over which banks and financial institutions have direct control. They concluded 
that NP A problems could be solved if proper care of internal factor is taken or in other 
words recovery firom NPAs is possible if efforts of the banks and financial institutions 
are strengthened. They observed that though the branch managers were quite clear 
about the RBI gmdelines on the classification of advances, they varied the actual 
classification of advances made by them based on their personal experience with 
different borrowers. This trend, in particular, was observed in trading accounts with 
persisting irregularity in cash credit account for long time. 
Bhattacharya (1997)^ ^ studied the impact of the limited liberalization initiated 
before the deregulation of the nineties on the performance of the different categories of 
banks. The study covered 70 banks for the period 1986-91. They constructed one grand 
frontier for the entire period and measured technical efficiency of banks under study. 
He found that the public sector banks had the highest efficiency among the three 
categories with foreign and private banks having much lower efficiencies. However, 
public sector banks started showing a decline in efficiency after 1987, private banks 
showed no change and foreign banks showed sharp rise in efficiency. The main results 
accord with the general perception that in the nationalization era, public sector banks 
were successful in achieving their principal objective of deposit and loan expansion. 
Sudhakar, V. K. (1998)^ ^ attempted to analyze the polices pursued by the banks 
with focus on PSBs since their NPA level was considerably high. The policies followed 
by different banks vary, based on the magnitude of the problem and limitation imposed 
by the practices they follow. He made an attempt to relate incidence of NPAs to 
industry geographical area, scheme of finance, sector, etc. His important findings were; 
(i) The appraisal was just the justification of sanction, i.e. decision to sanction 
precedes appraisal. 
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(ii) Credit monitoring and credit appraisal should be viewed complementary 
function and current system is ineffective, 
(iii) Lack of system, lack of staff accountability, lack of legal department, etc. 
were the major factors causing hurdles in the recovery of NPAs. 
Deb (1998)^ ^ critically studied the growth of banking system in India covering 
the period from 1966 to 1987. The analysis revealed that the structure of the banking 
system changed considerably over the years. It was further pointed out that the 
quantitative growth of the public sector banks was no doubt significant in some of the 
areas, but that the quantitative growth of the public sector bank was no doubt 
significant in some of the areas, but quantitative improvement, by and large lacked in 
desired standard. In spite of substantial increase in deposit mobilization, their share in 
national income continued to be very low. It was concluded that the public sector banks 
were neither always guided by the consideration of returns nor were they very much 
concerned with development strategies. 
Shajahan (1998)^ * concluded in his study that banking sector reforms since the 
beginning of the 1990's have almost brought the priority sector credit to a halt. It ia 
mainly on account of the failing share of the poorer states in total credit deployment, 
that the overall priority sector bank credit appears to have deteriorated. The manner, in 
which priority sector is targeted by linking it to total bank credit rather to bank deposits, 
the position of the poorer states with respect to priority sector bank credit seemed to 
have worsened. 
The focus of the study made by Das (1999)^' was to compare the inter-bank 
performance of the public sector banks for three years (1992, 1995 and 1998) in the 
post-reform period. He found a certain convergence taking place in the performance of 
the banks during the period under study. It was observed that whereas an increase in 
emphasis on non-interest income is a welcome change but the banks behaviuor to opt 
for risk free investments over risky loans may have serious effects on the economy. 
Khanna (1999)^ ° while studying the impact of financial reforms on industrial 
sector in India observed that the banking sector reforms have failed to achieve their 
goal of making this sector more efficient. It was observed that there has been hardening 
of interest rates instead of the cheaper credit that was promised. The analysis revealed 
that the cost of bank finance has risen sharply after the reforms and the availability of 
the credit to private sector too has curtailed. Bank loans as a proportion of total 
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financing to commercial sector declined in 1993 and 1994 as compared to 1998-89. The 
reforms have number of adverse effects on the industrial sector. 
Ambimiaini and Niranjana (1999)^ ^ in their study attempted to analyze the likely 
impact of social objectives and priority sector lending on bank profitability. They 
observed that as the target set for priority sector lending increased form 24.04 percent 
in 1969 to 46.15 percent in 1984, the profit percentage declined fi-om 1.2 percent to 
0.30 percent. When the target set was reduced to 41.93 percent during 189-90, the 
profit percentage increased to 0.60 percent. Also, the profitability of banks declined 
consistently from 0.17 per cent in 1969 to 0.08 percent in 1984 but rose to a level of 
0.13 percent in 1989-90. Hence, an adverse impact of priority sector lending on profits 
and profitability was observed. The interest income loss to public sector banks due to 
priority sector advances was Rs. 34.13 crores in 1974, which rose to the maximum of 
Rs, 973.25 crores in 1990-91 and then decreased to Rs. 532.08 crores in 1991-92. 
During 1969-1993, the total quantum of loss was Rs. 6483.01 crores of which 91 
percent of the income loss was on account of agriculture, export and small scale 
industries. 
Sowani (1999)^ ^ tried to identify various factors affecting the banks' 
profitability. As per the study, the nationalized banks' profitability had always been 
quite low and recorded huge losses. As percentage of working fimds, net profits of 
these banks were observed to be at a level of -2.2 percent and -0.1 percent during 1996 
and 1997 respectively. However, the profitability of foreign banks was always observed 
to be at a better level. Among the factors influencing the profitability of banks, the high 
level of NPAs was registered as the major factor. High levels of CRR and SLR, a large 
proportion of bank deposits (41.0 percent) allocated to the priority sector and the high 
cost of operation of public sector banks were the other factors which negatively 
influenced the profitability of public sector banks. 
Baiju S. and Gabriel Simon Thattil (2000)" highlighted the magnitude of NPAs 
in commercial banking sector of India taking the current position of scheduled 
commercial banks. They had graded all the four categories, i.e. SBI and its associates, 
nationalized banks, other scheduled commercial banks and foreign banks, in very good, 
good, bad and worst group on the basis of NPAs and capital adequacy. They concluded 
that banks, which got a 'very good' rating in terms of their NPAs, revealed that such 
banks were new private banks or foreign banks. One of reason given was that such 
banks had low network of branches, specially in rural areas. In addition, these banks 
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stressed upon a more stringent scrutiny of proposal and monitoring of usage for huge 
loans, which were main reason for the major chunk of NPAs. They were of the opinion 
that in the case of priority lending and lending imder government sponsored schemes, 
the need under the service area of each branch should be assessed and purpose-based 
lending should be undertaken. A strong banking culture ought to be developed, as 
diversion of funds and default in repayment will never be tolerated even to the smallest 
extent. 
Niettime and Kuruba (2000)^ '* observed that the pace of reforms in banking 
sector in bidia is definitely encouraging and giving positive signals of structural 
changes in the financial sector. However, it was opined that the reforms would be 
successfiiUy only if the level of NPAs is reduced, fa order to tackle the problem of 
NPAs there is need for legal reforms. It is the attitude and efficiency of the banking 
authorities, which have to go a long way in making the banking reforms operationally 
and functionally effective. 
The Verma Committee (2000)^ ^ identified and examined the problems of weak 
banks and suggested a strategic plan of financial, organizational and operational 
restructuring for them. The Committee on the basis of seven parameters covering 
solvency, eammg c£q)acity and profitability evaluated the public sector banks. These 
were, CAR-8 percent, coverage ratio-0.50 percent, return on assets median level, net 
interest margm-median level, profit to average workmg funds-median level, ration of 
cost to income -median level, and ration of staff cost to income-median level for the 
year 1997-98 and 1998-99. All the public sector banks were further categorized into 
five groups. IB, UCO and UNBOI were identified as weak banks. The Committee 
recommended recapitalization of these banks subject to strict conditionality relating to 
operational restructuring. 
Das (2000)^ ^ estimated and compared the various efficiency measures of 27 
public sector banks in fadia for the year ending 31"' March, 1998 under the fi-amework 
of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. He also examined the issue of how far a 
bank can mcrease its outputs by augmenting its efficiency through optimal deployment 
of resources. The results showed that during the year 1998 the public sector banks had 
the scope of producing 1.23 times of the present amount of outputs from the same 
inputs. The components of the efficiency considered in the study were overall 
efficiency. The technical efficiency of the State Bank group stood at 96.5 percent which 
was significantly higher than that of the nationalized banks which stood at 75.1 percent. 
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There was very little variation in the allocative efficiency of all banks. The inefficiency 
was due to under utilization or wasting of inputs as well as the incorrect choice of input 
combination. The public sector banks were less efficient in dealing with the distribution 
of mobilized fimds among competing demands. He conducted regression analysis to 
determine whether the efficiency scores were related to the size of the banks. The bank 
size was measured in terms of deposits and staff-strength. The results showed that there 
was negative relationship between the efficiency scores and the bank size. He 
suggested that with the existing level of non-performing assets the banks need to 
concentrate on business with the existing branches. 
Pal, Mukheqee and Nath, (2000)^' examined the productivity of 68 major 
Indian commercial banks for the year 1999. They took 27 public sector banks and 
21 foreign banks for their study. They also identified weak banks. The five ou^ut 
variables taken by them were: deposits, net profits, advances, non-interest income and 
spread. The five input parameters taken were net worth, borrowings operating 
expenses, number of employees in the country and number of bank branches in the 
country. They employed the CCR out put oriented DEA model to find out the relative 
efficiency of the 68 Indian banks. The results showed that 16 banks were CCR efficient 
(efficiency=l). The average efficiency figure for the banks came out to be 0.90889. 45 
banks had efficiency rating greater than 0.9 and out of these 50 per cent were private 
banks. They ranked the ICICI Bank, the UTI Bank, the Citi Bank, the Bank of America 
and the Jammu and Kashmir Bank as top five best banks and the Indian Bank, the UCO 
Bank, the Credit Agricole Indo Suez, the United Bank of India and the Banque National 
De Paris as the top five worst banks. They concluded that the privately-owned banks 
performed better than the foreign owned banks. 
Singh (2001)^ * made an attempt to assess the impact of the reforms on the 
operational performance and efficiency of the commercial banks in India. The ratio 
analysis has been used as a major tool for assessing the performance of the selected 
commercial banks. The study revealed that total income/working fimds/total 
advanced/total deposits have improved in the post-reform periods against the pre-
reform periods in most of the banks. Total income, interest earned, other income, 
spread, total expense, interest expended, operating expenses and establishment 
expenses are comparatively more consistent in the post-reform periods. The hypothesis 
that the profitability position has improved in post-reform periods may be accepted to 
some extent. It was observed that in the public sector banks the size of NPAs has also 
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reduced to some extent and quality of service has improved in the post-reform periods. 
The priority sector lending has registered a decline in the deregulation area. 
Ramachandra Reddy B., Vijayulu Reddy and Sakunthala (2001)^ ^ focused their 
attention on the seriousness of NPAs in public sector banks. They argued that with the 
introduction of international norms of Income Recognition, Asset Classification and 
Provisioning m the banking sector, managing NPAs had emerged as one of the major 
challenges facing the public sector banks. They feh that total elimination of NPAs is 
not possible in the banking business owing to externalities but their incidence can be 
minimized. To reduce the seriousness of the problem, they suggest that the banks 
should adopt proper policy for appraisal, supervision and follow-up of advances; 
special recovery cells may be set up at regional/ zonal levels; Recovery Offices should 
be qjpointed at branches having sizeable NPAs and their recovery progress may be 
monitored on monthly basis. They further suggested that the RBI has to publish the 
names of the defaulters of big loans and advances of banks. Unless the willful 
defaulters are compelled to do so with the threat of social exposure, confiscation of 
properties and imprisonment, the NPAs can not recovered. 
Abhiman Das (2002)^ *^  tried to find relationship among capital, non-performing 
loans and productivity in Indian context using the data on PSBs for the period 1995-96 
through 2000-2001. He found that explanatory power of net NPAs equation was 
reasonably high, ranging from 88 to 96 percent. Capital adequacy had a negative and 
significant effect. This implied that PSBs as a whole, relatively more capital tends to be 
associated with less credit risk. Annual growth rate of total loans had a negative effect 
on bad loans. The important aspect of finding was that higher productivity leads to drop 
in net NPAs, especially for small banks. Contrary to the widely held belief, loan to 
priority sector did not necessarily lead to high net NPAs, especially for small banks. 
D'Souza (2002)'*' in his study evaluated the performance of public sector, 
private sector and foreign banks during the period 1991 to 1999-2000. The efficiency of 
the banking system was measured in terms of spread/working funds ratio and 
turnover/employees ratio. With reference to the spread working fimds ratio the 
efficiency of the commercial banks as a whole has declined as the efficiency of the 
private and foreign banks has improved over the course of 1990s. Though the turn 
over/employee ratio has risen in the public sector banks, the turnover per employee in 
the private and foreign banks doubled relative to the ratio of public sector banks during 
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this decade. However, the analysis revealed that the profitability of the public sector 
banks in the late nineties improved relatively to that of private and foreign banks. 
Sreekantaradhya (2004/^ argues that even though the reforms measures have 
been recommended and adopted in Indian banking system. The measures have laid the 
base for a sound and viable banking system. But the problems of the banking sector are 
far from over. The main areas of concern are profitability, adequacy of capital, non-
performing assets, functionary of the supervisory system, and adequate flow of credit to 
the rural sector and SSIs and human resource development in the banking sector. 
Rudra Sensarma (2005)'*^  examined efficiency of all scheduled commercial 
banks in India for vs^om data was available for the period 1986-2003. He used the 
technique of stochastic fix)ntier analysis to estimate bank-specific cost and profit 
efficiency and found that while cost efficiency of the banking industry increased during 
the period, profit efficiency underwent a decline. This result is expected in an emerging 
economy imdergoing a process of deregulation. In terms of bank groups, domestic 
banks appear to be more efficient than foreign banks. 
Rakesh Chakrabrati (2006)^ argues that privatization is not solution for the 
woes of the public sector banks. It is not ownership itself but the existence of a market 
for corporate control and the resulting market discipline on managerial decisions that 
makes the real difference. Public sector banks are already feeling the heat of 
competition from new entrants in the banking sector. It is argued that the privatization 
of public sector banks has its own risks and it is not clear that the expected benefits 
necessarily justify assuming those risks. Perhaps bringing more transparency in public 
sector banking decisions and subjecting these banks to competitive pressures will 
accomplish the improvements in their performance rather than selling them lock, stock 
and barrel to private parties. 
P. Kannan (2007)'*^ argued that during the banking reforms, banking policy 
enhanced competition and provided greater opportunities for exercise of what may be 
called genuine corporate element in each bank to replace the elements of coordinated 
actions of all entities as a 'joint family' to fulfill predetermined plan priorities. Greater 
competition has been infused in the banking system by permitting entry of private 
sector banks and liberal licensing of more branches by foreign banks and the entry of 
new foreign banks. With the development of a multi-institutional stiiicture in the 
financial sector, emphasis is on efficiency, banks have had to improve eflBciency to 
ensure survival. 
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T. T. Ram Mohan (2007/^ argued that the public sector baidcs had shown a 
remarkable transformation in the post-reform period. Profitability is comparable to 
international banks, efficiency and stability have improved and there is a convergence 
between PSBs and private banks. But the PSBs will be severely tested as 
disintermediation proceeds apace on both the asset and liability sides. Their survival 
depends on their ability to rise to the challenges ahead. Both unions as well as 
government in its capacity as owner have an important role to play in ensuring that 
PSBs are well prepared to meet these challenges. 
1.3 Objective of the Study: 
Banking sector reforms is an important element of over all economic 
reforms of our country. Before 1991, the balance sheet of the performance of banking 
sector in India was a mixed one, i.e. strong in widening the credit coverage, but weak as 
far as viability and sustainability were concerned. The low productivity, low efficiency 
and erosion of profitability of the banking sector were diagnosed to be caused due to 
following reasons: 
• In directed investment and credit programme areas, banks were earning much less 
than what they could do by alternate deployment of funds. 
• Administered interest rates for both deposits and advances, which meant banks, 
had little control over their profitability. 
• Contamination of the loan portfolio, much of which are conceited due to lack of 
standard yardsticks for identification and provisioning of impaired debts. 
• Banks suffered fi-om excessive administrative and political interference in their 
internal management and credit decision. 
Hence by 1990, there was cause for serious concern on account of poor 
financial condition of banks. The crisis faced by the Indian banking sector paved the 
way for extensive banking sector reforms. Despite the impressive widening of banking 
sector in last three decades, there was a general consensus that it had not actually 
become sound and vibrant as it needed to be. So the deficiencies of Indian banking 
sector and the world - wide trend towards economic liberalization promoted the Indian 
authorities also to go in for banking sector reforms as part of general economic 
structural adjustinent programme (Akhtar, S. M. Jawed, 2006/^ The philosophy 
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behind the banking sector refonns was claimed to be to promote a diversified, efficient 
and competitive banking sector with the ultimate objective of improving the allocative 
efficiency of available resources, increasing the return on investments and promoting 
an accelerated growth of the real sector of the economy. More specifically, there are 
following reasons which bring out the rationale of banking sector reforms in India. 
• The development in banking sector needed to support the progressive changes 
taking place in industry, trade and fiscal sector. 
• Before the reforms, the priority sector lending created imbalances in the sectoral 
distribution of bank credit. So there was a need to transform the system of priority 
sector lending into a more selective and focused arrangement taking into account 
the imperatives of societal concems for assisting the truly weaker sections and 
tiny units. 
• A genuinely competitive banking sector called for review of interest rate 
structure in areas where it stood regulated, so that individual rates are allowed to 
reflect liquidity, maturity and risk of different instruments and the structure is 
attuned to achieving a more efficient mobilization and also deployment of scarce 
resources. 
• Inefficiencies in the banking system tended to make the cost of intermediation 
unduly high, the changing environment of competition, called for a different work 
and management ethos, much more professionally oriented and goal and 
performance determined. 
• These reforms were required to seek greater competition between banks, with a 
move towards level playing fields as between public and private sector banks. 
This increased competition would provide an efficient system of financial 
intermediation, with diversified banks catering to the varied needs of various 
sectors of the economy. 
Thus, to put Indian banking on a sound footing, against the background of 
increasing global integration of the Indian economy, some major reforms were required 
to be undertaken. 
With the nationalization of banks in 1969 and 1980, impressive quantitative 
achievements were made in the resource mobilization and extending credit reach. 
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However, certain weaknesses such as decline in productivity and efficiency and erosion 
in profitability had developed in systems which were to be addressed to enable the 
financial system to play an effective role in a competitive environment. Keeping in 
view this objective the Narasimham Committee on financial system was set up. The 
Committee made a number of recommendations aimed at improving productivity, 
efficiency and profitability of the banking system on the one hand and providing it 
greater operational flexibility and fimctional autonomy in decision-making on the other. 
Some of the major steps taken in the direction of banking sector reforms are 
progressive reduction of reserve requirements to correct the impact of directed 
investment on the profitability of banks, deregulation of complex and administered 
interest rate structure to move to market determined rates and introduction of prudential 
norms for assets classification, income recognition and provisioning in order to remove 
subjectivity etc. The govenunent implemented major reforms as envisaged by 
benchmark Report of Narasimham Committee, which have revolutionized the banking 
sector being the heart line of financial markets and moreover facilitated the much 
awaited paradigm shift firom a highly regulated one to market-oriented one. 
In the post-liberalization era, the Reserve Bank has initiated several measures to 
ensure safety and sotmdness of the banking system and at the same time encouraging 
banks to play an effective role in accelerating the growth process. It has been 
recognized that the Indian banking system should be in tune with well laid down 
international standards of capital adequacy and prudential norms. Banks have also been 
encouraged to adopt appropriate internal control system and corporate governance 
procedures to foresee and manage all types of risks. 
In the present study entitied "Banking Sector Reforms in India -An 
Evaluation" an attempt has been made to analyze the banking sector reforms with 
following objectives: 
i. To give a brief historical background on the origin and growth of the banking 
system in India; 
ii. To examine various policy measures of banking sector reforms; 
iii. To analyze the effect of reforms on operational autonomy and the performance 
of the banking sector; 
iv. To find out the major problems and challenges of banking sector; and 
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V. To suggest measures for improving efficiency and profitability of the 
commercial banks in India. 
1.4 Data Sources and Methodology Used: 
The study is exclusively based on the secondary data. The relevant data have 
been collected from the various issues of Economic Survey, Government of India, 
Report on Money and Baking, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), RBI 
Report on Trend and Progress in Banking in India, RBI Report on Currency and 
Finance, RBI Bulletin, Statistical Outline of India, Tata Services Ltd., and Report on 
Development Banking India, IDBI. Data have also been collected from Handbook of 
Statistics, Economic Political Weekly, and various websites such as www.rbi.org.in, 
www.iba.org.in, www.iibf.org.in, and Indiastat.com. 
The methodology used for evaluating banking sector reforms is based on 
different statistical tools. Student t-test and ANOVA are used to test whether there is 
any significant difference between the variables over different periods. Student t-test 
has been used to check the hypothesis as to whether there is any significant difference 
in the variables under study before the banking sector reforms based on Narshimhan 
Committee reconmiendations, that is, before and after 1992-93. It measures as to 
whether there is any significant difference between the means of the two samples. 
Generally the null hypothesis is formulated as if there is no significant difference 
between the variables and the alternate hypothesis is that there is a significant 
difference between the variables. In this study the hypotheses are tested under 5% level 
of significance. If the p value is greater than 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
and if the p value is less than 0.05 we accept the alternate hypothesis. The p value is the 
probability that the hypothesis being tested is true. If p value is 0.05 it indicates that the 
hypothesis has a 5 percent chance of being true. Generally p value of 0.05 is taken as 
the critical level for the rejection of the hypothesis. This level of significance is a 
measure of the degree of risk that a researcher makes while interpreting results. As it is 
the null hypothesis that is generally being tested we are always looking for low p values 
to reject this hypothesis. The smaller the p value the more confident we can be in the 
conclusions drawn from it. 
Secondly, ANOVA is used to test whether the differences among the variables 
for than two periods are significant are not. It is based on a comparison of two or more 
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estimates of the population variance. One estimate is obtained from variance among the 
sample means and the second estimate is obtained from variation that exists within 
samples. This ratio is referred to as F-ratio. If the calculated F-ratio value is less than 
the critical value or table value at the particular degrees of freedoms and significance 
level then we accept the null hypothesis or else we reject it. In this study ANOVA has 
been used to check the hypothesis as to whether there is any significant difference 
between three periods. The first period relates to the period before the Narasimham 
Committee (I) recommendation, that is, from 1980-81 to 1991-92. The second period is 
between the first Narasimham Committee recommendation and the second 
Narasimham Committee recommendations, that is from 1992-93 to 1998-99. And the 
third period relates to the post-Narasimham Committee (II) recommendations, that is, 
after 1999-00 to 2007-08. 
In order to study the year-wise growth in the variables percentage growth rates 
and compound annual growth rates (CAGR) have been calculated. It is a simple 
measure to get a look at the year-wise increase and decrease in the variables under 
study. The formula used is current year value minus last year's value, the whole divided 
by last year's value. Finally, compound annual growth rate is used to calculate the 
growth over a period of time. The compound annual growth rate is a number that 
represents a steady level of growth from the initial value to an ending value as it 
determines the average of year to year groAvth rate for time series data. For calculating 
CAGR the years have been coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on. The coded years have been 
taken as the independent variable and the natural log of the variable under study is 
taken as the dependent variables for obtaining the regression coefficients. The beta 
coefficient is processed further by taking the inverse and natural log and subtracted by 
one and then multiplied by 100, which finally yields the value of CAGR. 
1.5 Limitations of the Study: 
The study is limited for the period from 1980-81 to 2007-08. The study period 
has been divided into three sub-periods namely: 
First Phase (PI) -1980-81 tol991-92 (Prior Reforms Period); 
Second Phase (P2) -1992-93 to 1998-99 (First Reforms Period); and 
Third Phase (P3) -1999-00 to 2007-08 (Second Reforms Period). 
The major limitation of the study is that the impacts of banking sector reforms 
on the private sector banks have not been incorporated. The scope of the study is 
22 
limited to the scheduled commercial banks in general and public sector banks in 
particular. 
1.6 Scheme of the Study: 
The whole study is organized into six chapters. Chapter first introduces the 
main theme of the study, explaining about statement of the problems along with review 
of literatures, objective of the study, methodology, sources of data, and limitations of 
the study. 
Chapter second presents the evolution of the banking system in India during pre 
and post-nationalization era, and liberalization era as well as structure, and types of 
banking system in India. It also deals with the changing scenario of Indian banking 
system. It also incorporates the role of banking sector in growth performance of the 
economy. 
Chapter third explains rationale as well as objective, and policy measures of 
banking sector reforms in India. This section also explains recommendations and 
implementation of Narasimham Committee Report-I and II, It also describes about 
banking development in India during post- reforms period. 
Chapter four analyses performance of banking sector reforms in India which 
includes scheduled commercial banks and public sector banks. For evaluating the 
performance of the scheduled commercial banks the parameters such as branch 
expansion, term deposits, area-wise bank deposits, bank deposit by types, bank credit, 
state-wise distribution of credit, food and non-food credit etc. have been undertaken. 
Likewise, the parameters such as interest expended as percentage of total assets of 
public sector banks, interest income as percentage of total assets, return on assets, 
business per employee etc. have been undertaken for analyzing performance of public 
sector banks in India. 
Chapter five focuses on the issues and problems of banking sector reforms in 
India. It examines the priority sector lending and its social objectives. The problem of 
NPAs and its classification, incidence, consequences, reasons, measures as well as 
management has also been incorporated. It also describes Basel norms and challenges 
for India as well as capital adequacy standard in India. This section also explains the 
role of WTO in Indian banking system along with reforms initiated by the Indian 
government to strengthen the banking services at the international level. 
Chapter six of the thesis provides summary and conclusion of the study and 
some suggestions regarding banking sector reforms in India. 
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CHAPTER - 2 
BAMQNG SYSTEM IN 
INDIA 
BANKING SYSTEM IN INDIA 
The Indian banking has come from a long way from being a sleepy business 
institution to a highly proactive and dynamic entity. This transformation has been largely 
brought about by the large close of liberalization and economic reforms that allowed 
banks to explore new business opportunities rather than generating revenues from 
conventional streams (i.e. borrowing and lending). The banking in India is highly 
fragmented with 30 banking units contributing to almost 50 percent of deposits and 60 
percent of advances. Indian nationalized banks continue to be the major lenders in the 
economy due to their sheer size and penetrative networks which assures the high deposit 
mobilization. Conservative banking practices allowed Indian banks to be insulated 
partially from Asian currency crisis. Indian banks are now quoting at higher valuation 
when compared to banks in other Asian countries (viz. Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Philippines etc.) that have major problems linked to huge non-performing assets (NPAs) 
and payment defaults. Co-operative banks are nimble footed in approach and armed with 
efficient branch networks focus primarily on the 'high revenue' niche retail segments. 
The Indian banking has finally worked up to the competitive dynamics of the 'new' 
Indian market and is addressing the relevant issues to take on the multifarious challenges 
of globalization. Private banks have been fast on the uptake and are reorienting their 
strategies using the uitemet as a medium. The internet has emerged as the new and 
challenging frontier of marketing with the conventional physical world tenets being just 
as applicable like in any other marketing medium. 
2.1. Evolution of Banking System in India: 
Banking of India is as old as ancient Vedic period. However, the English 
agency house established the first modem bank known as The Bank of Hindustan at 
Calcutta inl770. After that Bengal Bank was set up in 1784 and around 1786 General 
Bank of India was established, but these banks could not provide the services due to their 
own crises (Panda N. M., 1997)'. The foundation of banking system was laid during the 
early part of the nineteenth century with the establishment of three Presidency banks, 
namely the Bank of Bengal (1806), Bank of Bombay (1840), and the Bank of Madras 
(1846). During the second half of the 19* century, some exchange banks and Indian 
joint-stock banks were also set up. In 1900, there were nine Indian joint-stock banks. 
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eight exchange banks, and three Presidency banks. The slow rate of growth of the 
banking business till the beginning of the present century was due to: 
(a) a high rate of failure banks, because most of them had been created in a 
speculative rush; 
(b) stagnant economic condition during the period; 
(c) declining prices; and 
(d) the passing of the Currency Act, 1861 which took away the power of banks to 
issue notes. 
During the first half of the present century, the banking system progressed 
rapidly. The deposits in banks increased from Rs. 82 crores in the year 1910 to Rs. 957 
crores in the year 1948. Except during the depression of the 1930s, the rate of economic 
progress was quite high in this period. In 1921 the three Presidency banks were 
combined to form the Imperial Bank of India (IBI). Although the Imperial Bank of India 
functioned as a quasi-central bank, the money market without a proper central bank until 
1935 when the Reserve Bank of hidia (RBI) was established (Bhole, L. M., 2005) .^ 
The period of last five decades has witnessed many macro-economic 
developments. The monetary and banking policies and the external situation has 
influenced the evolution of Indian banking in different ways. For this reason, it would be 
useful to analyze, in some detail, the evolution of Indian banking with reference to some 
distinct phase. The first phase covers the period from 1948 to 1968, (Pre-Nationalization 
Era), the second phase from 1969 to 1990, (Post-Nationalization Era) and the third 
phase, 1991 onwards (Globalization Era). The banking industry in India has grown in a 
specific kind of enviroiunent and with some defined objectives. This historicity of the 
environment and the objective has a strong bearing on the operations and management of 
present day. To appreciate any economic dimension of the banking industry in India in a 
proper prospective, understanding of the path of evolution of the industry is must. 
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Figure-1: Evolution of Banking Structure in India 
(i) Pre-Nationalization Era: 
The country inherited a banking system that was patterned on the style of 
British banking system. There were many joint-stock companies doing banking business 
and they were concentrating mostly in major cities. As a result of mushroom-like growth 
of banking companies, bank failures were very common in those days. In 1949, as many 
as 55 banks either went into liquidation or went out of banking business. The Banking 
Regulation Act, passed in 1948, provided the legal ftameworic for the regulation of the 
banking system by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The Act, which came into force in 
March 1949, imposed certain discipline on the joint-stock companies doing banking 
business in India. 
The banking system at the time of independence was deficient in many respects. 
The banks were largely urban-oriented and remained beyond the reach of the rural 
population. A large percentage of the rural peculation had to depend on the 
moneylenders as their main source of credit Banks' rural penetration was grossly 
inadequate, as agriculture was not considered as an economic proposition by banks in 
those days. Thus, the rural economy, in general, and the agricultural sector, in particular, 
which is the crucial segment of the Indian economy was not supported by banking 
system in any form. 
With the introduction of economic planning in 1951, the need was felt for 
aligning monetary and banking activity of the country with the requirements of planning. 
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The first step was taken to induct the commercial banks into rural credit, which was till 
then reserved for cooperative credit agencies who were waging a battle against money 
lenders. As a part of the process of geographical expansion of banking facilities to meet 
the credit needs of cooperatives, certain banking companies functioning earlier as 
princely states were converted into subsidiaries of State Bank of India (SBI), later, came 
to be known as Associate Banks of SBI. There was a shift in the method of lending from 
security based to capacity-to-produce-and-sell criteria. A review of ownership of bank 
deposits during this period revealed the nexus between business houses and banking 
companies, indicating the nature of control of banks by business houses. 
Even though Indian banking made considerable progress both functionally and in 
terms of geographical coverage during this period, there were still many rural and semi-
urban areas that were not served by banks. Moreover, large industries, big and 
established business houses tended to enjoy a major portion of the credit facilities. Vital 
and priority sectors, like agriculture, small scale industries, and exports did not receive 
the attention they deserved. Therefore, the government imposed ui 1968 social control 
over banks by amending banking laws. The objective was to achieve efficient 
distribution of banking resources in conformity with requirement of the economy and to 
meet the needs of the priority sectors. In this process RBI acquired wider powers in 
matters of appointment of heads of banks, directors on the boards of banks and auditors. 
The outcome of implementation of social control over banks is of interest. One is 
that the system of credit planning became an integral part of formulation of credit policy. 
Second, the introduction of the Lead Bank Scheme was to make the banking system 
function as an instrument of development. Under social control the banking system 
including smaller banks started gaining strength as evidenced by the absence of 
voluntary or compulsory mergers of banks. Thus, social control was a milestone in the 
evolution of banking system policy. This phase began in a sedate manner with the 
appointment in 1969 of the Banking Commission that was to reconmiend changes in 
structure, procedures and policy for the Indian banking system. However, the 
Commission did not have much time to complete its task as it was overtaken by swifl 
politico-economic developments, which culminated in the nationalization, on July 19, 
1969, of the 14 major Indian scheduled commercial banks, in the private sector. On April 
15,1980, six more private sector banks were nationalized, thus extending further the area 
of public control over the Indian banking system. Nationalization was seen as a major 
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step to ensure adequate credit flow into genuine productive areas in conformity with plan 
priorities. 
(ii) Post-Nationalization Era: 
The main objective of nationalization were growth; reduction in regional 
imbalances of economic activities; to make the banking system reach out to the small 
man in rural and semi-urban areas; extending banking facilities to areas hitherto not 
served by banks so that they not only mopped up potential savings but also meet the 
credit gaps in agriculture, small-scale industries, and other neglected sectors of the 
economy. The aim was to bring a large area of economic activity within the organized 
banking system. 
The two significant aspects of nationalization were therefore: rapid branch 
expansion and channeling of credit according to priorities. In the wake of nationalization, 
the growth and development of the Indian banking system was phenomenal. By the end 
of the second decade of nationalization, Indian banking was relatively sophisticated, with 
a wide network of branches, huge deposit resources and extensive credit operations. The 
outburst of banking activity during this period was such that it may be described as 
banking explosion. In terms of the branch licensing policy laid down by the RBI, the 
emphasis was on opening of branches in rural and semi-urban areas, backward regions 
and under-banked states so that inter-regional disparities could be reduced. 
Since nationalization and much prior to that, the banking in India has developed 
as a social banking. The banking has been used as an instrument for promoting socio-
economic objective, e.g., in the early 1970s, banking policy was extended for securing 
progressive reduction in income inequalities. The "Priority Sector Lending Scheme" was 
followed by the establishment of "Credit Guarantee Corporation" in 1971. This 
Corporation provided guarantees against the risk of default payment in respect of loans 
to various categories of small borrowers. Later on, a number of irmovations were made 
in the field of social banking and large volumes of credit were lent under programmes 
like "2-Point Economic Programme", Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(IRDP), and "Programmes for Self-Employment of Educated Unemployed Youth" 
(SEEUY). Many of the poverty-alleviation programmes in the nature of mass-lending 
scheme were adopted by the banking system of financing. 
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Although banks penetrated in rural areas, but amount of credit extended to the 
weaker sections of society was not satisfactory. In 1974 the Narasimham Committee 
went into these problems and recommended the establishment of Regional Rural Banks 
(RRB) under the 'Regional Rural Banks Act, 1975'. Banking in collaboration with 
central and state governments, set up Regional Rural Banks in selected regions where the 
co-cooperative system was weak and where commercial banks were not very active. 
The phenomenon growth of Indian banking system over the two decades prior to 
reforms gave rise to several problems which became more visible from the mid-eighties. 
The rapid and substantial growth rendered the banking system unwieldy because of 
constraints both internal and external to the banking system. To mention, these were: low 
operational efficiency, inadequate capital base, and high level of non-performing assets, 
low profitability, unhealthy balance sheet and unsatisfactory customer service. In this 
period, the viability of the banking system has come under question. 
The period prior to reforms, i.e., 1985-91 may be regarded as period of 
consolidation for banking system. This consolidation involved action on several fronts. 
Individual banks resorted to Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERPs) related to 
action plans covering organizational structure, house-keeping, training, customer service, 
credit management, recovery of loans, productivity, and profitability. As per the 
recommendation of the Rangrajan Committee on computerization in banks, banks were 
asked to introduce information technology into their operations. Although progress made 
by banking system in terms of geographical and functional coverage, resource 
mobilization, and credit deployed was tremendous, but it is still an unexplained 
characteristics of repressed financial system. 
(in) Liberalization Era: 
Third phase, the regime of reforms began with radical departure from regulated 
banking towards market oriented banking, as a result of introduction of financial reforms 
especially bankmg reforms. The evolution of banking industry in the liberalization era 
may be briefly simimed up as follows: 
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Table-1 
Evolution of Banking System in the Liberalization Regime 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1999 
2004 
2006 
Event 
First Narasimham Committee Report on Financial Sector Reforms 
Introduction of Weighted Capital Adequacy Norms and Prudential Norms 
Deregulation of Interest Rates, Prudential Norms for Non-Performing 
Assets 
Introduction of the Banking Ombudsman Scheme 
Concept of Local Area Banks Introduced 
First Shared Network System and Conditional Autonomy to Public Sector 
Units 
Second Narasimham Committee Report of Banking Sector Reforms 
Guidelines of Risk Management 
Verma Committee on Restructuring of Weak Public Sector Banks 
Basel Conmiittee II on New Capital Adequacy Framework 
Endorsement of document of Basel II Norms 
Implementation of Basel II Norms 
At the macro level, the reforms aim at removing the external constraints of the 
banking system as a whole and thus creating a climate in tune with liberalization. At the 
micro-level, the reforms are concerned with enabling the banking system to overcome 
the internal constraints on the function of banking organization. The basis of banking 
reforms was provided by the Committee on Financial Reforms (Narasimham Committee) 
which made recommendation in November 1991; and these recommendations are a land 
mark in the evolution of banking policy in the country, as these transformed the Indian 
banking system fh)m a highly regulated to a more market-oriented system. 
The government appointed a second high-level" Committee on Banking Sector 
Reforms" headed by M. Narasimham, to review the implementation of the first 
generation reforms. The Committee in its Report submitted in April 1998, made wide-
ranging recommendations covering various aspects of banking policy, institutional, 
supervisory and legislative dimension. The Conimittee came out with recommendations 
with regard to: capital adequacy; asset quality, non-performing assets; directed credit; 
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prudential norms; disclosure requirements; asset liability management; earnings and 
profitability; systems and methods in banks; restructuring including mergers and 
amalgamations; the reduction of government and RBI shareholding to 33 percent in the 
public sector banks; devising effective regulatory norms; and the review of banking 
sector laws. These recommendations are being progressively implemented. In a follow 
up of Narasimham Committee's (1998) reference to weak banks in the context of 
restructuring of banks, Verma Committee was appointed in 1999 with the specific task of 
identifying weak public sector banks, examining their problems and suggesting strategies 
for restructuring them. The recommendations of the Committee were approved in 
principle. 
The banking systems in India consist of the central bank, commercial banks, 
development banks, specialized banks, and foreign banks (Figure-2). 
(a) The Central bank of the country is known as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
R.B.I., the supreme monetary and banking authority in the country, has the 
responsibility to control the banking system in the country. 
(b) The Commercial banks are the joint-stock companies dealing in money and credit. 
- These banks mobilizing savings and make them available to large and small 
industrial and trading concerns with mainly for working capital requirement. 
(c) Cooperative banks, organized on imit banking principle, are mainly rural based, 
although, there are some banks operating in urban areas. The state funds for the 
agriculture are mainly routed through the state cooperative banks and central 
cooperative banks. 
(d) A number of apex banks are working in specialized areas. They include NABARD, 
IDBI, EXIM bank, and National Housing Bank. Among these the three most 
important term lending institutions are IDBI, ICICI, and IFCI. 
Thus, the organization of Indian banking system may be summed up as follows: 
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Figure-2: Organization of Banking in India 
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Under the Reserve Bank of hidia Act, 1934, banks were classified as scheduled 
banks (Figure-3).The scheduled banks entered in the second schedule of RBI Act, 1934. 
These are the banks with a paid-up capital and reserves of an aggregate value of not less 
than Rs. 5 lakhs and which satisfy RBI requirements laid down for this purpose. All 
commercial banks both Indian and foreign, regional rural banks, and cooperative banks 
are scheduled banks. On the other hand, non-scheduled banks are those which have not 
been included in the second scheduled of RBI Act, 1934. At present there very few non-
scheduled banks in India. 
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Figure-3: The Structure of Scheduled Banking in India 
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Scheduled commercial banks constitute the dominant section of the banking 
system. As on March 31, 2007 bidian banking system composed of 363 scheduled 
commercial banks in all. There are 196 regional rural banks and 93 other commercial 
banks. Out of this 93 banks, public sector banks (PSBs) are 27 in number, private sector 
banks are 30 and the foreign banks are 36 in number, hi public sector banks category, 
there are nineteen nationalized banks and eight belongs to the State Bank of India and its 
associate banks category. There are two types of private banks existing in India: (a) Old 
private which are twenty one in numbers, and (b) New private sector banks which just 
nine in numbers. Most of the foreign banks are just new entrants in India (Kumar, 
Pramod, 2006)^ 
2.2 Changing Scenario of Indian Banking System: 
The banking system is invariably Imked to a country's fabric and is a witness to 
its process of economic change. The development of a banking system is always 
associated with the contemporary changes in the economy, both in the internal and 
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external fronts. Changes in the internal front can be attributed to changes with in the 
bank or with in the industry. On the external front, changes in the political, economical, 
financial, social, legal and technological environments influence the banking system. 
Banking has traditionally been regulated in many economies. Regulated deposit 
and lending rates and restrictions on competition have enabled comfortable spreads. 
There was limited pressure on banks to come out of this dormant and protected world. A 
combination of developments has compelled bankers to change the old ways of domg 
business. These include technological advancements, disintermediation pressures arising 
from a liberalized financial marketplace, mcreased emphasis on shareholder value, and 
macroeconomic pressures and banking crises in the 1990s. The scope, timing and speed 
of this process, however, have not been uniform across countries or segments of the 
industry, reflecting the different objectives of intervention and diverse initial conditions. 
After shortly achieving independence, public ownership of banks became inevitable and 
in line with the requirements, SBI was created in 1955 to spearhead the expansion drive 
penetrating rural India and speed up the process of monetization. Norms for income 
recognition, asset classification and loan loss provisioning were put in place and capital 
adequacy ratio became mandatory. Major changes came about in the banking sector as 
the economy grew and matured during the decades since independence. The financial 
sector reforms have also provided the necessary platform for the banking sector to 
operate on the basis of operational flexibility and functional autonomy, thereby 
enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability. The banking sector reforms have 
succeeded in easing external constraints over bank operations, infroducing transparency 
in reporting procedures, restructuring and recapitalizing banks and enhancing the 
competitive element in the market through the entry of new banks. As a part of the 
reforms, the Indian banks also had to automate their operations. The competitive 
environment created by banking sector reforms has nevertheless compelled the banks to 
gradually adopt modem technology to be comparable with their foreign counterparts 
(Rao, T. S. Krishna, Sivaram, Y. G., and Seethapathi, K. S., 2003)". 
In recent years, the banking industry has been undergoing rapid changes, 
reflecting a number of ongoing reform processes. The most significant has been far 
reaching developments in telecommunication and information technology, which have 
accelerated and broadened the dissemination of financial information while lowering the 
costs of many financial activities. A second key impetus change has been the increasing 
competition among a broad range of domestic and foreign institutions in providing 
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banking and related financial services. Third, financial activity has become larger 
relative to over all economic activity in most economies. This has meant that any 
disruption of the financial markets or financial infrastructure has broader economic 
ramifications than might have been the case previously. The process of computerization 
and application of information technology in banks has gained momentum. Banks are 
now gradually switching to Internet banking, creating a network connecting their major 
branches and administrative offices. On its part RBI has created the INFINET & 
BANKNET for_connecting different banks and financial institutions with in the country 
and SWIFT which serves to connect Indian banks with International Banking 
Institutions. In last few years, there is no wonder that the banking sector has seen a 
virtual cornucopia of new products: credit card, ATMs, quick collection facilities for out 
station checques, retail Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), Electronic Clearing Services 
(ECS) debit and credit for repetitive payments like dividend, interest, utility bills, 
Internet banking etc. Now there are indications of moving towards the introduction of 
smart cards, debit cards, on-line banking for e-commerce and financial EDI for straight 
through processing. 
After a decade of reforms, the Indian banking sector is slowly emerging stronger. 
Regulations are forcing the banks to adopt better operational strategies and upgrade their 
skills. The system is also witnessing the integration of the financial markets. Externally, 
the happenings in the international markets are having their implications on the markets 
and the players. All these are making the operational environment more volatile and 
hence challenging for tiie Indian banks. The Indian banks have nevertheless, withstood 
all these challenges and are becoming more adaptive to the changing environments 
(Swain, B. K., 2006)^ 
The wave of liberalization has been guided by the Report of the Committee on 
Financial System (Narasimham Committee, 1991). The Report very accurately 
summarized the objective of the nationalization as, "Nationalization was recognition of 
the potential of the banking system to promote broader economic objectives such as 
growth, better regional balance of economic activity and the diffusion of economic 
power. It was designed to make the system reach out the small man and the rural and 
semi-urban areas and to extend credit coverage sectors till now neglected by the banking 
system and through positive affirmative action provided for such expansion of credit to 
agriculture and small industry in place of what was regarded as a somewhat oligopolistic 
situation where the system served mainly the urban and industrial sectors and where the 
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grant of credit was seen to be an act of protection and receiving it an aspect of privilege. 
The Report made the strategic judgment what the problem Indian banking were not 
fiindamental attributable to public ownership, but rather to the managerial and policy 
environment with in which the banks operated. It was forthright in drawing attention to 
the high cost, poor service, low profitability, poor loan recovery, and weak capital 
position of virtually all public-owned banks. The main explanations provided for this 
state of affairs were excessive centralization and political interference, which had served 
to undermine the sense of institutiorial autonomy, pride and accountability in the banks. 
As a consequence, Indian banking which was operating in a highly comfortable 
and protected environment till the beginning of 1990s has been pushed into choppy 
waters of intense competition. Every aspect of the functioning of the banking industry, 
be it customer services, resource mobilization, credit management, asset liability 
management, investments, human resources development, and forest management 
underwent dramatic changes with the reform process gathering the momentum and 
speed. 
In the new millennium, banks should strive to achieve significant increases in 
their productivity, efficiency, and profitability. The area of challenges that lie ahead 
would be: 
• Restructuring and recognizing banks setup towards thiimer and leaner 
administrative offices; 
• Closing down and/or merging of unviable branches particularly in urban and 
metropolitan branches; 
• Forging of strategic alliances to take advantage of the geographic spread of 
branch network of banks; 
• Type of customer concentration with a view to developing niche markets suitable 
for each bank consistent with its ethos and culture; 
• Develop new products and services that would meet the emerging customer 
needs; and 
• Professionalizing management structures that would be responsive to the changes 
in the business environment''. 
Cyber banking and e-commerce would make large urban branch network 
irrelevant. Many banks will be forced to open more ATMs in the place of their branches 
40 
in urban areas. The market is seeing new products such as phone-banking, home-
banking, finance against securities and time (FAST), credit cards etc. The more one goes 
closer to the customer the more one would get higher volume and value addition in 
business. For all banks, repositioning for competitive advantage in the rapidly changing 
market place will call for large investments in information technology and 
communication networks. The challenges in the new millennium for the banking 
industry are, therefore, enormous and can be met effectively only when the banking 
institutions also make knowledge as engine for growth (Srivavstava, M. P., 2004) .^ 
2.3 Banks and Performance of the Economy: 
The bank has become a foundation of modem economic development. According 
to the dictionary, the term bank means the side of the sea, a little hill, a shoal in the sea or 
a repository for the money of the whole economy. The term banking is being used for a 
pretty long time but its beginning is shrouded in mystery (Sachdeva, S.K., 1972)^ . 
Banking is an important segment of the tertiary sector and act as a backbone of 
economic progress (Jha, Probodh Kumar, 1985). The banks render vital services to the 
mass belonging to the various sector of the economy like agriculture, industry whether 
small scale or large scale (Vashist, Avtar kirishna, 1991)^ . The banking system is one of 
the few institutions that impinge on the economy and affect its performance for better or 
worse. They act as the development agency and are the source of hope and aspiration of 
the masses (Soden, Minakshi, 1992)"*. 
Financial inter-mediation has a positive role to play in the development process 
because finance plays a significant role in the economic development. Without finance 
the economy is like a fish without water. "It seems to be the case that where enterprise 
leads finance follows. The same impulse within an economy which sets enterprise on 
foot makes owner of wealth venturesome and when a strong impulse to invest is fettered 
by lack of finance, devices are invested to release it habits and institution are developed" 
(Patrick,H.T,1966)". 
As an economic institution, banks supposed to be more directly and positively 
related to the performance of the economy than most non-economic institutions are. 
Schumpeter, the first modem economist, regarded the banking system as one of the two 
key agents (the other being entrepreneurship) in the whole process of economic 
development (Schumpeter, J. A. 1993)'^ . 
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Within the banking institutions, the role of commercial banks has occupied a new 
meaning and significance in view of the changing structure and requirements of the 
developing economy. The increased horizons of commercial banks identifies itself with 
the problems and responsibilities for making banking instrument for bringing about 
social and economic transformation of a developing coimtry. Social responsibilities have 
undergone far-reaching changes. Banks have become the prime mover and pace setters 
for the achievement of socio-economic objectives of the country (Gupta, S.B.,1985) . 
The resources of individual savers are meager and scattered. Commercial banks 
play an important role in mobilizing savings of economically surplus units, which are 
widely scattered. Commercial banks in view of their vast branch network spread over the 
country, obtain the savings on a short or medium term basis, are placed in specially 
privileged position to collect them. If the banks fail to tap these savings, the surplus 
money lying idle in the hands of the people could not be of any use in a nation's 
endeavour of economic development. 
Savings and investments are the most important ingredients of capital formation 
for an economy, therefore, the promotion of domestic savings is must to boost the 
process of capital formation and development. In fact capital formation is a function of 
generation, mobilization and canalization of savings into productive 
activities/investments. Thus, the commercial banks are in the nature of a catalyst, 
converting savings into capital for productive investment (Dhawan, C. L. 1975)'^ . 
According to Nurkse, low income leads to low savings, which in turns to low 
capital formation (Nurkse, R. 1973)'^ But when the savings of economically surplus 
units are pooled together in commercial banks, it results in a large reservoir of social 
capital. It helps in cq)ital formation and capital accumulation, which are very necessary 
for building infrastructure and setting up of basic and key industries. Among the factors 
determining economic growth m underdeveloped countries, capital is of supreme 
importance (Parsad, Sada 1969)'^ . Developing economies do not suffer as much from 
lack of national resources as they do from the under-utilization of the existing resources. 
Capital formation is, therefore, the sin qua-non for activating these dormant and 
unexploited resources. It is needless to say that capital formation largely depends on the 
effectiveness of the institutions, which furmel the money capital flows (Adoef, J. H. 
1943)'^ 
If any country wants to increase its rate of capital formation, it is very important 
to build an efficient commercial banking system equipped with an adequate coverage so 
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that a part from mobilizing savings, it may also be able to foster the banking habits in a 
society (Aggarwal, B. P.1981)**. The commercial banks create the awareness among the 
rural and urban people about socially wasteful spending and provide them the golden 
opportunities to make investment in more generating assets. 
Lewis has emphasized the key role of bank credit in bringing about a structural 
transformation of an under developed economy. In the expansion of the capitalist sector, 
bank credit becomes a factor of fundamental importance. Keynes and Schimipeter too 
have emphasized the role of credit in economic development. It is more important that 
the hindrance and rigidities, which operate in the under developed countries, should not 
be strengthened by paucity of credit. David Rockfeller, Chairman of Chase Manhattan 
Bank, has pointed out: "The innovator looked to the bank for credit he needed to carry 
out his plans. Ultimately, it was the banker, who provided the basic fuel (credit) for 
economic growth" (Rockfeller, David 1985)'^ 
A developing economy faces many problems, like poverty, scarcity of capital, 
lack of entrepreneurship etc. There is dependence on agriculture and at the same time 
agriculture is not modernized. Means of transport are underdeveloped (Misra, S. K., Puri, 
V. K. 1983)^ ". There is growing concern over the developing regional disparities in these 
country, concern emanates both from the intellectual curiosity as well as political 
compulsion created by the development process. The commercial bank can work as 
catalytic agents of growth by following the right kind of policies in their woricing, 
depending upon the socio-economic conditions prevailing in a country (Singh, S. 
1977) '^.They have stupendous investment potentially and can make a significant 
contribution in eradicating poverty, unemployment and in bringing about progressive 
reduction in inter-regional and inter-sectoral disparities through rapid expansion of 
bankmg services (Bilgrami, S.A.R. 1982)^1 
The commercial banks help the agriculture sector in a number of ways. They 
open a network of branches in rural areas to provide agricultural credit. They also 
finance agriculture sector for modernization and mechanization of farms, for the 
marketing of their produce, for providing irrigation facilities, for high yielding seeds and 
fertilizers. They provide medium or long-term finance for the purchase of tractors and 
other equipments, for electrification and installation of electric or diesel pump sets, or for 
developing or improving land etc. The commercial banks are moving fast towards the 
attainment of agricultural development goals (Shah, S. G. 1968)". They also provide 
financial assistance for animal husbandry, dairy farming cheep breeding, poultry farming 
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and horticulture. In India for financing agriculture various schemes have been undertaken 
(Saraiya, R. G. 1972) '^'. The small and marginal farmers, landless agriculture workers, 
artisans and petty shopkeepers in rural areas are provided financial assistance through 
regional rural banks in India. These regional rural banks operate under commercial banks 
(Vashist, Avtar krishan, 1987)^ .^ Since commercial banks are the single most important 
source of institutional credit in India they fulfill the credit requirements of all types of 
rural people and help in enlistment of rural areas. 
The industrial sector is also not away from the help of the commercial banks. 
They finance industrial sector in many ways. They provide short term, medium term, and 
long term loans to industry. In India commercial banks grant loans to small scale, 
cottage and village-industrial units for expansion, modernization and renovation and also 
provide them working capital finance. Besides industrial units, loans are also granted to 
technocrats, technologists, technicians and entrepreneurs to set up the small-scale 
industrial units. The commercial banks also give finance for promotion of industrial 
estate for purchase of land and constructions of sheds. The role of banks is not limited to 
the extent of providing adequate working capital facilities; rather the banks play a wider 
role in the revival of sick unit by not only providing adequate working capital facilities 
but also by preventing and detecting sickness in its early stages (Saraiya, R. G. 
1972)°'"". 
The commercial banks help in developing both internal and external trade of a 
coimtry. The banks provide loans to retailer traders, wholesalers for their inventory and 
also help in transferring of goods from one place to another by providing all types of 
facilities, such as discounting and accepting bills of exchange, providing overdraft 
facilities, issuing draft etc. They also finance both exports and imports of developing 
countries by providing foreign exchange facilities to importers and exporters of goods. 
Export requires pre-shipment packing credit, which is also, made available by these 
banks in the form of loans, cash credit and overdraft facilities, while post-shipment credit 
is provided by discounting of export bills or by lending against these. Commercial banks 
in developing countries have been facilitating the flow of foreign receipts and payments. 
In order to encourage better participant of commercial banks in the area of finance, some 
countries have established a system of guarantee and ensure banks against fluctuations in 
exchange values and dangers of non-realization of payment due to commercial or 
political reasons (Soden, Minakshi, 1992)°'"'''. 
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The commercial banks further help the economy by providing fimds to investors 
and consumers that tend to stimulate and facilitate the growth in both the aggregate 
demand and supply of goods and services. Banks by providing loans to the investors and 
consumers, are not only helping in increasing the living standard of the people, but also 
help in reducing the recession in the economy through enhancing the demand for raw 
materials and finished goods that ultimately leads to increase in the employment 
opportunities. 
The banks provide a wide range of services to the whole community in many 
ways. Apart from the basic banking services such as deposit, loans and advances, banks 
have been traditionally rendering certain ancillary services also to their customers such 
as remittance, demand drafts, mail transfers, and telegraphic transfers, sale and purchase 
of foreign exchange, locker facilities, safe custody and safe deposit vaults, guarantee 
facilities, sale of travelers cheques, trustier and executor services etc. They act as bankers 
for the issue of new capital. They help their customer in marketing of securities and send 
the dividends to customers account directly. Moreover, commercial banks undertake the 
payment of subscriptions, premix rents etc. on behalf of their customers. Besides this, 
commercial banks undertake the issue of credit instruments like letters of credit, the 
acceptance of bills of exchange and documents, acting as a referee as to the respectability 
and financial standing of customers and providing specialized advisory services to the 
customers. Among the services introduced by modem commercial banks during the last 
quarter of century the bank giro and credit cards deserve special mention. The bank giro 
is a system by which a bank's customer with many payments to make, instead of 
drawing a cheque for each item, may simple instruct his bank to transfer to the bank 
account of his creditors the sum due from him and he writes one cheque debiting his 
accoimt with the total amount. By providing these diversified services banks help in the 
growth of trade and industry to a great extent (Shekhar, K.C., 1974)^ *. 
Modem commercial banks have diversified their activities with their entry into 
new non-traditional areas of business. These new areas include mutual fund, merchant-
banking activities, portfolio management, corporate counseling, project counseling, and 
hire-purchase finance, equipment leasing, venture capital and factoring services. These 
new activities by banks and their subsidiaries result in the development of the industry 
and trade in the country. Briefly it can be said that it constitute the very lifeblood of 
economic society. 
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To sum up, the banks have become an omnibus institution in the modem times to 
which people of varied interests look for help and success. They give life and substance 
to their customers and, in turn, get vitality and vigour from them, to become an effective 
tool of social transformation and rejuvenation. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
BANKING SECTOR 
REFORMS IN INDIA 
BANKING SECTOR REFORMS IN INDIA 
Until the early 1990s, the banking sector suffered from lack of competition, low 
capital base, low productivity and high intermediation cost. After the nationalization of 
large banks in 1969 and 1980, government-owned banks have dominated the banking 
sector. The role of technology was minimal and the quality of service was not given 
adequate importance. Banks also did not follow proper risk management system and the 
prudential standards were week. All these result in poor asset quality and low 
profitability (Bhasin, Niti, 2006)'. 
Liberalization process that was initiated m.India in 1991 posed some challenges 
for the bankers to act more efBciaitly. Before 1991, bankors had definite goals to be 
achieved. The government set their agenda for action and directed the flow of credit. 
Competition was restricted and safety was ensured. Bankers were enjoyuig the spread 
and they were not bothered about their efficiency and lending effectiveness. The 
cumulative effect of factors mentioned below had left many public sector banks 
unprofitable: 
• Excessive focus on quantitative achievements; 
• Total neglect of return and earnings; 
• Lack of coital adequacy measures and neglect of bad debts; and 
• Poor customer service and ineflScient system (Joshi, 1998) .^ 
So there was a need to improve their efSciency and this initiated reforms in the 
bankmg sector (Cheema, C.S and Aggarwal, Monika, 2003)^. As a part of this process, 
banking sector reforms is now under way. The banking system is, by far, the most 
dominant segment of the financial sector accounting for about two thirds of the asset of 
the organized financial sector and it is appropriate that reform in this sector has been 
receiving major emphasis. The reform measures taken in ^ s area have followed the 
recommendation of the Committee on the Financial System (CFS), which submitted its 
Report in November 1991. The Report had made a number of reconmiendations aimed at 
improving the productivity, efficiency and profitability of the banking system on the one 
hand, and providing it greater operational flexibility and fimctional autonomy in decision 
making, on the other. It covered policy aspects, accounting practices, institutional and 
structural issues and matter relating to organizational development. Following the 
recommendations of the Committee on Financial System (CFS) v^ch reported m 
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199land the second Report of the Narashnham Committee in 1998, a considerable 
ground has been covered in putting in place a financial system which can meet the 
requirements of a more competitive and open economy(Kapila, Raj & Kapila, Uma 
1999)''. Reforms in the banking sector must not only help banks get considerable profits 
in their venture, but also achieve the overall objective of the nation — putting in place a 
socialistic pattern of society, which, of course, is not feasible with a laissez faire policy 
(The Hindu, 2008)^ 
3.1 Rationale of Banking Sector Reforms: 
From time to time, machinery requires service/repair to work efficiently; similar 
is the case of banking system, which requires some dose to improve its performance to 
comply with the required standard. Hence, banking sector reforms were introduced to 
remove the deficiencies in banking sector. Since 1991, the banking sector was facing the 
problems listed below: 
Highly regulated by the RBI; 
Eroded productivity and efficiency of public sector banks; 
Continuous losses bom by public sector banks year after year; 
Increasing non-performing assets (NPAs); 
Deteriorated portfolio quality; 
Poor customer service; 
Obsolete work technology; and 
Unable to meet competitive environment. 
Hence, the need of the hour was to introduce some policies to remove the above 
said deficiencies. In light of above distortions, the Narasimham Committee was 
appointed and the Committee submitted its Report in November 1991, with detailed 
measures to improve the adverse situation of the banking industry. The main motive of 
the reforms was to improve tiie operational efficiency of the banks to fiirther enhance 
their productivity and profitability. 
Table-1: Branch Expansion during 1969-1991 
Year 
1969 
1980 
1991 
Total No. of Branches 
8226 
32419 
60220 
Rural Branches 
1833 
15105 
35206 
Source: Banking Statistics, 1998, RBI. 
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Semi-Urban Branches 
3342 
8122 
11344 
From the above Table-1, it is seen that the total number of bank branches 
increased eight-fold between 1969-1991 and the bulk of the increase was on account of 
rural branches which increased from 1833 to 35206 during the period. The percentage 
share of the rural and semi-urban branches rose from 22,2 and 40 respectively in 1969 to 
46.5 percent and 25 percent in 1980 and 58.4 percent and 18.8 percent in 1991. The 
impact of this phenomenal growth was to bring down the population per branch from 60, 
000 in 1969 to about 14,000 in 1991. The banking system thus assumed a broad mass-
base and emerged as an important instrument of socio-economic changes. "However, this 
success was neither imqualified nor without costs. While the rapid branch expansion, 
wider geographical coverage has been achieved; lines of supervision and control had 
been stretched beyond the optimum level and had weakened. Moreover, retail lending to 
more risk-prone areas at concessional interest rates had raised costs, affected the quality 
of assets of banks and put their profitability under strain. The competitive efficiency of 
Indian banks was at low ebb (Verma, M. S., (1998) .^ 
Table-2: Progress of Commercial Banking in India: 1951-91 
Indicator/Year 
No. of CBs including RRBs 
1. Scheduled Banks 
2. Non-Scheduled Banks 
Number of Offices 
Total Deposits of Scheduled 
Banks 
Total Credit of Scheduled 
Banks (Rs. Crore) 
1951 
566 
92 
474 
4151 
908 
547 
1969 
89 
73 
16 
8262 
4646 
3599 
1987 
279 
275 
4 
53840 
107345 
67213 
1991 
276 
272 
4 
60220 
201199 
1218865 
Source: Banking Statistics, 1972-95, RBI, 1998. 
The two decades since nationalization have seen progress with respect to its 
various objectives. The Narasimham Committee (1991) acknowledged the spectacular 
success of public sector banks since 1969 as follows; 
(i) Massive branch expansion particularly in rural areas; 
(ii) Expansion and volume of deposits, which constituted two-fifths of the 
financial sector of the household sector in 1991; 
(iii) Rural deposits as a proportion of total deposits increased from 3 percent 
to 6 percent; 
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(iv) Deployment of increasing proportion of bank credit to priority sectors, 
viz., agriculture, small industry, transport, etc. The priority sector credit 
had gone up from 14 percent to 41 percent between 1969 to 1991; and 
(v) Increase in deposit accounts by over 300 million and borrowers accounts 
by over 35 million. 
Despite this commendable progress serioiis problems have emerged 
reflected m a decline in productivity and efficiency and erosion of the profitability of the 
banking sector. The squeeze on profitability had emanated both fix)m the factors 
operating on the side of income and on the side of expenditure. The Narasimham 
Committee-I identified the following factors as responsible for decline in income 
eamings: 
(i) Directed investment in terms of minimum statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
which together with variable cash- reserve ratio, pre-empting well over 
half of the total resources mobilized by banks; 
(ii) Directed credit programme of deploying 40 percent of bank credit to the 
priority sectors at low interest rates; 
(iii) Low capital base; 
(iv) Low technology; 
(v) Phenomenal branch expansion; and 
(vi) Political interference in loan disbursal and poverty eradiation 
programmes. 
The above factors led to the depression in the interest income available to banks 
on the one hand and the deterioration in the quality of loan portfolio both of the priority 
sector and traditional sectors resulting in acciunulation of non-performing assets on the 
other. This has been responsible for erosion of eamings and profitability of banks. 
Commenting on the squeeze on the profitability of banks, the Narasimham 
Committee on Financial System observed, perhaps the single most important cause for 
the further increase m expenditure has been the impact of the phenomenal expansion of 
branch banking. Growing diversification of functions, particularly with respect to 
extending the coverage of bank credit to agriculture and small industries, where the unit 
cost of administering the loan tend to be high in proportionate terms, have also 
contributed to a faster growth of expenditure. 
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Many of rural branches, unfortunately, have not been able to generate adequate 
business to justify their existence, most of them operating below the break-even point. 
An inverse correlation between the extent of the commercial banks presence in rural 
areas and the volume of business generated by these oiitlets is clearly visible. This has 
decisive impact on the overall profits of the banks. The public sector banks, although 
have a large nxraiber of rural branches, only a small proportion of their business is 
generated by these branches. It is estimated that 41 per cent of PSBs branches handle 
only 10 percent of total advances and the contribution of rural branches to deposit 
mobilization is only 14 percent. It is a laboiir intensive process to handle a large number 
of small deposit accounts and this has resulted in low average business per employee in 
rural branches. These branches have to service 39 percent of small borrowing accounts a 
major mmiber of which are less revenue generating. It is observed that even if public 
sector banks hive off ail their rural branches its impact would hardly be a 10 percent 
reduction in the total business. 
The story is not different in the case of private sector banks. 22 percent of their 
rural branches mobilize only 6 per cent of their deposits. They disburse hardly 4 percent 
of the total credit and deploy 11 percent of the staff to manage these branches. The rural 
branches of the private sector banks appear as a small appendage, maintained because of 
its inevitability \mdsr the existing banking regulations than for its utility. The other 
causes for mounting expenditure were: 
(i) The line of command and control tended to weaken central office supervision, 
internal inspection and audit and increased unreconciled inter-branch and 
inter-bank entries; 
(ii) Rapid increase in number of employees and in accelerated promotions; 
(iii) Role of trade unions; and 
(iv) Extension of the coverage of bank credit to agriculture and small industry 
where the unit cost of administering the loans was high, besides, this type of 
credit was at low rates of interest. 
3.2 Objective of the Banking Sector Reforms: 
The initiation of financial sector reforms in the early 1990s was essentially to 
bring about a transformation in the structure, efficiency and stability of financial 
markets, as also an integration of the markets. Some of the important structural changes 
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enable by financial sector reforms related to introduction of free pricing of financial 
assets in almost all segments, relaxation of quantitative restrictions, removal of barriers 
to entry, new methods of flotation/issuance of securities, increase in the number of 
instruments and enlarge participation, improvement in trading clearing, and settlement 
practices, and improvement in information flows, transparency and disclosure practices. 
The key objective of reforms in the banking sector in India has been to enhance 
the stability and efficiency of banks. To achieve this objective, various reform measures 
were initiated that could be categorized broadly into three main groups: 
• Enabling measures; 
• Strengthening measures; and 
• Institutional measures. 
Enabling measures were designed to create an environment where banks could 
respond optimally to market signals on the basis of commercial consideration. Salient 
among these included reduction in statutory pre-emptions so as to release greater funds 
for commercial lending, deregulation of interest rate to enable price discovery, granting 
of operational autonomy to banks and liberalization of the entry norms for financial 
intermediaries. 
The strengthening measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability of banks in the 
face of fluctuations in the economic environment These included, inter alia, capital 
adequacy, income recognition, asset classification and provisionii^ norms, exposure 
norms, improved levels of transparency, and disclosure standards (Bhasin, Niti, 2(i06f^-
"\ Institutional frameworic conducive to development of banks needs to be developed. 
Salient among these include reforms in the legal fi-amework pertaining to banks and 
creation of new institutions. 
3.3 Policy Measures! of Banking Sector Reforms: 
The first phase of banking sector reforms includes: 
• Reduction in SLR &CRR; 
• Deregulation of interest rates; 
• Transparent guidelines or norms for entry and exit of private sector banks; 
• Public sector banks allowed for direct access to capital markets; 
• Branch licensing policy has been liberalized; 
• Setting up of Debt Recovery Tribunals; 
• Asset classification and provisioning; 
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• Income recognition; | J^ h ,., 4 . f 
.f 'i . I-
• Asset Reconstruction Fund (ARF); and 
• At least 40 percent of the total advances should be in privity se^biV 
The first phase of banking sector reforms, termed as 'Curative' measures, came 
up with its main objective to improve the operational efficiency of banks. Although, tiie 
first phase of banking sector reforms has improved the performance of the banks, but 
competition has also increased with more liberalization, privati2ation and globalization. 
With better use of technology, the new entrants have been able to spur competition, and 
the pubic sector banks have suffered as they are not suing the technology to large extent 
rather only to an affordable extent, mainly due to opposition from trade unions and high 
initial costs of installation. 
In spite of the optimistic views about the growth of banking industry in terms of 
branch expansion, deposit mobilization etc; several distortions have still crept into the 
system which are enumerated as follows: 
• Increasing competition; 
• Increase in non-performing assets (NPAs); and 
• Obsolete technology. 
Hence, yMlQ observing above distortions, the Government of India appointed 
second Narasimham Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. M. Narasimham in 1998 
to review the first phase of banking reforms and chart out a programme for further 
reforms, necessary to strengthen India's financial system so as to make it internationally 
competitive. This situation has arisen mainly due to the global changes occurring in the 
world economy, which has made each industry very competitive. The Committee 
reviewed the performance of the banks in light of first phase of reforms and submitted its 
Report with some repaired and some new recommendations. There were no new 
recommendations except the following: 
• Merger of strong units of banks; and 
• Adaptation of the 'narrow banking' concept to rehabilitate weaker banks. 
As the process of banking sector reforms is going on since 1991, it has shown 
improvement into the performance of banks and on the other side, many changes have 
occurred due to the entry of banks in the global market (Uppal R. K. and Kaur R.2006)'. 
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3.4 Implementation of the Narasimham Committee Reports I and II: 
The government implemented following recommendations of Narasimham 
Committee-I: 
i. Statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) on incremental net demand and time liabilities 
have been reduced from 38.5 percent to 25 percent by October 1997 and SLR on 
outstanding net domestic demand and time liabilities was reduced from 38.5 
percent to 34.75 percent in 1993-94 and gradually to 28.2 percent by March 
1996,27 percent in March 1997, and recently it has been reduced to 25 percent. 
ii. RBI intended to bring down the cash reserve ratio (CRR) ftom the statutory 15 
percent, but in fact it was brought down to 14 percent in May 1993. At the same 
time the incremental CRR of 10 percent was abolished. However, the surge in 
foreign exchange inflow and consequent increase in primary liquidity forced RBI 
to raise CRR from 14 to 15 percent in 3 phases between June and August 1994. 
Further, it has been reduced to 8 percent, and recently it has been reduced to 5 
percent. 
iii. Prudential accounting norms relating to income recognition, assets classification 
and provisions for bad and doubtfril debts were introduced in a phased manner, 
beginning 1992-93. These norms were progressively tightened with the view to 
achieving international best practices. 
iv. To infuse competition into the banking system private sector banks were allowed 
to enter the industry. Non-banking financial companies also emerged as 
competitive force. 
V. Credit-delivery system was significantly improved with banks being endowed 
with greater fi«edom in assessing working capital requirement. Delivery system 
terms for rural credit were revamped. A rural infrastructural development fund 
was constituted at NABARD in 1995, The system of extending credit to small 
scale industries was simplified and recommendations for improving the delivery 
system were examined. 
vi. Board of financial supervision (BFS) started its operations in 1995-96, with on-
site inspection and off-site supervisory system. Inspections of banks kinder new 
mechanism which would start as part of 1996-97 inspection cycles. 
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vii. The revised format for balance sheet and P&L account reflecting actual financial 
health of the commercial banks has been introduced from 1992-93. 
viii. Banks were free to open branches. As per April 1992, banks attaining capital 
adequacy norms and prudential accoimting standards can set-up new branches 
without the prior approval of RBI. Banks now have the fireedom to rationalize 
their exiting branches network by relocating branches, opening specialized ones, 
spinning off business, setting up or controlling offices/ administration units, etc. 
ix. Banks lending rates have been progressively rationalized over the years. 
Begiiming October 1994, lending rates have been deregulated and the structure 
of lending rates has been progressively linked to bank rate. The government 
accepted the recommendations of Narasimham Committee that the actual rate of 
interest should be remimerative. The concessional rate of interest should not be 
an instrument of economic aid. 
X. Recovery of debt due to banks and financial Institutions, Act was passed in 
1993, which provided for the establishment of special recovery loan, to facilitate 
quicker recoveries of loan arrears. There are five debt recovery Tribunals, 
functioning at Calcutta, Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, and Bangalore and Appellate 
Tribunal has been set up at Bombay, 
xi. Two important recommendations of the Narasimham Committee pertaining to 
scaling down priority sector credit and setting up the Asset Reconstruction Fund 
(ARF) remained unattended so far. 
There are other recommendations, i.e. restructuring of the banking industry 
through mergers and acquisitions. Abolishing of Banking Services Recruitment Board, 
destructing of the Industrial Development Bank of India and abolition of dual control 
between the; Reserve Bank and the Banking Division of the finance minister \(^ere the 
progress has been shown (Hundal B. S., Saini, B. S. and Chahal, H. S. 2003)*. 
There are following policy announcement by the RBI regarding the 
implementation of the Narasimham Committee II: 
i. Banks should achieve a minimum CAR of 9 percent as on March 31,2000. 
ii. 2.5 percent risk weight for market risk with effect fi-om the year ending 
March 31,2000 for Government/ approved securities, 
iii. As first step, banks have been dkected to make a general provision of a 
minimum of 0.25 percent for the year ending March 31,2000. 
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iv. An asset will be treated as doubtful; if it has remained in sub-standard 
category for 18 months, instead of 24 months, by March 31,2001. Banks may 
make provision in two phases, as imder: 
a) As on March 31, 2001: Provisioning of not less than 50 percent on the assets 
which have become doubtful on account of the new norms. 
b) As on March 31, 2002: Balance 50 percent of the provisions should be made 
in addition to provisions needed as on March 31,2002. 
V. Banks were advised to bring out revised operational manual and ensure 
regular updating. Compliance to be reported to the Reserve Bank by 
September 30,1999. 
vi. Banks should ensure a loan review mechanism for larger advances soon after 
their sanction and continuously monitor the weaknesses developing in the 
account for initiating corrective measures in time (Hundal, B. S., Saini, B.S., 
and Chahal, H. S., 2003)°""=". 
The Narsimham Committee II strongly felt that it is the combination of 
operational flexibility and outside competition that would improve the functioning of the 
public sector banks. The persisting oligopolistic nature of the functioning of the public 
sector banks should be dismantled and a level playing groimd should be installed. A 
financial system, in the words of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve System, 
New York is only as strong as its weak link. This justifies the attempt of the Narasimham 
Committee Report n to strengthen the financial system by recommending a complete 
restructuring of the industry together with the phasing out of directed lending. It was 
criticized by certain sections that there is not much of a difference between the 
recommendations of both the Reports but it should be remembered that Report, of 1999 
has reiterated that there is no soft option and complete autonomy is the watch word for 
the health of the banking sector. It has also done threadbare analysis of the problems 
with illiquidity and insolvency and how to tackle them in the context specific manner 
with long term perspective. 
Brahmananda has aptly pointed out that unlike in other sciences; there is no 
linear development in economics (Brahmananda, P. R. 1999/, He observed that what is 
passed in time may re-emerge in a different form in the fijture. The recommendation of 
the Narasimham Committee Report II in 1999 for banking and financial sector reforms 
based upon the withdrawal or the stated and the introduction of market fiiendly approach 
echo the above narrated message. Consequently, a market for funds which is responsive 
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to demand and supply forces, has gradually emerged in the backgrotmd of gradual 
implementation of most of the recommendations of Narasimham Committee I& II. In the 
ensuring era of knowledge management, it is the knowledge and vision about the 
management of funds that will be the most coveted skill. It is the duty of the central bank 
to attend to that knowledge management with a supervisory and not a regulatory outfit. 
That is the message of the Narasimham Committee Report I, which is more vigorously 
emphasized in Report II. 
3.5 Banking Developments in India during Post-Reforms Period: 
The Narasimham Committee made comprehensive proposals for reforms in this 
area. The irregularities and firaudulent manipulations in securities trading of certain banks 
and financial organizations, which surfaced in April 1992, had drawn attention to some 
systemic weakness in our banking system and capital market which needed urgent 
corrections. The Government took a number of steps in this area. The main elements of 
the reform programmes were as follows. 
(i) A large proportion of commercial bank funds in the past pre-empted by the 
Government borrowing at below market rates through the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
and cash reserve ratio (CRR). These pre-emption had an adverse effect on bank profits; 
they limited the ability of banks to pay high enough interest rate on deposits and, at the 
same time, forced them to charge very high interest rates on the commercial part of their 
portfolio. In recognition of these problems, the Government decided to reduce 
progressively the pre-emption under the SLR and CRR and steps were taken in this 
direction in the course of 1992-93. 
(ii) In 1993-94, the banking sector saw major development in identification of system 
problems and the start of systematic improvements. Structural changes and policy 
reforms during 1993-94 were designed to achieve the twin objectives of strengthening 
the public sector banks and introducing greater competition in this important sector. The 
new provisioning and income recognition norms, as announced by the RBI in April 
1992, came into force and revealed extensive weakness in the financial structure of some 
public sector banks. The 1993-94 budgets allocated Rs. 5,700 crores for improving the 
capital base of public sector banks so as to help them achieve the required capital 
adequacy norms. This was released to the banks following performance agreements 
between the; recipients banks and the RBI. Non-fulfilhnent of these commitments based 
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on time bound improvement of performance, as measured by stipulated indicators, 
invited sanctions against the defaulting banks. Legislation was introduced to make it 
possible for public sector banks to access the capital market. With the objective of 
increasing competition in the banking system, the RBI granted licenses to several private 
banking operations. Foreign banks were permitted to have equity participation up to 20 
percent in new banks, while NRIs could have equity outside the RBI. 
(iii) In 1994-95, the reforms continued to strengthen the banking system and promote 
competition. Six new private sector banks were established. The complete decontrol of 
interest rates on large loans expanded the arena for competitive forces to work. Public 
sector banks completed provisioning for sub-standard assets and attained 4 percent 
capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR) in 1993-94. The Banking Companies Act 
was amended to enable public sector banks to access coital market, 
(iv) Prudential and cq)ital adequacy norms were announced for the five All India 
Development Financial Institutions namely, Industrial Development Bank of India, 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, Industrial Finance Corporation of 
India, Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India, and Export-Import Bank. Prudential 
norms were also announced for non-banking financial companies. Companies with net 
owned-fimds of Rs. 50 lakhs and over were required to register with RBI and meet a 
coital adequacy norm of 6 percent by March 1995 and 8 percent by March 1996. 
(v) The entry of 9 new private sector banks during 1994-95 and 1995-96, and the 
potential future entry of more banks, provided competitiveness and cost consciousness 
and greater attention to depositors interests. 
(vi) The Board for Financial Supervision was set* up in 1994-95 with statutory powers 
over financial institutions, banks and non-bank financial institutions. It was designed to 
provide guidance on the supervisory initiatives and interventions of RBI. There are now 
five Debts Recovery Tribunals fiinctioning along with an Appellate Tribunal, for 
expediting the loan recovery process through adjudication. A major institutional step in 
1995-96 was the appointment of eight Ombudsmen under Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 
1995, who would function to resolve customer's grievances in a quick and inexpensive 
manner. 
(vii) Decontrol of the banking system continued during 1996-97. The mterest rate on 
term deposits was deregulated. Selective credit controls on a niunber of commodities 
were eliminated firom October 1996. The minimum maturity period of term deposits of 
30 days to one year was reduced to 10 percent. A number of banks reduced their prime 
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lending rate (PLR) by 1 to Vi per cent points and announced a 2.5 to 4.5 percent 
maximum margin over PLR. From October 1996, banks were permitted to provide 
foreign currency denominated loans based on their PCNP accounts, to be used for 
meeting either foreign currency or rupee requirements. 
(viii) Non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) were brought under the regulatory 
purview of the RBI, through an Ordmance amending the RBI Act, 1934. To protect the 
interests of ordinary depositors, an NBFC was defined to include a company whose 
principle business is the receiving of deposits, under any scheme or arrangement or in 
any other manner, or lending in any maimer. All NBFCs had to meet net worth and 
capital adequacy criteria. The RBI also specified accounting, income recognition and 
other norms under the law. Existing NBFCs had a transitional period of three years to 
come up to the specified standards. 
(ix) In 1997-98, there was progress in the decontrol of the banking system with fiirther 
deregulation of interest rates on deposits. Scheduled commercial banks were given 
freedom to fix interest rates on term deposits of 30 days and over from October 22,1997. 
The interest rate on NRE term deposits with maturity of 6 months and above was 
deregulated from September 1997. This helped align the interest rate and maturity 
structure of non-resident (external) Rupee term deposits witii that of domestic term 
deposits. Interest rate controls on FCNR (B) deposits were also liberalized in October 
1997 by enabling banks to offer rates not exceeding LIBOR for relevant maturity and 
currency. As part of the monetary and credit policy for the first half of 1998-99, it was 
decided to increase the interest rate ceiling on FCNR (B) deposits of one year and above 
by 50 basis points and reduce that on such deposits below one year by 25 basis points. 
(x) The Reserve Bank of India Act 1997, conferred wide ranging powers on the RBI for 
registration, regulation, supervision, issue of guidance and winding-up of the non-
banking financial companies (NBFCs). The process of resignation of 37,478 NBFCs 
more than 9,000 of which had NOF of Rs. 25 lakhs and above was attended to on top 
priority basis. The focus of supervision shifted to NBFCs accepting public deposits, as 
only such companies were subjected to deposit regulations and prudential norms. 
Auditors were entrusted with the task of ensuring compliance with regulations by the 
NBFCs not havmg public deposits. Any non-compliance had to be reported by auditors 
to the RBI without exception. 
(xi)On January 2, 1998, the RBI issued detailed guidelines regarding norms of deposit 
acceptance, prudential norms, etc. for various categories of the NBFCs. They were later 
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reconsidered and revised guidelines were issued on January 31, 1998. Deposit 
entitlement limits were raised in certain cases to minimize hardship without endangering 
the interests of depositors. According to these guidelines, NBFCs had to obtain the 
minimum prescribed investment rating before accepting public deposits. The limit of 
acceptance of public deposit was linked to the Net Owned Fund of NBFCs. 
(xii) Banking reforms in 1998-99 is based on the recommendations of the Narasunham 
Committee-II. The Reserve Bank announced a number of decisions as part of its mid-
term review of the monetary and credit policy released on October 30, 1998. NPAs of 
scheduled commercial banks declined marginally from 3.0 per cent of their total assets 
on March 31, 1998 to 2 .9 percent on March 31, 1999. In order to enable financially 
sound banks to play a greater role in resource mobilization for investment and growth, 
they were permitted to enter the insurance business with prior q)proval of RBI. 
Similarly, well-managed non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) were allowed to 
enter insurance business with prior approval of RBI. Other measures included, revised 
norms for entry of new banks in the private sector, reduction in the minimum maturity of 
Certificate of Deposits fix>m 3 months to 15 days, issuance of final guidelines on 
Commercial Papers imparting greater flexibility to corporates, especially those in the 
service sector in resource mobilization, mandatory rating for term deposits accepted by 
AIFIs, and move towards consolidated supervision of banks and theu* subsidiaries by 
incorporating the balance sheets of subsidiaries in the balance sheet of the parent bank, 
(xiii) A number of policy measures were taken in 1999-00 to improve the financial 
health and operational efficiency of commercial banks in India. The major policy 
measures included, legislative initiative to reduce the minimum government 
shareholding in nationalized banks to 33 percent, announcement of revised norms for 
entry of new bank in the private sector, move towards consolidated supervision by 
incorporating the balance sheets of subsidiaries into the balance sheet of the parent bank, 
in house arrangements by banks for collecting credit and other related information 
required by the proposed Credit Information Bureau, close monitoring of suit-filed and 
decreed accounts on an on-going basis and a simplified, non-discretionary mechanism 
for recovery of non-performing assets (NPAs). 
The process of financial and banking sector reforms was carried forward during 
the year with particular focus on banking and financial institutions. The specific reforms 
undertaken included: allowing banks to lend at interest rate below their respective PLRs, 
permission to formulate fixed rate deposit schemes offering higher interest rates to senior 
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citizens, flexibility in the composition of working capital between cash credit and loan 
components, reduction exposure limits for borrowers, revised guidelines for exposure for 
banks to capital market and guidelines for investment in non-SLR securities through the 
private placement route. 
The initiatives specially aimed at strengthening the operational efficiency of 
banks related to the voluntary retirement scheme (VRS), abolition of the banking service 
recruitment boards and enlargement of the reach and scope of the electronic funds 
transfer facility (EFT). The measures pertaining to financial institutions included: 
operational and regulatory issues concerning transition to imiversal banking, a 
transparent mechanism for corporate debt restructuring, coordination between banks and 
financial institutions, amended guidelines for asset-liability management and 
classification and valuation of investments. As regards the non-banking financial 
companies (NBFCs), the major policy initiative related to reduction m the maximum 
interest rates on public deposits from 14 percent to 12.S percent. 
The year under review was characterized by measures designed to move towards 
a flexible interest rate regime. The reduction in the administered interest rates on 
contractual savings made the interest rate regime more flexible. Reduction in the bank 
rate to 6.5 percent was supplemented by reduction in the cash reserve ratio to 6.5 p&xcat, 
which further improved liquidity in the banking system. 
During the year under review, banking sector reforms were carried forward with 
the introduction of risk-based supervision, liberalization of foreign direct investment in 
banking companies and enhanced transparency in the pricing of loan products. 
(xiv) The RBI issued final guidelines in April 2003 under the Securitization and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Internet (SARFAESI) 
Act, 2002. These guidelines covered aspects relating to registration and operation of 
assets reconstruction/securitization companies. In addition of these guidelines, RBI 
issued notes of a recommendatory nature covering acquisition of assets and issue of 
security receipts. In order to facilitate sale of NPAs to securitization companies 
(SCs)/assets reconstruction companies (RCs) RBI issued guidelines to banks and 
financial institutions, covering accounting treatment of sale of NPAs to SCs/RCs. With a 
view to enabling banks to meet the shortfall, if any, resulting from the sale of assets at a 
discount, banks were advised to build up provisions significantly above the minimum 
regulatory requirements for then" NPAs. 
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(xv) In another move, the Finance Minister while presenting the Union Budget for 2003-
04 announced the decision to raise the limit of foreign direct investment in banking 
companies from the existing level of 49 percent to 74 percent. 
Technical upgradation remained a priority area of banking sector reforms. RBI 
commenced implementation of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system in a 
phased manner. A demonstration version of the system was implemented in Jime 2003. 
The system was made operational in March 2004. 
(xvi) With legalization and growing integration of the Indian financial sector with the 
international maricet, the supervisory and regulatory role of RBI, in 2004-05, became 
critical for the maintenance of financial stability. RBI had been continuously fine-tuning 
its regulatory and supervisory mechanism to match international standards. Migration to 
new capital adequacy framework based on a three pillar approach, namely minimum 
capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline, involved 
implementation challenges for both RBI and banks, RBI took a number of initiatives to 
make migration to Basel II smoother. Banks were advised to undertake a self-assessment 
of the existing risk management systems and to simultaneously initiate suitable measures 
to upgrade them to match international standards. Banks were also asked to prepare a 
road map and to review the progress on a quarterly basis. 
In its annual policy statement for 2004-05, the RBI carried forward mitiatives 
aimed at improving prudential regulation and credit delivery, particularly to e^culture 
and the SSI sectors. The RBI introduced higher provisioning requirement for NPAs 
included under doubtful assets for more than three years category effective March 31, 
2005. In order to contam risks arising from non-SLR portfolio of banks, the RBI 
prohibited banks from investing in unrated non-SLR securities. Further, the RBI 
indicated that beginning January 1,2005, only those banks, whose investment in unlisted 
non-SLR securities were within the prudential- limit of 10 percent of their total 
investment in non-SLR securities, would be allowed to make fresh investment in such 
securities up to the prudential limits. 
(xvii) In 2005-06, continuing the process of financial reforms for induction of best 
practices and technological changes, the RBI emphasized transparency, diversification of 
ownership and strong corporate govemance practices to mitigate the prospects of 
systemic risks m the banking sector. The overall improvement in the efficiency 
parameters of the scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) reflects the positive response to 
the policy initiatives and changing business environment. 
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In February, 2005, the RBI had released a roadmap for entry of foreign banks 
consistent with WTO commitments. Broadly, the roadmap required the following: 
• Ultimate ownership and control should be well diversified; 
• hnportant shareholder should be 'fit and proper'; 
• Directors and CEO should be 'fit and proper' and should observe sound 
corporate governance principles; 
• Private sector banks should maintain a minimum capital for optimal operations 
and for systemic stability; and 
• PoUcy and process should be transparent and fair. 
The guidelines also envisaged that aggregate foreign investment in private banks 
firom all sources was not to exceed 74 percent of paid-up capital of a bank. If foreign 
direct investmoit (FDI), other than by foreign banks or foreign bank groups, in private 
banks exceeded 5 percent, then the entity acqmring such stake had to meet the 'fit and 
proper' criteria as indicated in the share transfer guidelines and had to obtain the RBI's 
approval for transfer of the shares. The aggregate limit for all foreign institutional 
investors' (FIIs) investments was restricted to 24 perc^t, which could be raised to 49 
percent with the approval of the board/shareholders. The current segregate limit for all 
non-resident Indians (NRIs) investments was 24 percent, with the individual NRI limit 
being S percent, subject to the approval of board/shareholders, 
(xviii) RBI also continued to monitor the progress of implementation of the Basel II 
fi-amework, vMch was to be operationalised by banks and other financial institutions by 
March 2007. To enable banks operating in India to'acquire Basel II, the Reserve Bank of 
India on January 25, 2006 issued detailed guidelines, for raising capital funds to meet 
market as well as credit risks. 
After taking into account the state of preparedness of the banking sector, m 2006-
07, RBI allowed banks some more time to put to place appropriate systems so as to 
ensure fiill compliance with Basel II. Indian banks having presence outside India and 
foreign banks operating within in India are to migrate to the standardized £^proach for 
credit risk and the basis indicator approach for operational risk under Basel II with effect 
from March 31, 2008. All other scheduled commercial banks are encouraged to migrate 
to these approach for operational risk under Basel II in alignment with them, but in any 
case not latter than March 31,2009. 
(xix)Banks were advised to formulate a transparent policy, with the approval of then-
Boards, for providing one time settlement facility to those farmers whose accounts have 
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been rescheduled/restructured due to natural calamities as also for those who have 
defaulted on account of circumstances beyond their control. 
Banks were further advised in July 1, 2006 to ensure that loan accounts of 
farmers, which are overdue as on July 2006 be rescheduled on the lines of the package of 
relief measures to the Vidarbha Region in Maharashtra announced by the Prime Minister 
and the interest thereon be waived, fi«sh finance to be ensured to such farmers. 
In order to mitigate distress of farmers in ttie 31 debt-stressed districts of Andhra 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kamataka and Kerala, government announced a rehabilitation 
package in respect of agriculture credit. The components of the package are as follows: 
• The entire interest on overdue agricultural loans as on July 31,2006 will be waived 
and all farmers will have no past interest burden as on that date, so that diey will be 
immediately eligible for fi%sh loan from the banking system. 
• The overdue loans of the fanners as on July31, 2006 will be rescheduled over a 
period of 3-5 years with one year moratorium. 
• An additional credit flow will be ensured in these 31 districts through the banking 
sector. The burden of waiyer of overdue interest on agricultural loans will be 
shared equally by the Central and State Governments. 
(xx) The Annual Policy Statement of RBI for 2006-07 envisaged that banks' total 
exposure to venture capital funds (VCFs) will be treated as part of capital market 
exposure and assigned a higher risk weight of ISO p » cent. In August 2006, banks were 
advised that all exposures to VCFs would be deemed at par with equity, and hence would 
be reckoned for compliance with the capital market exposure ceilings and the limits 
prescribed for such exposure would also apply to investments in VCFs. 
(xxi) To prepare banks for the unplementation of Basel II norms 2007-08, a three-track 
approach was adopted by the RBI with regard to capital adequacy rules. In the first track 
commercial banks were required to maintain capital for credit risk and market risk as per 
Basel I framework. In the second track were the cooperative banks. They were required 
to maintain prescribed capital for credit risk as .per Basel I fi-amework and through 
surrogates for market risk. The RRBs, which were on the third track, had to maintain a 
minimum capital which might not be on par with Basel 1 rules. 
In his 2008-09 budget speech, the Union Finance Mmister maintained that 
government's policy of a careful and calibrated opening of the financial sector had 
proved successful and it would continue to take measured steps in this direction. The 
final Report of the Committee on Financial Inclusion was received by the Government 
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and the Minister announced the acceptance of two its recommendations to begin with: (a) 
to advise commercial banks, including RRBs, to add at least 250 rural household 
accounts every year at each of their rural and semi-urban branches, and (b) to allow 
individuals such as retired bank officers, ex-servicemen etc. to be appointed as business 
facilitator or business correspondent or credit counselor. 
Banks would be encouraged to embrace the concept of Total Financial Inclusion. 
Government would ask all scheduled commercial banks to follow the example set by 
some public sector banks and meet the entire credit requirements of self-help groups 
(SHGs) members, namely (a) income generation activities, (b) social needs like housing, 
education, marriage etc., and (c) debt swapping. 
In order to increase the resource base of NABARD, SIDBI, and NHB, the 
Minister proposed to tap into the resources of scheduled commercial banks to the extent 
that they fail short of their obligation to lend to the priority sector. Accordingly, it was 
announced to create the following funds: 
• A fund of Rs. 5,000 crores in NABARD to enhance its refinance operations to 
short-term cooperative credit institutions. 
• Two funds of Rs. 2,000 crores each in SIDBI, one for risk capital financing and 
the other for enhancing refinancing capability to the MSME_sector. 
• A fimd of Rs. 1,200 crores in NHB to enhance its refinance operations in the 
rural housing sector. 
Other aimouncements made by the Finance Minister were as under: 
• Take measures to develop the bond, currency and derivatives markets that will 
include launching exchange-traded currency and interest rate futures and 
developing a transparent credit derivatives market with appropriate safeguards. 
• Enhance the tradability of domestic convertible bonds by pulling in place a 
mechanism that will enable investors to separate the embedded equity option 
fi-om the convertible bond and trade it separately. 
• Encourage the development of a market-based system for classifying financial 
instruments based on their complexity and implicit risks (Prasad, C. S. 2008)'**, 
Thus, the aforesaid radical reforms taken as per the recommendations of the 
Narasimham Committee have since changed the face and prospects of Indian banking 
and other financial institutions and intermediaries. The prospects of immense business 
opportunities are also opening-up in the liberalized atmosphere. While the prospects in 
the financial sector thus seem attractive, the operating environment in industry has also 
qualitatively changed in the recent past. 
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CHAPTER -4 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
OF BANKING SECTOR REFORMS 
IN INDIA 
Performance Evaluation of Banking Sector Reforms in India 
Since independence of India, there has been considerable development in 
banking system of India. Public sector in the banking industry emerged with the 
nationalization of Imperial Bank of India in 1921 and created the State Bank of India in 
1955 as part of integrated scheme of rural credit proposed by the All India Rural Credit 
Survey Committee in the same year. In 1969, important step of reform in banking 
sector was nationalization of majot commercial banks for social development for 
weaker section of the society. Public sector in the Indian banking got widened with 
two rounds of nationalization -Fist in July 1969, 14 major private sector banks each 
with deposits of Rs. 50 crores or more, and thereafter in April 1980,6 more banks with 
deposits of not less than 200 crores each. It resulted in the creation of public sector 
banking with a market share of 76.87 percent in deposits and 72.92 percent of assets in 
the bankmg industry at the end of March 2003 (Rao, D. S. 2008)'._With the merger of 
New Bank of India with Punjab National Bank in 1993, the number of nationalized 
banks became 19 and the number of public sector banks 27. The public sector banks 
came to occupy a predominant position in the Indian banking scene. There was a 
complete transformation from class banking to mass banking during the period. In early 
1991, a large number of economic problems were faced by the Indian economy. In 
order to overcome the problems, the Government of India started a series of measures 
which is popularly known as New Economic Reforms. However, Indian private banks 
and foreign banks are also growing very fast. Standard Charted Bank, Citibank and 
HSBC are the top three foreign banks in India with more than 65 percent of the total 
assets of foreign banks. Most of global players in banking and financial services-
Morgan Stanly, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, UBS, ABN Amro, 
Braclyas, Calyon etc. are in India. The mutual ftmds industry has both domestic and 
foreign companies-UTI Mutual Fund, Prudential ICICI, HDFC, Franklin Templeton, 
Birla and Tata. It is obvious from the above passage that banking sector has been 
spreading since the nationalization of banking system, however, the extent of the 
impact of the system on different sector of bank, has to be analyzed. For this, the study 
period has been divided into three sub-periods namely: 
• First Phase (PI)-1980-81 tol991-92 (Prior Reforms Period); 
• Second Phase (P2> 1992-93 to 1998-99 (First Reforms Period); and 
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• Third Phase (P3)-l999-00 to 2007-08 (Second Refonns Period). 
For evaluating the performance of the banking sector refonns in India, we have 
tried to analyze its impact on the performance of the scheduled commercial banks in 
general and the public sector banks in particular. We have also tried to determine the 
overall changes in the banking scenario of the coimtry during the reforms ear. 
4.1 Performance Evaluation of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs): 
In fact the study is intended to analyze tiie performance of the schedule 
commercial banks in different phases of banking sector reforms over the period of 
1980-81 to 2007-08 which have been divided into three periods, that is, PI, P2, and P3. 
For this purpose following parameters have been selected: 
Branch expansion 
Term deposits 
Area-wise banks deposits 
Banks deposit by types 
Banks credit 
State-wise distribution of credit 
Food and non-food credit 
Area-wise distribution of credit 
Credit to priority sector 
Non-performing assets by Types of Assets; and 
Total advances 
(i) Branch Expansion: 
First of all we analyze banks' branch expansion in different geographical areas 
namely rural, urban, semi urban and metropolitan areas. It is assumed that, null 
hypothesis; there is no significant difference between rural branches over the three 
periods, PI, P2 and P3. And alternative hypothesis is there is significant difference 
between rural branches of banks over the three periods. Since P -value (0.028) is less 
than a (0,05), therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-IA in appendix). So 
far as period of reforms is concerned, it is found that during 1992-93 to 1998-99 (P2) 
average branch expansion of banks in rural areas is 33623.86 which is higher than that 
of period P3 i.e. 31816.11 which is greater than that of PI i.e. 27747.62. It is meant 
that rural bank branch expansion before banking reform was less in comparison to first 
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and second reform periods. Similarly, for urban areas, null hypothesis is no significant 
difference between urban branches over the three periods and alternative hypothesis is 
that there is significant difference over urban braches over the period. The calculated 
result reveals that P value is less than a (0.05), therefore, alternative hypothesis is 
accepted (Table-l.C in appendix). It is clear that branch expansion in urban area over 
the three periods has increased. In P3, after second reforms, the expansion of branches 
in urban areas is 11480.11 which is higher than 9156.571 of first reform periods which 
is more than prior 6813.538 of reform period. In other words, impact of bankmg 
reforms in urban areas has been positive as the reform has been made by the 
Government of India. So far as semi-urban areas is concerned, it is assumed that there 
is no significant difference over the three periods and othor hypothesis is that there is 
significant difference OVCT the periods, that is, PI, P2, and P3. From calculation, it is 
found that P value is less that a (0.05X hence, the siscond hypothesis is admitted (Table-
IB in appendix). It is meant that impact of banking reforms over the given periods is 
positive. Average branch expansion in semi urban areas was 10089.92,13167.29, and 
15281.6 in respective periods. For metropolitan areas, similar hypothesis was assumed 
and it is found that expansion of bank branches has increased in the areas. The average 
trend of banks in the areas is the same as it is found in urban and semi-urban areas. In 
other words, the impact of banking reforms in India has been higher in developed areas 
in comparison to less developed areas that is rural areas. 
Table -1: Branch Expansion of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
(1980 to 2008) 
Year 
1 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Rural 
2 
15105 
17656 
20401 
22686 
25380 
30185 
29703 
30209 
31114 
33014 
34791 
35206 
% 
Change 
16.89 
15.55 
11.20 
11.88 
18.93 
-1.60 
1.70 
3.00 
6.11 
5.38 
1.19 
Semi-
Urban 
3 
8122 
8471 
8809 
9081 
9326 
9816 
10585 
10637 
11132 
11166 
11324 
11344 
% 
Change 
4.30 
3.99 
3.09 
2.70 
5.25 
7.83 
0.49 
4.65 
0.31 
1.42 
0.18 
Urban 
4 
5178 
5454 
5693 
5917 
6116 
6578 
7209 
7218 
7322 
7524 
8042 
8046 
% 
Change 
5.33 
4.38 
3.93 
3.36 
7.55 
9.59 
0.12 
1.44 
2.76 
6.88 
0.05 
Metro-
politan 
5 
4014 
4126 
4274 
4395 
4510 
4806 
5790 
5795 
5842 
5995 
5595 
5624 
% 
Change 
2.79 
3.59 
2.83 
2.62 
6.56 
20.47 
0.09 
0.81 
2.62 
-6.67 
0.52 
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1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008P 
35269 
35389 
35329 
33004 
32995 
32915 
32878 
32857 
32734 
32562 
32380 
32303 
32121 
32082 
30579 
30551 
31033 
0.18 
0.34 
-0.17 
-6.58 
-0.03 
-0.24 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.37 
-0.53 
-0.56 
-0.24 
-0.56 
-0.12 
-4.68 
-0.09 
1.58 
11356 
11465 
11890 
13341 
13561 
13766 
13980 
14168 
14407 
14597 
14747 
14859 
15091 
15403 
15556 
16361 
17627 
0.11 
0.96 
3.71 
12.20 
1.65 
1.51 
1.55 
1.34 
1.69 
1.32 
1.03 
0.76 
1.56 
2.07 
0.99 
5.17 
7.74 
8279 
8562 
8745 
8868 
9086 
9340 
9597 
9898 
10052 
10293 
10477 
10693 
11000 
11500 
12032 
12970 
14304 
2.90 
3.42 
2.14 
1.41 
2.46 
2.80 
2.75 
3.14 
1.56 
2.40 
1.79 
2.06 
2.87 
4.55 
4.63 
7.80 
10.29 
5666 
5753 
5839 
7154 
7384 
7529 
7763 
8016 
8219 
8467 
8586 
8680 
8976 
9370 
11304 
11957 
12857 
0.75 
1.54 
1.49 
22.52 
3.21 
1.% 
3.11 
3.26 
2.53 
3.02 
1.41 
1.09 
3.41 
4.39 
20.64 
5.78 
7.53 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues, Note: P=Provisional 
The table-1 and figure-1 clearly reveals that the expansion of bank branches in 
rural areas from 1980 to 1985 increased fix>m about 11 percent to 18 percent. In 1986 
there was negative growth rate. After it the growth rate enhanced firom 0.18 percent to 
6.11 percent during 1986 to 1992. After the reforms in banking sector, branch 
expansion did not increase in the rural areas. The growth rate of branch expansion 
remained negative. 
Figurc-1 
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So far as semi-urban areas is concerned, the annual growth rate of branch 
expansion enhanced positively all over the period but more stable rate was found in the 
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areas after banking reforms in India. Before the banking reforms, there was highest rate 
of percentage change i.e. 7.83 percent, in 1986. After the reforms, highest rate, 12.20 
percent, was observed in 1995. After 1995, percentage change rate of expansion was 
decreased slightly to 2005 which is counted about 1 to 2 percent but in 2006 the 
percentage change rate increased to 5.17 percent. In other words, we can say that 
expansion of bank branch in semi-urban areas was better than that of rural areas. 
Before banking reforms, the percentage change rate of branch expansion in 
urban areas in 1981 was 5.33 percent which was increased to 9.59 percent in 1986, and 
then it declined to 0.05 percent in 1991. After the reforms, growth rate of bank 
branches enhanced to 7.80 percent in 2007. In brief, it can be said that the percentage 
change rate of bank branch in urban areas is higher than that of rural and semi-urban 
areas. 
The percentage change rate of branch expansion in metropolitan areas increased 
from 2.79 percent in 1981 to 20.47 percent in 1986. After the period, the percentage 
change rate declined to -6.67 percent in 1990 and 0.05 percent in 1991. After first 
reforms period, the percentage change increased to 22.52 percent in 1995 and then the 
growth rate declined to 4.39 percent in 2005, then it increased substantially to 20.64 
percent in 2006, and then again it reduced to 5.78 percent in 2007 (Table-ID in 
appendix). 
Thus, after nationalization of major banks and banking reforms, for nearly two 
decades there had been massive branch expansion, primarily with the objective of 
covering the unbaked centres in rural and semi-rural centres, coupled with intensive 
branch network in metro-urban centres to sustain profitability. But fi-om above study, it 
is clear that the maximum benefits of banking reforms reached to urban areas in 
comparison to other areas. 
(ii) Term Deposits: 
Deposits are the chief source of bank's fimds and hence it is called as the 
lifeblood of banks. The term deposit, according to the Oxford dictionary means, "lay 
down in a place, store or entrust for keeping". This is a general term, means that money 
deposited in a bank is known as bank deposits. In fact, the traditional fimctions covered 
by the term banking are defined in section 5 (b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, 
"Banking means the accepting for the purpose of lending or investment of deposits of 
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money from the public, repayable on demand of otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, 
draft, order or otherwise" (Mathur, B. L. 2008)^ . 
Deposits have been categorized into many sub-groups such as demand deposits, 
time deposits, deposit per capita etc. Here, we examine the extent of deposits in banks 
that have been affected after and before banking reforms m India. In our study, data of 
28 years, from 1980-81 to 2007-08 have been under taken. In this study, it is assumed 
that there is no significant difference between demand deposits before and after reforms 
(null hypothesis) and alternative hypothesis is that there is significant difference 
between demand deposits before and after reforms. It is foimd that P value is less than 
a (0.05), therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-2A in appendix). It is 
meant that after banking reforms deposits in banks has increased. Similarly, for time 
deposits, null hypothesis is no significant difference between time deposits before and 
after reforms. And alternative hypothesis is that there is significant difference between 
time deposits before and after reforms. The calculated result shows that P value is 
lower than a (0.05), hence, alternative hypothesis is accepted which means time 
deposits are more after banking reforms. In the same way, the two hypotheses for 
deposits per capita have been examined. After calculating the hypotheses, it is found 
that P value is less than a (0.05), so, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-2B in 
appendix). It is clear that deposit per capita after reforms is greater. 
Table-2: Term Deposits of SCBs 
(1980 to 2008) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Demand 
Deposits 
(Rs. crores) 
7798 
8383 
9984 
11312 
14132 
16303 
19227 
19863 
25274 
33437 
33192 
48893 
49541 
58123 
76903 
80614 
Time 
Deposits 
(Rs. crores) 
30190 
35350 
41374 
49284 
58113 
71585 
83496 
97711 
118651 
140078 
159349 
188672 
225397 
261421 
309956 
353205 
Total 
Deposits 
(Rs. crores) 
37988 
43733 
51358 
60596 
72244 
87887 
102723 
117574 
143925 
173515 
192541 
237566 
274938 
319544 
386859 
433819 
Demand 
Deposits 
(% 
change) 
17.38 
17.5 
19.1 
13.3 
24.93 
15.36 
17.94 
3.31 
27.24 
32.3 
15.03 
47.3 
1.33 
17.32 
32.31 
4.83 
Time 
Deposits 
-(% change) 
20.2 
17.09 
17.04 
19.12 
17.91 
23.18 
16.64 
17.02 
21.43 
18.06 
15.38 
18.4 
19.46 
15.98 
18.57 
13.95 
Totai 
Deposits 
(% 
change) 
19.61 
15.12 
17.44 
17.99 
19.22 
21.65 
16.88 
14.46 
22.41 
20.56 
15.32 
23.38 
15.73 
16.22 
21.07 
12.14 
Deposits 
per 
Capita 
(Rs.) 
559 
632 
725 
838 
978 
1164 
1332 
1492 
1788 
2111 
2295 
2775 
3153 
3582 
4251 
4675 
Deposits 
per 
Office 
(Rs.crores) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1.37 
NA 
1.86 
2.08 
2.44 
2.87 
3.12 
3.82 
4.38 
5.04 
6.06 
6..73 
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1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
90610 
102513 
U7423 
145283 
159407 
153048 
187837 
245943 
254876 
364640 
429731 
524310 
414989 
495972 
596602 
706310 
829734 
950312 
1123924 
1296342 
1453734 
1744409 
2182203 
2672630 
505599 
598485 
714025 
851593 
989140 
1103360 
1311761 
1542285 
1708610 
2109049 
2611933 
31%939 
12,4 
13.14 
14.54 
23.73 
9.72 
-3.99 
22.73 
30.93 
3.63 
43.07 
17.85 
22.01 
17.49 
19.51 
20.29 
1839 
17.47 
14.43 
18.27 
15.34 
12.14 
20 
25.1 
22.47 
16.55 
18.37 
19.31 
19.27 
16.15 
11.55 
18.89 
17.57 
10.78 
23.44 
23.84 
22.4 
5345 
6208 
7264 
8507 
9707 
10630 
12434 
14387 
15690 
19069 
23279 
28093 
7.77 
9.09 
10.71 
12.7 
4.65 
16.25 
19.27 
22.47 
24.42 
29.8 
35.68 
NA 
Source: C M I E , Various Issues, N A=Not available 
In table-2, percentage change in demand deposits in 1980-81 was 17.73 percent, 
24.93 percent in 1984-85, and 47.3 percent in 1991-92. After first reforms, growth rate 
of demand deposits declined to 1.33 percent in 1992-93, and then it increased to 9.72 
percent in 2000-01 in comparison to 1992-93. In 2001-02, the growth rate reached to 
negative which is -3.99 percent. Percentage change in demand deposits boosted to 
22.01 percent in 2007-08. Likewise, the percentage change in time deposits was 20.20 
percent in 1980-81 which increased to 21.43 percent in 1988-89 and reduced to 18.4 
percent in 1991-92. After the banking reforms the growth rate improved to 25.1 percent 
in 2006-07 and to 22.47 percent in 2007-08. 
Figure-2 
WUH I mv^mi 
3000000 Comparison of OMnand •nd Tiro* 0«|M»ili 
2500000 •-
^2000000 
« 
e 
^1500000 
1000000 
sooooo 
MJUi 
B Demand 
depottis 
(Rscrore) 
../.#V/A./.^*46/.^//// 
• Time 
deposits 
(Rs.crore) 
75 
Figure-2 also reveals that both demand and time deposits increased more in 
post-reforms period in comparison to pre-reforms period. But the time deposits 
increased at increasing rate over periods and are more than that of demand deposits. 
The deposit per-capita increases to Rs.559 in 1980-81, Rs. 2295 in 1990-91, Rs. 6208 
in 1997-98, and Rs. 28093 in 2007-08. Deposit per offices all over period boosted 
except in 2000-01. It was Rs.1.86 crores in 1986-87, Rs. 3.82 crores in 1991-92, Rs. 
4.65 crores in 2000-01, and Rs. 35.68 crores in 2006-07. 
(iii) Area-wise Banks Deposits: 
For the study of impact of banking reforms on banks deposits in different 
areas, null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between rural, semi-
urban, urban and metropolitan areas. Alternative hypothesis is there is significant 
difference between these areas. The calculated result shows that P value is less than a 
(0.05), hence, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-3 in appendix). The average 
deposit of urban and metropolitan areas was Rs. 714495.2 crores which is more than 
that of semi-urban deposits of, Rs. 176628.80 crores, which is higher in comparison to 
rural areas average deposits of Rs. 130013.6 crores. 
Figure-3 
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The table-3 shows that the rural areas deposit by populations was Rs. 31009.8 
crores in 1990-91 which increased to Rs. 596468.6 crores in 1997-98, and further to Rs. 
2597045 crores in 2006-07. The figure-3 reveals that percentage share of rural deposits 
to total deposits has been near about stable from 1990-91 to 2001-02 such as 15.46 
percent in 1990-91, 15.01 percent in 1992-93, 13.67 percent in 1994-95, 14.54 percent 
in 1997-98, and 14.19 percent in 2001-02 . After that there is slightly decline in the 
rural areas deposits which was 13.83 percent in 2002-03, 12.02 percent in 2004-05, and 
9.74 percent in 2006-07. Similarly, the above table-3 shows that the semi-urban areas 
deposit by population was Rs. 41439.16 crores in 1990-91 which increased to Rs. 
115644.3 crores in 1997-98, and Rs. 357395.1 crores in 2006-07. The above figure 
reveals that the percentage share of semi-urban areas deposit remained stable from 
1990-91 to 1999-00 such as 20.66 percent in 1990-91, 19.39 percent in 1997-98, and 
19.72 percent in 1999-00. 
(iv) Banks Deposits by Types: 
Here, we examine the impact of banking reforms on bank deposits in the form 
of current, saving.and term deposits. The table-4 clearly shows that the current deposits 
increased from Rs. 30334.66 crores in 1990-91 to Rs. 79770.2 crores in 1997-98. 
Current deposits again boosted to Rs. 321834 crores in 2006-07. So far as saving 
deposit is concerned, it too enhanced from Rs. 56151.9 crores in 1990-91 to Rs, 142412 
crores in 1997-98. After the second period reforms, the amoimt reached to Rs. 
679070.8 crores in 2006-07. Term deposit amount was more than three times of each 
deposit. Term deposit was Rs. 114081.79 crores in 1990-91 and boosted to Rs. 
374286.4 crores in 1997-98. After passing 8 years it increased to Rs. 1596139.7 crores 
in 2006-07. The percentage share of each in total deposits has been shown in figure-4. 
It reveals that the share of term deposit has been higher over the periods followed by 
saving deposit and current deposit. No doubt, total current deposit in the form of 
amount has increased but its percentage share in total deposits year-wise has been 
declining, that is, 15.12 percent in 1990-91 to 13.37 percent in 1997-98, and then to 
12.39 percent in 2006-07. In the case of saving deposit, the percentage share is more in 
comparison to the percentage share of current deposit, but it fluctuated over the periods. 
It declined from 28 percent to 26.15 percent during 1990-91 to 2006-07. 
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The percentage share of term deposit increased from 56.88 percent in 1990-91 
to 61.46 percent in 2006-07. After this, there is slightly decline in semi-urban areas 
deposit percentage share which is 19.61 percent in 2000-01, 18.94 percent in 2002-03, 
16.93 percent in 2004-05, and 13.76 percent in 2006-07. The deposit of urban and 
metropolitan areas increased from Rs. 128119.4 crores in 1990-91 to Rs. 394117.9 
crores, and further to Rs. 1986636 crores in 2006-07. The above figure-4 shows that 
percentage share of deposit varied about 63.88 percent to about 67.23 percent during 
1990-91 to 2002-03. After 2002-03, the percentage share of deposit increases to 70.87 
percent in 2004-05, and 76.5 percent in 2006-07. 
Table-5 clearly reveals that the amount of saving deposit in Indian banks 
increased after banking reforms in India. During the prior banking reforms phase, it 
was Rs. 10667 crores in 1980-81. The amount has reached to Rs. 136770 crores in the 
second banking reforms periods 1997-98. However, in 2006-07, the saving deposit of 
Indian banks was Rs. 747189 crores. 
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TabIe-5: Saving Deposits in Indian & Foreign Banks 
(1980-81 to 2007-08) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Source: Indiasti 
Indian 
Bank 
(Rs. crores) 
10667 
12692 
14719 
17430 
21300 
24071 
28787 
32546 
36756 
43744 
49542 
55554 
57256 
69434 
89019 
99347 
112570 
136770 
160889 
187173 
217452 
272119 
302816 
373137 
443573 
556303 
649586 
747189 
itcom 
Foreign Bank 
(Rs. crores) 
270 
304 
336 
381 
427 
485 
567 
625 
690 
823 
959 
1348 
1317 
1718 
2305 
2514 
2875 
3194 
3836 
4727 
5530 
6988 
8748 
12232 
15045 
18827 
21839 
25093 
Total 
(Rs. crores) 
10937 
12995 
15055 
17811 
21727 
24555 
29354 
33171 
37446 
44567 
50501 
56902 
58573 
71151 
91324 
101861 
115445 
139964 
164725 
191900 
222982 
279107 
311565 
385369 
458618 
575130 
671425 
772282 
Indian Bank 
(%) 
97.53 
97.67 
97.77 
97.86 
98.03 
98.03 
98.07 
98.12 
98.16 
98.15 
98.1 
97.63 
97.75 
97.59 
97.48 
97.53 
97.51 
97.72 
97.67 
97.54 
97.52 
97.5 
97.19 
96.83 
96.72 
96.73 
96.75 
96.75 
Foreign Bank 
(%) 
2.47 
2.34 
2.23 
2.14 
1.97 
1.98 
1.93 
1.88 
1.84 
1.85 
1.9 
2.37 
2.25 
2.41 
2.52 
2.47 
2.49 
2.28 
2.33 
2.46 
2.48 
2.5 
2.81 
3.17 
3.28 
3.27 
3.25 
3.25 
It is obvious from the study that the saving deposit after the reforms is 
augmented by seven times more of before the reforms. So far as the saving deposit of 
the counterpart banks is concerned, it was fifty time less than that of its counter 
deposits. But the amount has been increasing over the periods and during banking 
reforms it was increased substantially from Rs. 270 crores to Rs 3194 crores, and then 
to Rs. 25093 crores in 2006-07. The figure-5 shows that saving deposits in Indian 
banks has been improving at the increasing rate while saving deposits in the counterpart 
enhances but at a decreasing rate. 
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(v) Banks Credit: 
For analyzing the impact of banking reforms on bank's credits, null 
hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the credits given by the 
different types of banks in India. Contrary hypothesis is that there is significant 
difference between the credits given by the different types of banks in India. The results 
show that P value is less than 0.05; therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-
4 in appendix). At the time of introduction of banking reforms, credit of SBI and its 
associate banks was Rs. 34715.99 crores in 1990-91. The credit amount increased to 
Rs. 107544.6 crores in the period of second reforms i.e., 1998-99. After the second 
reforms, credit of SBI and its associate bank boosted by Rs. 448362.1 crores in 2006-07 
which shows about four times growth. So far as credit of nationalized banks is 
concerned, it was Rs. 71402.38 crores in 1990-91 which enhanced to Rs. 188109 crores 
in 1998-99 and fiirther reached to Rs. 925965.3 crores in 2006-07. The amount of 
credit in nationalized banks was one and half folds higher than that of SBI and its 
associate banks over the same periods. Credit of foreign banks in 1990-91 was Rs. 
9358.88 crores. After that, credh of foreign banks improved substantially to Rs. 
29767.2 crores in 1998-99. The second reforms period enhanced the bank credh to Rs. 
134853,2 crores in 2006-07. No doubt there is increment in the amount of credit of 
foreign banks but hs quantity is still less than that of both nationalized and SBI and its 
associate banks, hi the case of regional and rural banks, the amount of credit without 
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any hurdle goes up from Rs. 3750.59 crores, Rs. 11278.6 crores and Rs. 47855.1 crores 
during 1990-91, 1998-99, and 2006-07 respectively, but credit provided by the banks 
was about three times less in comparison to discussed banks credit. Credit offered by 
other scheduled commercial banks was Rs. 4975.1 crores which increased to Rs. 
35061.6 crores in 1998-99. The credit offered by the banks was Rs. 390064 crores in 
2006-07. From above table-4, it is obvious that credit supplied by other commercial 
banks is more than that of regional rural banks. The Figure-6 reveals that percentage 
change in SBI and its associate banks credit was 8.06 percent in 1991-92, after the 
effective reforms in banking sector, the percentage change rate swelled up 33.53 
percent in 1992-93 and then reduced significantly to 7.72 percent in 1994-95. With the 
implementation of second reforms in banking industry, the percentage change rate of 
SBI and its associate banks bumped up to 18.23 percent in 1999-2000, and then 
declined slightly but remained near about stable in 2003-2004. After it, annual 
percentage change rate of the banks rises in comparison to that of 1990-91. The 
percentage change rate of nationalized banks during the first refonns period fluctuates 
highly after every two years within 7.3 percent to 21.52 percent. In the second phase of 
banking reforms, the reverse of first situation has been observed. The annual percentage 
change rate augmented from 14.07 percent to 35.09 percent. The percentage change of 
foreign banks credit in 1990-91 was 34.66 percent. But it lowered suddenly to negative, 
i.e., -4.11 percent and -5.30 percent in 1992-93 and 1993-94 respectively. After this, the 
Figure-6 
83 
credit growth remained substantially high but again reduced to 5.26 percent in 1997-
98. During the second phase of banking reforms, credit supplied by nationalized banks 
improved to 6.17 percent in 2001-02 and further boosted by 35.96 percent in 2006-07. 
Credit growth of other scheduled commercial banks was better than that of discussed 
banks. During 1990-91 to 1997-98, annual percentage of credit increased from 19.09 
percent to 54.35 percent. In second phase of reforms, it enhanced from 24.58 to 61.33 
percent. In other words, the impact of second roimd reforms on other scheduled 
commercial banks has been more effective in comparison to the first phase of reforms. 
So far as compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is concerned, the CAGR of SBI and its 
associate banks credit is 16.04 percent, foreign banks 16.9 percent, nationalized banks 
16.86 percent, regional rural banks 17.26 percent, other scheduled commercial banks 
32.31 percent and for total credit it is 20.21 percent. 
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(vi) State^Wise Distribution of Credit: 
For examining the impact of banking reforms on state-wise distribution of 
banks credit, the null hypothesis is, there is no significant difference between the 
distribution of credit among states. And alternative hypothesis is, there is significant 
difference between the distribution of credit among states. After calculating the result, 
it is found that P value is less than 0.05; therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted 
(Table-S in: appendix). The table-7 shows that the highest average bank credit is 
observed in Mahrashtra, i.e. Rs. 149424.43 crores followed by Rs. 93218.27 crores in 
Delhi, Rs. 59884.95 crores in Tamil Nadu, Rs.43588 crores m Kamataka, Rs. 39829.35 
crores in Andhra Pradesh, Rs. 33523.72 crores m West Bengal, Rs. 31730. 57 crores in 
Uttar Pradesh, Rs. 26410.32 crores in Gujarat, Rs. 20235.21 crores in Kerala, Rs. 
18316.42 cores in Punjab, Rs. 16195.29 crores in Madhya Pradesh, Rs. 15817.62 crores 
in Rajasthan, Rs. 12264.94 crores in Haryana, Rs. 9063.66 crores in Bihar, Rs. 8805.73 
crores in Orissa, Rs. 8432.55 crores in Chandigarh, Rs. 7762.98 crores in Assam, Rs. 
7699.90 crores in Jharkhand, and the lowest average credit is provided by Lakshadweep 
of Rs. 15.87 crores. The following table-7 shows that the percmtage share of 
Maharashtra in total bank credit is also the highest. In 1990-91, it was 21.11 percent 
which increased to 25.19 percent in 1997-98, and 25.73 percent was observed in 2006-
07. In Delhi, share of bank credit to total credits was 9.08 percent in 1996-97. It was 
boosted to 12.01 percent in 2006-07. In Tamil Nadu, there was some increment in 
percentage share of bank credit to total credits. It ranges between 10.64 percent to 9.89 
percent over period of times. The percentage share in Uttar Pradesh was 7.86 percent in 
1990-91, but declined to 5.95 percent and reached to 4.7 percent in 2006-07. The same 
situation prevailed in Bihar. In 1990-91, the share was seen to be 2.99 percent but 
reduced to 2.7 percent in 1997-98, and arrived to 1.41 percent in 2006-07. Thus, the 
study shows that credits provided by banks to backward areas has been declining as 
different steps were taken in banking system in India during 1990-91 to 2006-07. 
86 
•o 
o 
e 
(0 9 
I 
iS 
(0 9 
> o 
o 
3 
'5 
<0 
i 
s 
s 
I: 
s 
8 
8 
8 
>|2 I 
S 
8 
S 
^ 
8 
» 
S 
3 9 
n 
a 
^ 
» 
!^ ' 
{:! 
§ 
^ 
» 
8 
8 
S 
SS 
8 
8 
?i 
8 
III J 
8 
8 
8 
i 
I 
8 
8 
S 
8 
8 
^ 
i 
K 
S 
8 
d 
I 
8 
8 8 
8 
I 
S 
I 
i 
i 
uT 
J] 
(vii) Food and Non-Food Credits: 
For analyzing the impact of banking sector reforms on food credit in scheduled 
commercial banks, the null hypothesis is there is no significant difference between food 
credit, and alternative hypothesis is there is significant difference between food credit 
before and after banking reforms in India. By examining table-8, we find that P value is 
less than 0.05, hence alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-5A in appendix). It is 
meant that more food credits provided by scheduled commercial banks after banking 
reforms in India. Again, it is hypothesized that there is no significant difference in non-
food credits before and after reforms in banking sector in India (null hypothesis). And 
alternative hypothesis is there is significant difference in non-food credits before and 
after banking reforms. The calculated results show that P value is less than 0.05; 
therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-5B in appendix). It is clear that non-
food credits after banking reforms in India is also increased. Similarly, for credit per 
capita in scheduled commercial banks, these hypotheses are taken, i.e. null hypothesis: 
there is no significant difference between credit per c^ita before and after reforms and 
alternative hypothesis: there is significant difference between credit per capita before 
and after reforms. Calculated P value is lesser than 0.05, so, alternative hypothesis is 
accepted (Table-5C in appendix). Per capita credit in SCBs is more after reforms in 
banking industry. Before reforms food credits was Rs.l759 crores in 1980-81 and 
Rs.5665 crores in 1984-85. After this, food credits fluctuated and declined to Rs. 4506 
crores in 1990 -91. After second reforms in banking sector, food credits increased to 
Rs. 12275 crores in 1994-95 and fiirther to Rs. 44399 crores in 2007-08. Non-food 
credits in SCBs has been rising from Rs.23612 crores in 1980-81 to Rs.l 11795 crores 
in 1990-91, and to Rs.2317515 crores in 2007-08. Total credits (food and non-food 
credit) and credit per capita has increased fixim Rs.25371 crores & credit per C8q)ita 
from Rs.374 in 1980-81to Rs.l 16301 crores & Rs.l386 m 1990-91, and to Rs.2361914 
crores & credit per capita to Rs. 20755 in 2007-08(Table-8). 
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Table-8: Food and Non-Food Credit in SCBs 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Food 
Credit 
(Rsxrores) 
1759 
2127 
2965 
4022 
5665 
5535 
5104 
2190 
770 
1867 
4506 
4607 
6788 
9105 
12275 
9791 
7597 
12485 
16816 
24926 
39762 
53978 
49398 
36514 
41553 
40691 
46521 
44399 
Non-Food 
Credit 
(Rs.crores) 
23612 
27555 
32528 
37272 
43288 
54410 
58204 
67899 
86048 
103583 
111795 
126913 
1480S0 
157217 
199285 
244224 
270804 
3311594 
352021 
429143 
489510 
535745 
697034 
829080 
1050455 
1466387 
1884668 
2317515 
(1980-81 to 2007-08) 
Total 
Credit 
(Rs.crores) 
25371 
29681 
35493 
41294 
48953 
59945 
63308 
70089 
86818 
105450 
116301 
131S20 
154838 
166322 
211560 
254015 
278401 
324078 
368837 
454069 
529272 
589723 
746432 
865594 
1092008 
1507077 
1931189 
2361914 
Food 
Credit 
chance) 
-16.24 
20.92 
39.4 
35.65 
40.85 
-2.29 
-7.79 
-57.09 
-64.84 
142.47 
124.63 
224 
47.34 
34.13 
34.82 
-20.24 
-22.41 
64.34 
34.69 
48.23 
59.52 
35.75 
-8.48 
-26.08 
13.8 
-2.07 
14.33 
-4.56 
Non-food 
Credit(% 
change) 
21.48 
16.7 
18.05 
14.58 
16.14 
25.69 
6.97 
16.66 
26.73 
20.38 
12.42 
13.52 
16.65 
6.19 
26.76 
22.55 
10.88 
15.06 
12.97 
21.91 
14.07 
9.45 
30.11 
18.94 
26.7 
39.6 
28.52 
22.97 
Total 
Credit 
chanee) 
17.8 
16.99 
19.58 
16.34 
18.55 
22.45 
5.61 
10.71 
23.87 
21.46 
14.64 
13.09 
17.73 
7.42 
27.2 
20.07 
9.6 
16.41 
13.81 
23.11 
16.56 
11.42 
26.57 
15.% 
26.16 
38.01 
28.14 
22.3 
Credit per 
capita 
(Rs.) 
374 
429 
501 
571 
662 
794 
821 
889 
1078 
1283 
1386 
1536 
1776 
1865 
2325 
2737 
2943 
3362 
3752 
4536 
5194 
5681 
7075 
8075 
10028 
13626 
17212 
20755 
Credit per 
office 
(Rs.crores) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0.93 
NA 
1.15 
1.24 
1.47 
1.74 
1.88 
2.12 
Z47 
2.63 
332 
3.94 
4.28 
4.92 
5.53 
6.77 
7.84 
8.69 
10.96 
12.61 
15.61 
21.29 
26.38 
NA 
Source: CMiE, Various Issues. 
The per office credit data is not available for every year. However, it was Rs. 
1.88 crores in 1990-91. After banking sector reforms credit per office in SCBs 
increased to Rs. 4.92 crores in 1997-98, and to Rs.26.38 crores in 2007-08. 
Figure -7 shows the percentage change in food and non-food credits as well as 
total credits in scheduled commercial banks. For food credits percentage change varies 
and it was 20.92 percent in 1981-82 which was increased to 40.85 percent in 1984-85 
but declined to -2.29 percent in 1985-86, -64.84 percent in 1988-89, but increased to 
124.63 percent in 1990-91, and was declined to 47.34 percent 1992-93, -22.41percent 
in 1996-97, increased to 64.34 percent in 1997-98, but again declined to 14.33 peroent 
89 
in 2006-07, and further to -4.56 percent in 2007-08. Likewise, the percentage change 
of non-food credits in SCBs was also not constantly increased rather it followed the 
same pattern. It was 16.7 percent in 1981-82, 25.69 percent in 1985-86, 12.42 percent 
in 1990-91, 6.19 percent in 1993-94, and 22.97 percent in 2007-08. Also, the 
percentage change in total credits before and after reform periods not constantly 
increased rather fluctuated which wasl7.78 percent in 1980-8, 14.64 percent in 1990-
91, 9.6 percent in 1996-97, 28.14 percent in 2006-7, and 22.3 percent in 2007-08. 
Figure-? 
PercMtag* Change in Food and Nonfood Cradit in SCBs 
•ao 
-MO 
VMT 
(viii) Area-wise Distribution of Credit: 
For estimating the extent of the impact of banking sector reforms on area-wise 
distribution of SCBs credit the null hypothesis: there is no significant between credit in 
different groups by population and alternative hypothesis is there is significant 
difference in credit in different groups by populations. The calculated value shows that 
P value is less than 0.05, therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted. Again, we make 
another hypothesis regarding percentage share among difference groups: rural, semi-
urban, urban and metropolitan. The null hypothesis is, there is no significant difference 
percentage share in different groups. The resuh reveals that P value is less than 0.05, 
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hence, later hypothesis is accepted (Table-6 in appendix). Thus, it is obvious that 
banking reforms role is important in expansion of credit in rural, semi-urban, urban and 
metropolitan areas. Table-9 shows that just before reforms in 1990-91 rural areas credit 
was Rs.26643.86 crores, semi-urban areas credit was Rs.20800.12 crores, urban areas 
credit was Rs.27369.26 crores, and metropolitan areas credit was Rs.49389.7 crores. 
After reforms in banking sector credit of all areas like rural, semi-urban, urban and 
metropolitan credit by population has been rising. Rural areas credit was Rs. 48132.1 
crores in 1997-98, Rs. 160479.4 crores in 2004-05, and Rs.235703.7 crores in 2006-07. 
Semi-urban credit by population was Rs.46510.3 crores in 1997-98, Rs. 142836.3 crores 
in 2004-05, and Rs.212752.8 crores in 2006-07. Urban areas credit was Rs.59804.0 
crores in 1997-98, Rs.212299.8 crores in 2004-05, and Rs.350194.3 crores in 2006-07. 
Metropolitan credit was Rs. 175498.0 crores in 1997-98, Rs.636852.5 crores in 2004-
05, and Rs. 1148448.8 crores in 2006-07. 
Figure-8 
PcrMittog* Sham in ToM Cfwitt by PofMiMiim 
X*<*<*<//AV//////// 
The table and figure-9 reveals that since banking sector reform in 1990-91, the 
percentage share of rural credit in total credit has been declining. In 1990-91 rural 
credit shares in total credit was 21.45 percent, which declined to 20.13 percent in 1991-
92, 14.59 in 1997-98, and 12.11 percent in 2006-07. Likewise, the semi-urban 
percentage credit share in total credits did not increase after reforms rather it declined 
in comparison to 1990-91. Semi-urban percentage share in total credit was 16.75 
92 
percent in 1990-91, which declined to 14.1 percent in 1997-98, and 10.93 percent in 
2006-07. As similar to semi-urban credit share, percentage share of urban areas credit 
was fluctuated over the period of reforms which was 22.04 percent in 1990-91, 18.13 
percent in 1997-98,19.31 percent in 2003-04, and 17.99 percent in 2006-07. Moreover, 
the percentage share in total credit of metropolitan-areas has been rising over the period 
of banking sector reforms. It was 39.77 percent in 1990-91, 53.19 percent in 1997-98, 
55.16 percent in 2003-04, and 58.98 percent in 2006-07. 
(ix) Credit (Lending) to Priority Sector by SCBs: 
For the analysis of the impact of banking sector reforms in India, the null 
hypothesis is, there is no significant difTerence m priority sector lending between the 
three periods and alternative hypothesis is there is significant difference hetweea the 
three periods. The calculated value shows that P value is less than 0.05; hsacc, 
alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-7A in appendix). Before banking reforms, in 
period PI, there was average of Rs. 25286.50 crores credits to priority sector. After the 
reforms, average of Rs.233886.6 crores was given to priority sector, while it was Rs. 
77171.43 crores and Rs. 355776.1 crores in P2 and P3 respectively. Compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of credit to agriculture is 15.16 percent which is higher than that 
of small scale industry i.e., 13.99 percent over the given periods. It is obvious that 
credit provided by Indian banks improved a lot after introduction of banking sector 
reforms in India. Similarly, we have to examine how much other sectors have been 
influenced by the banking reforms in India over the period of times. 
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Regarding other industry including medium and large, null hypothesis is that 
there is no significant difference in industry's lending between the three periods. And 
alternative hypothesis is there is significant difference in industry's lending between the 
three periods. It is found that P value is less than 0.05, hence, we accept alternative 
hypothesis (Table-7D in appendix). Average credit of Rs. 3632 crores is observed in 
period PI which is lower than that of P2 i.e., Rs. 10792.71 crores which is less in 
compared to Rs. 31056.11 crores in comparison to period P3. In other words, credit 
provided by banks in India to medium and large scale industry is higher during banking 
sector reforms in comparison to that of before banking reforms period. CAGR of the 
sector is more that of agriculture, small scale industry, and non-food gross bank credit. 
For the analysis of the wholesale trade sector lending in the given three periods, 
PI, P2, and P3, null hypo&esis is, there is no significant difference in wholesale trade 
sector between the three periods. Alternative hypothesis is there is significant 
difference in wholesale trade s^tor lending between the three periods. The calculated 
value of the three periods reveals that P value is less than 0.05, therefore, alternative 
hypothesis is accepted (Table-7C in appendix). It is meant that over the periods, credit 
to wholesale trade has mcreased. Now, it is to be seen in which period the credit is 
augmented high. The average credit of PI is Rs. 9752.75 crores which is less than Rs. 
438.41.14 crores of P2, which is also lower than Rs. 276776.2 crores of P3. It is obvious 
that impact of banking sector reforms has been more effective. But CAGR of wholesale 
trade is appeared less that of other discussed sectors. 
The same method has been used to analyze the impact of the reform on non-
food gross bank credit, null hypothesis is, there is no significant difference in non-food 
gross bank credit sector between the three periods. Alternative hypothesis is, there is 
significant difference in non-food gross bank credit sector lending between the three 
periods. It is found that P value is less than 0.05, hence, alternative hypothesis is 
accepted (Table-7B in appendix). The average credit of this sector before banking 
reforms was Rs. 62998.5 crores which increased to Rs, 222501.9 crores after banking 
reforms. In period P3, it reached to Rs. 1004936 crores which is highest credit supplied 
by banks in India. The compound annual growth rate of this sector is 17,09 percent 
which is greater than that of large and medium industry. Thus, fi'om the study it is clear 
that impact of bankmg reforms in India on lending of priority sector has been 
successful. But more benefit of the reforms went to large and medium industry along 
with non-food gross bank credit m comparison to other sub-sectors of priority sector. 
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(x) NPAs by Type of Assets: 
Loan assets of the banks are broadly classified as performing and non-
performing, while non-performing asset (NPA) is fijrther classified into sub-standard, 
doubtful and loss assets. However, performing asset is called standard asset (Jain, Viva, 
2009)^ 
(a) Standard Assefy: 
Standard asset is a credit facility, which is not classified as NPA and which does 
not disclose any problem and also does not carry more than the normal credit risk 
attached to a business. Null hypothesis is, there is no significant difference between the 
standard of assets of public sector banks, other scheduled commercial banks, foreign 
banks, and all scheduled commercial banks. And alternative hypothesis is there is 
significant difference between the standard assets of the classified banks. The 
calculated value shows that P value is less than 0.05; hence, alternative hypothesis is 
accepted (Table-8 in appendix). 
TabIe-11: Standard Assets 
(1997-98 to 2006-07) (Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Public Sector 
Banks 
239318 
273618 
326783 
387360 
452862 
523724 
610435 
830029 
1092607 
1425519 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
33567 
38394 
53317 
65071 
109272 
134248 
167076 
188789 
309918 
410905 
Foreign Banks 
28996 
28702 
34817 
42285 
47838 
51288 
59619 
74705 
96907 
125453 
All Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
301881 
340714 
414917 
494716 
609972 
709260 
837130 
1093523 
1499431 
1961877 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
Table-11 shows that standard asset has been increasing since 1997-98 to 2007. 
Standard assets of public sector banks amounted to Rs. 239318 crores, other scheduled 
commercial banks Rs. 33567 crores, and foreign banks Rs.28996 crores in 1997-98. In 
2002-03, public sector banks counted Rs. 523724 crores, other scheduled commercial 
banks Rs. 134248 crores and foreign banks Rs.51288 crores. In 2007 public sector 
banks amounted to Rs. 1425519 crores, other schedule commercial banks Rs. 410905 
96 
crores and foreign banks Rs. 125453 crores. Figure-9 also shows that standard asset in 
all areas in scheduled commercial banks always increases. Standard asset in all 
schedule conmiercial banks has been rising from Rs.301881 crores in 1997-98 to 
Rs. 1961877 crores in 2006-07, (Table-11). Average of standard assets in public sector 
banks are observed Rs. 616225.5 crores in the given periods. In other scheduled 
commercial banks it was Rs. 151055.7 crores which was higher than that of foreign 
banks i.e., Rs. 59061 crores during the same periods. 
Figure-9 
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(b) Sub-standard Assets: 
For the analysis of sub-standard, null hypothesis is, there is no significant 
difference between the sub-standard assets of public sector banks, other scheduled 
commercial banks, foreign banks, and all scheduled commercial banks. And alternative 
hypothesis is there is significant difference between the sub-standard assets of the 
classified groups. It is found that P value is less than 0.05, hence, alternative hypothesis 
is accepted (Table-9 in appendix). Average of sub-standard assets in public sector 
banks is Rs. 14600.4 crores, while in other schedule commercial banks the average is 
observed to be Rs. 3021.2 crores. In foreign banks, it is Rs. 1027.7 crores. C. V. of sub-
standard assets in public sector banks is 63.05, while for other scheduled commercial 
banks is 82.54, and in foreign banks it is 53.44 which is lower than that of all scheduled 
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commercial banks. The statistical analysis shows that maximum fluctuation of sub-
standard assets in descending order is observed in scheduled commercial banks then in 
public sector banks followed by foreign banks. 
TabIe-12: Sub-Standard Assets 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Source: CM 
Public 
Sector 
Banks 
14463 
16033 
16361 
14745 
15788 
14909 
16909 
11068 
11453 
14275 
616225.5 
388512.9 
63.05 
E, Various Issues. 
(1997-98 to 2006-0 
Other Scheduled 
Comnnercial Banks 
1766 
2657 
2137 
2585 
4738 
4174 
3127 
2233 
2427 
4368 
151055.7 
124681.9 
82.54 
7) 
Foreign Banks 
1198 
1238 
1096 
876 
856 
995 
990 
715 
946 
1367 
59061 
31563.7 
53.44 
(Rs. crores) 
All 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
17428 
19928 
19594 
18206 
21382 
20078 
21026 
14016 
14826 
20010 
826342.1 
544125.7 
65.85 
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So far as the amount of sub-standard assets is concerned, the figure reveals that 
for public sector banks it was Rs. 14463 crores in 1997-98 which declined to Rs. 14275 
crores in 2006-07. In other scheduled commercial banks, there was of Rs. 1766 crores 
98 
sub-standard assets in 1997-98 then it increased to Rs. 4368 crores in 2006-07. The 
sub-standard assets also increased in foreign banks from Rs. 1198 crores to Rs. 1367 
crores during the same period. 
(c) Doubtful Assets: 
Null hypothesis regarding doubtful assets, is there is no significant difference 
between the doubtful assets in the classified groups as given in table-13. Alternative 
hypothesis is that there is significant difference between the doubtful assets in the 
groups. 
Table-13: Doubtful Assets 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Source: CM 
Public Sector 
Banks 
25819 
29252 
30535 
33485 
33658 
32340 
28756 
30779 
25028 
19873 
28952.5 
4317.75 
14.91 
E, Various Issue 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
1077 
1591 
2355 
3069 
6539 
6447 
6392 
5929 
4406 
3930 
4173.5 
2099.36 
50.30 
s. 
Foreign Banks 
250 
507 
798 
1202 
1004 
944 
1099 
1035 
670 
.605 
811.4 
300.10 
36.99 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
27146 
31350 
33688 
37756 
41201 
39731 
36247 
37763 
30105 
24408 
33939.5 
5570.29 
16.41 
The result shows that P value is less than 0.05, therefore alternative hypothesis 
is accepted (Table-10 in appendix). It is clear that doubtful asset increased over the 
period of times. Public sector got highest average of doubtfiil assets, that is, Rs. 2895.5 
crores. The average in other scheduled banks is Rs. 4173.5 crores. The lowest average 
is seen in foreign banks, that is, Rs. 811.4 crores. The lowest coefficient of variance of 
doubtful assets, (14.9 percent) is appeared in public sector banks and then in foreign 
banks i.e., 36.99 percent and it is the highest ia other scheduled commercial banks 
(50.30 percent). It is clear that in public sector banks we find more doubtful assets in 
comparison to other banks. 
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Null hypothesis for loss asset is, there is no significant difference between the 
loss assets of the classified groups. Alternative hypothesis is there is significant 
difference between loss assets in the groups. Again, the calculated result shows that P 
value is less than 0.05, therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-11 in 
appendix). Loss assets in given classified groups have increased over the years. 
Table-14: Loss Assets 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
SD 
CV 
Source: CMIE, 
Public Sector 
Banks 
5371 
6425 
6398 
6544 
7061 
6840 
5876 
5929 
5636 
4826 
6090.6 
692.10 
11.36 
Various Issues. 
(1997-98 to 2 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
343 
407 
439 
424 
389 
1177 
825 
883 
939 
941 
676.7 
305.64 
45.17 
006-07) 
Foreign Banks 
528 
612 
712 
1033 
920 
954 
924 
570 
441 
447 
714.1 
225.45 
31.57 
(Rs. crores) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
6242 
7444 
7558 
8001 
8370 
8971 
7625 
7382 
7016 
6215 
7482.4 
861.05 
11.51 
100 
Average of the loss assets of public sector banks amounted to, Rs. 6090.6 
crores, which is higher in comparison to foreign banks' average i.e., Rs. 714.1 crores. 
The lowest average of the groups, Rs. 676.7 crores, is found in after scheduled banks. 
Trend of C.V of loss assets is the same as it is observed in the doubtful assets. C.V of 
other scheduled commercial banks is found to be, 45.17 percent which is higher than 
31.57 percent of foreign banks which is lower as comp^6eFto 11.36 of public sector 
banks. Table-14 and figure-12 indicates that loss- of assets of all classified banks 
increased fi-om 1997-98 to 2002-03, then declined «iore than former period except in 
other scheduled commercial banks. 
Figure-12 
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(e) Total NPAs: 
Again, we use the same method for estimating change in total NPAs 
over the given periods as in doubtfiil assets. Null hypothesis is, there is no significant 
difference between total NPAs in the classified groups. Alternative hypothesis is, there 
is significant difference between total NPAs in the groups. The calculated value reveals 
that P value is less than 0.05, therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted (Table-12 in 
appendix). The mean value of public sector total NPAs is Rs. 49646.4 crores which is 
greater than Rs. 7871.5 crores of other scheduled banks in India. The mean of foreign 
bank's NPAs is the smallest of the groups is Rs. 2554.1 crores. The co-efficient of 
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variation of total NPAs is less than that of other discussed assets. The trend of C.V in 
total NPAs is the same as in earlier assets. Lower C. V. is found in the public sector 
banks i.e., 11.71 percent and to 15.35 percent in foreign banks, and 38.66 percent in 
other scheduled commercial banks. However, there is more stability in total NPAs in 
comparison to other assets. 
Table-15: Total NPAs 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
SD 
CV 
Source: CMIE, 
Public Sector 
Banks 
45653 
51710 
53294 
54774 
56507 
54098 
51541 
47796 
42117 
38974 
49646.4 
5814.7 
11.71 
Various Issues. 
(1997-98 to 200C 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
3186 
4655 
4931 
6078 
11666 
11798 
10344 
9045 
7772 
9240 
7871.5 
3043.2 
38.66 
.-07) 
Foreign Banks 
1976 
2357 
2615 
3111 
2780 
2893 
3013 
2320 
2057 
2419 
2554.1 
392.1 
15.35 
(Rs. crores) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
50815 
85722 
60840 
63963 
70953 
68780 
64898 
59161 
51947 
50633 
62771.2 
10852.3 
17.29 
Figure-13 
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Table-17 reveals that gross non-performing assets in SBI and its associates was 
Rs. 199773 crores in 1999-00, which reduced to Rs. 19736 crores in 2001-02, and 
further it declined to Rs. 12677 crores in 2006-07. Gross NPAs of nationalized banks 
were Rs. 33260 crores, which was lower tfian that of SBI and its associates during 
1999-00, further, it increased to Rs. 36763 crores during 2001-02 which was higher 
than that of SBI and its associates, but it declined to Rs. 26291 crores during 2006-07, 
which was still higher than that of SBI and its associates. Likewise, Net non-
performing assets in SBI and its associates was Rs. 8752 crores in 1999-00, which 
increased to Rs. 9455 crores in 2001-02, and it declined to Rs. 6359 crores in 2006-07. 
Net NPAs of nationalized banks were Rs. 17048 crores, 19032 crores, and further, it 
increased to Rs. 8786 crores which was higher than that of SBI and its associates during 
the same periods. However, gross NPA of SCBs was Rs. 60304 crores during 1999-00 
which increased to Rs. 70909 during 2001-02, but it declme to Rs. 50486 crores during 
2006-07. Likewise, net NPA of SCBs was Rs. 29261 crores during 1999-00 which 
increased to Rs. 32662 during 2001-02, but it declined to Rs. 20100 crores during 
2006-07. Thus we find the same trend of gross and net NPAs for SCBs over the given 
periods. 
Year 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D 
C.V 
Sources: C 
SBI & its 
associates 
199773 
20587 
19736 
17204 
15989 
15603 
12541 
12677 
39263.75 
64920.294 
165.34 
Tal 
Nationalized 
Banks 
33260 
34088 
36763 
36883 
36892 
32803 
28817 
26291 
33224.63 
3923.923 
11.81 
)le-16: Gross NPAs 
[1999-00 to 2006-07) 
Foreign 
Banks 
2633 
3100 
2726 
NA 
2684 
2191 
1928 
2263 
2503.57 
396.099 
15.82 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
4638 
5897 
11683 
NA 
8848 
8527 
7234 
9255 
8011.71 
2325.503 
29.03 
VflE, Various Issues. NA= Not Available. 
(Rs. Crores) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
60304 
63672 
70909 
NA 
64413 
59124 
50520 
50486 
59918.29 
7451.667 
12.44 
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Table-17: NetNPAs 
(1999-00 to 2006-07) (Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D 
C.V 
SBI & its 
associates 
8752 
9455 
8968 
7796 
5967 
6363 
6072 
6359 
7466.5 
1444.55 
Nationalized 
Banks 
17048 
18523 
19032 
17167 
12361 
10541 
8492 
8786 
13993.75 
4428.37 
Foreign 
Banks 
757 
723 
893 
NA 
864 
649 
805 
927 
802.57 
99.525 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
2704 
3438 
3770 
NA 
4021 
4086 
2897 
4028 
3563.43 
568.54 
All Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
29261 
32140 
32662 
NA 
23212 
21638 
18266 
20100 
25325.57 
5929.541 
19.35 31.65 12.40 15.95 23.41 
Sources: CMIE, Various Issues, NA= Not Available. 
(xi) Total Advances: 
Null hypothesis of total advances is assumed that there is no significant 
difference between the total advances of classified groups as given in table-18. And 
alternative is, there is significant difference between the total advances of the groups. 
The result shows that P value is less than 0.05, therefore, alternative hypothesis is 
accepted (Table-13 in appendix). It is meant that total advances has boosted over the 
periods, 
TabIe-18: Total Advances 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
SD 
CV 
CI 
Public Sector 
Banks 
284971 
325328 
380077 
442134 
509369 
577813 
661975 
877825 
1134724 
1464493 
665870.9 
384071.43 
57.68 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
997-98 to 2006-07) 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
36753 
43049 
58248 
71149 
120938 
146046 
177420 
197834 
317690 
420145 
158927.2 
126095.55 
79.34 
Foreign Banks 
30972 
31059 
37432 
45396 
50618 
54181 
62632 
77025 
98965 
127872 
61615.2 
31482.36 
51.10 
(Rs. crores) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
352696 
399436 
475757 
558679 
680925 
778040 
902027 
1152684 
1551378 
2012510 
886413.2 
540928.76 
61.02 
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Figure: 14 
The trend of mean value of the sector is the same as in above sector of total 
NPAs. Rs. 665870.0 crores is observed in public sector banks, Rs. 158927.2 crores in 
other scheduled banks, and Rs. 61615.2 crores in foreign bank. C. V. of total advances 
is lower than that of total sub-standard assets but higher than that of other discussed 
assets. In other words, there are more fluctuations in total advances of all classified 
groups of banks over the period. In public sector banks, C. V. of total advances is 57.68 
percent, of other scheduled commercial banks is 79.34 percent and for foreign banks, it 
is 51.10 percent. The figure-14 reveals clearly that amount of total advances has been 
rising continuously fi:om 1997-98 to 2006-07. 
4.2 Performance Evaluation of Public Sector Banks in India: 
The rapid growth of the banking system following nationalization of banks in 
1969 has been impressive. By the 1990s the public sector banks had 90 percent share in 
the country's banking business. Now we have to examine the impact of banking sector 
reforms on public sector banks. For this purpose, following parameters have been 
selected: 
• Interest expended as percentage of total assets of public sector banks; 
• Interest income as percentage of total assets; 
• Net interest income / margin as percentage of total assets; 
• Net profit / loss as percentage of total assets; 
• Operating expenses as percentage of total assets; 
105 
• Capital adequacy ratio; 
• Return on assets; 
• Business per employee; and 
• Profit per employee. 
(i) Interest Expended as Percentage of Total Assets: 
In table-19, interest expended as percentage of total assets of public sector 
banks in 1991-92 was 6.96 percent which declined to 4.24 percent in 2006-07. The 
average of percentage of interest expended is 5.71 percent. But the compound annual 
growth rate of interest expended public sector banks is -3.42 percent. Thus, the 
compound annual growth rate of individual bank in public sector is negative. Average 
interest expended as percentage of total assets of all public sector banks varies between 
5 percent to 6.5 percent. Average interest expended as percentage of total assets of 
Allahabad Bank is 6.10 percent, Bank of Baroda 5.64 percent, Canara Bank 5.7 
percent, Punjab National Bank 5.69 percent etc. On the other hand, coefficient of 
variance of public sector banks varies between 11.76 percent to 28.37 percent. The 
highest negative compound annual growth rate of interest expended to total assets of 
public sector banks is observed in Indian Bank, i.e., -5.78 percent and the lowest one is 
appeared in State Bank of India is -2.64 percent. Also, there are many banks such as 
State Bank of Hyderabad, Bank of Maharashtra, Oriental Bank of Commerce and Dena 
Bank for which CAGR of interest expended are -2.64 percent, -2.85 percent, -2.88 
percent, and -2.99 percent respectively over the periods. 
(ii) Interest Income as Percentage of Total Assets: 
Table-20 reveals that the average of interest income as percentage of total assets 
of public sector banks fluctuated from 5.15 percent to 9.30 percent. The average of 
interest income as percents^e of total assets for Bank of Maharashtra is 8.67 percent, 
Allahabad Bank 8,75 percent. Oriental Bank of Commerce 9.30 percent, Dena Bank 
8.90 percent, State Bank of India 8.44 percent, and State Bank of Saurashtra 9.14 
percent. The compound annual growth rate of interest income as percentage of total 
assets of all banks given below is negative. The lowest CAGR is appeared in United 
Bank of India, i.e., -0.75 percent, in Indian Overseas Bank, it is 0.84 percent, in Punjab 
and Sind Band -0.95 percent etc. The coefficient of variance of interest income as 
percentage of total assets of the banks varied from 10.70 to 17.55 percent. 
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(iii) Net Interest Income/Margin as Percentage of Total Assets: 
Average of percentage of interest income as margin to total assets of public 
sector banks in India, as shown in table-21, changes from 0.43 percent to 3.59 percent 
over the given periods. The aggregate of public sector banks average in terms of margin 
percentage is 2.84 percent. Nationalized banks is having 2.76 percent margin to total 
assets of public sector banks. The average of State Banks Group is 3.02 percent and 
other public sector banks 0.43 percent. The coefficient of variance of the entire public 
sector banks is 8.37, while in nationalized banks it-is found 10.04 percent. The highest 
C.V is observed in IDBI Ltd. is 46.51 percent, then it reduced to 40.54 in United Bank 
of India further declined to 20.66 in Allahabad Band, 20.44 in Andhra Bank etc. So far 
as compound aimual growth rate is concerned, positive growth rate is appeared in 
public sector banks. Nationalized Banks, Allahabad Bank, Andhra Bank, Bank of India, 
Bank of Maharashtra, Central Bank of India, Indian Bank, India Overseas Bank, Punjab 
and Sind Bank and it is 0.09 percent, 1.24 percent, 3.61 percent, 3.14 percent, 0.64 
percent, 1.31 percent, 2.79 percent, 8.34 percent etc. respectively. 
(iv) Net Profit/Loss as Percentage of Total Assets: 
The average of net profit/loss as percentage of total assets of public sector 
banks is 0.4 percent (Table-22). There are many banks for which average of net 
profit/loss percentage is obtained such as Bank of Maharashtra, Central Bank of India, 
Punjab and Sind Bank, Syndicate Bank, UCO Bank and United Bank of India, and their 
coefficient of variance of net profit/loss is negative. The highest average of percentage 
in Corporation Bank is 1.15 percent which declined to 1.12 percent in Oriental Bank of 
Commerce. The rest of the banks average ranges between 1 and 0. The standard 
deviation of net profit/ loss as percentage of total assets of public sector banks is 0.648. 
The highest S.D of net profit/loss as percentage of total asset appeared in United Bank 
of India. On the other hand, the lowest value in S.D is foimd in State Bank of 
Travancore. There are more fluctuations observed in C.V of net profit/loss percentage 
of total assets of public sector banks. It means that no stability m terms of net 
profit/loss percentage. 
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(v) Operating Expenses as Percentage of Total Assets: 
Operating expenses include establishment expenses, rent, taxes, lighting, printing 
and stationary, advertisement and publicity, depreciation etc. It is the expenditure incurred 
to operate an institution. Table?23 reveals operating'expenses as percentage of total assets 
of public sector banks. The average of operating expenses in public sector aggregated to 
2.43 percent, whilein nationalized banks it is more, i.e., 2.44 percent. The highest average 
of operating expenses, 3.13 percent, is noticed in State Bank of Mysore which declined to 
2.99 percent in Syndicate Bank, 2.77 percent in Central Bank of India, and 2.66 percent in 
Allahabad Bank, and so on. Standard deviation of operating expenses as percentage to 
total assets of Bank of Baroda is 0.209 which is the lowest. S. D ranges between 0.209 to 
0.725. The coefficient of variance of operating expenses as percentage of total assets of 
public sector banks is found to bel5.29, while in nationalized banks it is observed 14.85. 
The range of C.V. is 9.38 to 27.21 that is noticed in Bank of Baroda and State Bank of 
Indore respectively. So far as. Compound annual growth rate is concerned, it is found 
negative in the banks over the given periods. 
(vi) Capital Adequacy Ratio of Public Sector Banks in India: 
Table-24 shows capital adequacy ratio of public sector banks in India in terms of 
percentage. Average of capital adequacy ratio for scheduled commercial banks aggregated 
to 12.34 percent, in public sector banks it is 12.32 percent, and in nationalized banks 12.03 
percent. Thus, average of scheduled commercial banks and public sector banks as well as 
nationalized banks is near about the same. In Corporation Bank of India, the average of 
capital adequacy ratio is 14.85 percent which is the highest among given banks. In Indian 
Bank it is the lowest, that is, 6.18 percent. There are many banks for which average of 
capital adequacy is more than 12 percent such as Andhra Bank, Bank of Baroda, State 
Bank Group, and State Bank of Saurashtra etc. The lowest standard deviation of capital 
adequacy ratio is found in State Bank Group i.e., 0.59. And the highest is 11.40 in Indian 
Bank. Standard deviation of scheduled commercial banks aggregated to 0.53, while in 
public sector banks it is 0,68 and 1.11 in nationalized banks. The coefficient of variance of 
capital adequacy ratio in nationalized banks is foimd to be 9.19 which reduced to 5.48 in 
public sector banks and further it declined to 4.26 in scheduled commercial banks. So far 
as compound annual growth rate is concerned, there are only two banks, Oriental Bank of 
Commerce and State Bank of Saurashtra, in which the growth is found negative and the 
rest banks possess positive growth rate over the given periods. 
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(vii) Return on Assets: 
Retxim of assets is defined as net profit divided by average of total assets. This 
ratio measures a banks profit per currency unit of assets. This is main indicator of 
profitabihty used in international comparisons and it is one among the guidelines of 
Rfil for balance sheet analysis of banks. The return on assets of different banks and 
different categories of public sector banks is shown in table-25. It may be noted that 
immediately after introduction of reforms, the PSBs have registered negative returns in 
United Banks of India, Punjab Sind Bank, Indian Bank, Central Bank of India, UCO 
Bank, and Bank of Maharashtra. It is because of net losses registered by the banks. 
However, in remaining banks situation has changed for the better. There have been 
fluctuations (in the year to year percentages, but in Punjab National Banks, Oriental 
Bank of Commerce, Corporation Banks, and Union Bank of India, average returns on 
assets are boosted by 7.81 percent, 1.13 percent, 1.22 percent, and 0.92 percent 
respectively. Average returns on assets of public sector banks ranges fi»m -0.75 percent 
to 7.81 percent. Similarly, inter-banks standard deviation reveals that S, D. of Punjab 
National Banks is 28.59 which is higher when compared to the S.D. of other banks and 
is followed by Indian Bank (2.73), and Bank of Maharashtra (1.77). When a 
comparison of coefficient of variance (C.V.) of different banks is made. Syndicate 
Bank (4259.99 percent), and Indian Overseas Bank (4980.10 percent) are in the top of 
the PSBs list, while United Bank of India (-338.26 percent), UCO Bank (-343.11 
percent), Punjab and Sind Bank (-510.90), Indian Bank (-303.53 percent), Centr^ Bank 
of India (-2155.00 percent), Bank of Maharashtra (-1089.27 percent) were in the 
bottom. There existed large variations among the PSBs with regard to this particular 
indicator throughout the study. 
(viii) Business per Employee: 
The average business per employee is an improved measure of efficiency of 
employee because the total business combines both deposits and advances. The 
intermediation process between savers and borrowers becomes complete when deposits 
mobilized are lent to borrowers engaged in different types of business activities. The 
table-26 shows average-business p«: employee of different banks groups. The average 
business per employee, has increased throughout the study period. The business per 
employee of all PSBs taken together increased fi-om 1203.95 lakhs in 1992-93 to 
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15637.76 lakhs in 2007-08, an improvement of about 11 times. State Bank of India and 
its associate banks have been able to improve average business per employee within the 
range of 144.63 lakhs to 232.82 lakhs over the given period. It appears from the date 
that State Bank of Patiala has made remarkable progress in area of average business per 
employee in the case of State Bank and its associate banks. The average business per 
employee of public sector banks rages from 114.63 lakhs in State Bank of Bikaner and 
Jaipur to 313.78 lakhs in Oriental Bank of Commerce, and it declmed to 230.85 lakhs 
in Union Bank of India, and fiirther it reduced to 236.56 lakhs in Bank of Broda and so 
on. 
As compared to SBI and its associated banks, the nationalized banks, on an 
average, continued to register higher business per employee in the period under study. 
Similarly, compoimd annual growth rate of business per employee of nationalized 
banks is higher than those of SBI and associated bank. 
A bank-wise analysis of co-efQcient of variance of business per employee 
reveals that State Bank of Patiala (93.40 percent) is followed by UCO Bank (92.59 
percent). On the other hand, State Bank of India (70.01 percent), Central Bank of India 
(71.32 percent), and State Bank of Saurashtra (72.36 percent) secured the lowest 
business per employee. 
Inter-bank comparison on the basis of compound annual growth rate of business 
per employee shows that State Bank of India secured the lowest growth rate i.e., 16.14 
percent while Andhra Bank got the highest growth rate of 21.81 percent in public sector 
banks. It appears that there is positive growth in all public sector banks in case of 
business per employee. 
(ix) Profit per Employee: 
The data on average profit per employee are presented in the table-27. During 
the entire period (1992-93 to 2007-08) SBI and its associates made profits. Their total 
profits per employee increased from Rs. 79.94 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 88.19 lakhs in 
2007-08. The average of total profits of SBI and its associate banks per employee is Rs. 
9.62 lakhs over the given period. Individually, average profit of banks ranges between 
Rs. 0.55 lakhs to Rs. 1.58 lakhs in SBI and its associate banks. Nationalized banks 
reveals somewhat different picture. The nationalized banks faced loss of Rs, -0.63 lakhs 
in 1992-93, Rs. -0.81 lakhs in 1993-94, and Rs. -0.2 lakhs per employee and rest of the 
years show positive gain per employee. So far as public sector banks are concerned, 
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they incurred loss in first two years of given period, i.e., Rs. 0.38 lakhs per employee in 
1992-93, and Rs. 0.49 lakhs in 1993-94. In other words, except SBI and its associate 
banks, loss per employee is found in all other banks including Allahabad Bank, Andhra 
Bank, Bank of India, Bank of Maharashtra, Canara Bank, Central Bank of India, 
Corporation! Bank, Dena Bank, Indian Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, Punjab and Sind 
Bank, Punjab Bank, Syndicate Bank, UCO Bank, United Bank of India, and Vijaya 
Bank during 1992-95. The remaining periods show positive profit per employee. This 
has resulted in negative average profitability of PSBs. The average profit per employee 
of other banks mcreased fi:om Rs. 154.87 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 217.28 lakhs in 2007-
08. In the first three to four years of early periods of reforms, large number of banks 
sustained losses due to write-off of accumulated bad and doubtfiil debts and higher 
provisioning for NPAs. 
The co-efi5cient of variance of profitability per employee of SBI and its 
associate banks and other remaining banks are 91.64 percent and 130.59 percent 
respectively. There are many banks for which C.V of profit per employee is 
substantially high such as Indian Bank (12994.86 percent), United Bank of India 
(465.04 percent). Central Bank of India (460.50 percent), Punjab and Sind Bank 
(449.56 percent). Bank of Maharashtra (272.99.percent), Allahabad Bank (156.77 
percent) etc. Thus, there existed exceptionally higher inter-bank variations with respect 
to profit per employee. 
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CHAPTER -5 
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
RELATED TO BANKING SECTOR 
REFORMS 
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO BANKING 
SECTOR REFORMS 
5.1 Priority SectorcLendingtand Social Objectives: 
As per the revised draft guidelines issued by RBI on 8* November 2006, the 
priority sector broadly includes agriculture, small scale industries, small 
business/service enterprises, micro credit, education loans, and housing loans. The 
guidelines on lending to priority sector were revised with effect from April 30, 2007 
based on the Report of the Internal Working Group on Priority Sector Lending. The 
priority sectors are agriculture (both direct and indirect finance), SSI, small road and 
water transport operators, retail trade, small business, professional and self employed 
persons. State sponsored schemes for scheduled castes/schediiled tribes, education, 
housing and consumption, retail trade, micro credit, education and housing subject to 
certain limits (Bhasin, Niti, 2006)'. The broad categories of priority sector for all 
scheduled commercial banks are: 
(!) Agriculture (Direct and Indirect Finance): . 
Direct finance to agriculture shall include short, medium and long term loans 
given for agricxilture and allied activities directly to individual farmers, self-help 
group (SHGs) or joint liability group (JLGs) of individual farmers without limit and 
to others (such as corporate, partnership firms and institutions) up to Rs. 20 lakhs, for 
taking up agriculture/allied activities. Indirect finance to agriculture includes loans 
given for agriculture and allied activities. 
(ii) Small Scale Industries (Direct and Indirect Finance): 
Direct finance to small scale industries (SSIs) include all loans given to SSIs 
units which are engaged in manufacturing, processing or preservation of goods and 
whose investment in plant and machinery (original cost) excluding land and building. 
Indirect finance to SSIs comprises finance to any person providing inputs to or 
marketing the output of artisans, village and cottage industries, handlooms and to 
cooperatives of producers in this sector. The Union Budget for 2008-09 set a target of 
Rs. 2,80,000 crores for disbursement of agricultural credit during the year by all banks 
including co-operative banks and RRBs. Several measures were taken during the year 
to increase, the flow of credit to agriculture and allied activities. 
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(iii) Small Business/Service Enterprises: 
It refers to small business, retail trade, professional & self employed persons, 
small roadi& water transport operators and other service enterprises, 
(iv) Micro Credit: 
Provision of credit and other financial services and products of very small 
amounts not exceeding Rs. 50,000 per borrower to the poor in rural, semi-urban and 
urban areas, either directly or through a group mechanism, for enabling them to 
improve their living standards, constitute micro credit, 
(v) Education loans: 
Education loans includes loans and advances granted to only individuals for 
educational purpose up to Rs. 10 lakh for studies in India and Rs. 20 lakhs for studies 
abroad and does not include those granted to institutions, 
(vi) Housing Loans: 
Loans up to Rs. 15 lakh for construction of house by individuals,(excluding 
loans granted by banks to their own employees) and loans given for repairs to the 
damaged houses of individiials up to Rs. 1 lakh in rural and semi-urban. RRBs were 
permitted to extend direct finance up to Rs.lO lakhs to the housing sector in rural and 
semi-urban areas as part of priority sector lending, with the prior approval of their 
boards. In i August 2007, the limit of board-approved direct finance to housing by 
RRBs was raised to Rs.20 lakhs, irrespective of the area. 
The definition of weaker sections in priority sector has also been revised and 
accordingly, the weaker sections in priority sector are now defined as: 
a) small and marginal farmers v^th land holdings of 5 acres and less, landless 
labourers, tenant fanners, and share croppers; 
b) artisans, village and cottage industries with individual credit requirements 
not exceeding Rs.50,000/-; 
c) beneficiaries of the Swamajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY); 
d) scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; 
e) beneficiaries of the differential rate of interest (DRI) scheme; 
f) beneficiaries under Swama Jayanti Shahari Roj gar Yojana (SJSRY); 
g) beneficiaries imder the scheme for liberation and rehabilitation of 
scavengers; 
h) advances to self help groups (SHGs); and 
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i) loans to distressed urban poor to pre-pay their debt to non-institutional 
lenders, against appropriate collateral or group security, subject to the 
guidelines to be approved by their Board of Directors. 
Foreign banks operating in India were advised to progressively increase their 
advances to the priority sector categories of borrowers and such advances were to 
reach a level of 15 percent of their net bank credit (NBC) by the end of March 1992. 
hi April 1993, this ratio was further raised to 32 per cent of NBC to be achieved by 
March 1994. New private sector banks were advised to observe priority sector lending 
targets as applicable to other domestic commercial banks at 40 per cent. The Local 
Area Banks (LABs) in the private sector were also advised in August 1996 to observe 
priority sector lending targets as appUcable to other domestic banks. Within this 
target, LABs are to adhere to the requirement of lending at least 25 per cent of their 
priority sector deployment (10 per cent of NBC) to weaker sections. Primary co-
operative (urban) banks are also required to attain a priority sector lending of 60 per 
cent of their total advances, of which at least 25 per cent should be to weaker sections. 
Foreign banks operating in India are required to achieve the target of 32.0 per cent of 
NBC for priority sector advances with sub-targets of 10.0 per cent for SSIs and 12.0 
per cent for exports. Lending to the priority sector by foreign banks constituted 34.8 
per cent of their NBC as on the last reporting Friday of March 2004, of which the 
shares of export credit and SSIs as a percentage of NBC were 18.7 per cent and 10.4 
per cent, respectively. During the period 1998-2004, the average annual growth rate 
of priority sector advances of foreign banks was 16.9 percent. The average annual 
growth rate during the same period for SSIs was at 18.1 per cent compared to 12.0 
percent growth in export credit. 
In April 1993, it was also decided that the requirement for lending to priority 
sector in respect of foreign banks should be raised fijom 15 per cent to 32 per cent of 
their NBC from March 1994. Further, with effect from July 1993, the composition of 
priority sector advances in case of foreign banks was widened to include export credit. 
It was prescribed that within the overall target of 32 per cent, the advances to SSI 
sector and export sector each should not be less than 10 per cent of the NBC. The 
stipulation of depositing the amount of shortfall with SIDBI against the enhanced 
target of 32 per cent was continued on the same terms. In November 1996, the sub-
target for export sector was raised to 12 per cent, which was required to be reached 
before March 1997. 
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The credit advanced to the priority sector by scheduled commercial banks 
recorded an average annual growth rate of 18,4 per cent during the period from 1995 
to 2004, which was marginally higher than the average annual growth of 18.0 per cent 
observed in aggregate bank credit. However, the share of priority sector advances as a 
percentage; of NBC had shown undulating trends during the period. During 1995-
1996, it fell from 33.7 per cent to 32.8 per cent, but remained steady at around 35 per 
cent during the years 1997 to 2000. Thereafter, it dipped sharply to 31.0 per cent in 
2001 recovered to 35.1 per cent in 2003 and further to 36.8 per cent in 2004 
(http://www. banknetindia. com/banldng/psl htm) . 
The nimiber of accoxmts covered under agriculture in priority sector declined 
from 2.03 crores in 1995 to 1.99 crores in 2004. However, outstanding advances to 
agriculture had increased substantially during the period from Rs. 24,200 crores to 
Rs.99,302 crores, registering an average anniial growth rate of 16.6 per cent. 
Outstanding advances to agriculture as a percentage of net bank credit had recorded a 
negligible increase from 11.4 percent at the end of 1995 to 11.5 percent at the end of 
2004. During the period 2001-04, the total outstanding credit to agriculture sector 
extended by public sector banks was within the range of 15-16 percent of NBC as 
against the target of 18.0 percent whereas in respect of private sector banks, the share 
of agricultural credit in NBC increased from 7.1 per cent to 11.8 per cent during the 
same period. The average annual growth of direct finance to agriculture was lower at 
13.9 per cent during 1995-2004 (Table-1). The share of direct finance to agriculture in 
total agricultural credit declined from 88.2 per cent in 1995 to 71.3 percent in 2004. 
Direct finance to agriculture as a percentage of NBC had also declined from 10.1 per 
cent to 8.2 per cent during the above period (RBI, 2004)^. 
The share of credit for distribution of fertilizers and other inputs which was at 
2.2 per cent in 1995 increased to 4.2 per cent in 2004. The share of other types of 
indirect finance to agriculture to total agriculture credit mcreased significantly from 
4.8 per cent to 21.0 per cent during the said period. As a percentage of NBC, other 
types of indirect finance to agriculture increased fix)m 0.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent. 
Indirect credit to agriculture provided by banks, comprising of finance for distribution 
of fertilizers and other inputs and other types of indirect finance, grew at a rate of 30.8 
per cent during the corresponding period. It would be observed that the share of 
indirect credit to agriculture in total agriculture credit increased from 11.8 per cent in 
March 1995 to 28.7 per cent in March 2004 despite the fact that indirect agriculture 
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advances are reckoned only to the extent of 4.5 per cent while measuring the 
performance of banks in achieving the target of 18.0 percent of NBC in agriculture. 
As a percentage of NBC, indirect credit to agriculture increased from 1.4 per cent to 
3.3 per cent during the above period. 
Scheduled commercial banks' credit to SSIs increased at an average annual 
rate of 11.7 percent during the period 1995 to 2004, as compared to the average 
annual growth rate of 18.4 per cent m bank credit to priority sector during the same 
period. However, the credit to SSIs as a percentage of NBC declmed from 13.8 
percent to 8.2 per cent. The number of accounts of SSIs units availing banking finance 
declined from 29.6 lakhs to 18,1 lakhs during the same period. However, outstanding 
credit per account increased from Rs.0.98 lakhs in 1995 to Rs.3.94 lakhs in 2004. 
Though loans for setting up of industrial estates grew at an average annual rate of 36.6 
per cent, the growdi rate showed fluctuations during the period, mth very high growth 
rates in the year 1998,2001 and 2004 and negative growth rates in 1995,1996,1999, 
2000,2002, and 2003. Such loans as a percentage of NBC were at a negligible level. 
Table-1: Outstanding Advances of Scheduled Commercial Banks to Agriculture 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005P 
2006P 
2007P 
Direct 
Finance 
to 
Agriculture 
(Rs. crores) 
21334 
23814 
27448 
29443 
33094 
36466 
40485 
46580 
56858 
70781 
95565 
134798 
172128 
Finance for 
Distribution 
of 
Fertilizer 
and 
Other 
Inputs (Rs. 
crores) 
536 
756 
968 
1200 
1491 
1675 
2304 
3304 
3241 
4118 
5134 
6440 
8616 
Loans to State 
Electricity 
Boards (Rs. 
crores) 
1165 
1058 
1222 
1417 
1627 
1723 
1697 
1841 
2967 
3533 
4174 
6464 
11319 
Other 
Types 
of 
Indirect 
Finance 
(Rs. 
crores) 
1164 
1860 
2785 
3718 
4999 
9570 
14824 
13094 
17483 
20869 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Total 
(Agriculture) 
(Rs. crores) 
24200 
27488 
32423 
35777 
41211 
49434 
59310 
64819 
80547 
9930 
NA 
NA 
NA 
% 
direct 
Finance 
to 
Agriculture 
88.2 
86.6 
84.7 
82.3 
80.3 
73.8 
68.3 
71.9 
70.6 
71.3 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India, NA Not Available, P= Provisional 
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The average annual growth rate of advances to road and water transport 
operators was at 12.7 per cent during 1995-2004 with per account outstanding amount 
at Rs.0.41 lakh in 1995 vis-a-vis Rs.1.40 lakhs in 2004. Loans to road and water 
transport operators as a percentage of NBC declined marginally from 1.4 per cent to 
1.0 per cent. The significant feature observed in this regard is the decline in the 
number of accoimts in SSIs and other sub-sectors over the period, while the amount 
outstanding increased. This shows that enhanced credit limits were granted to such 
units to meet their requirements. 
The outstanding priority sector advances of public sector banks (PSBs) 
increased by 21 per cent in 2003-04 as against an increase of 18.6 per cent during 
2002-03. During the period 1995-2004, the average annual growth rate of advances to 
priority sector by public sector banks was 17.6 per cent as compared to average 
growth rate of NBC at 16.7 per cent in the same period. The higher growth in priority 
sector advances of PSBs during the above period was primarily due to 28.8 per cent 
average growth rate recorded by other priority sectors which compensated for the low 
average growth rate in the credit to SSIs (9.3 per cent) and direct agriculture credit 
(15.7 per cent). The share of priority sector advances in NBC of PSBs increased to 44 
per cent in 2003-04 from 42.5 per cent in 2002-03. The growth in priority sector 
advances of PSBs was frielled by the surge in the loans and advances to various other 
priority sectors and robust growth of credit to the agriculture sector. Advances to 
agriculture constituted 15.4 per cent of NBC of PSBs as on the last reporting Friday of 
March 2003. The share of advances to other priority sectors in NBC of PSBs 
increased to 17.0 per cent in 2003-04 from 15.0 per cent in 2002-03. The number of 
accounts covered under various major segments (agriculture, SSI and other priority 
sectors) of priority sector declined over the period. 
The Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (Narasimham Committee-II) 
recognized that the small and marginal farmers and the tiny sector of industry and 
small businesses have problems with regard to obtaining credit and some earmarking 
may be necessary for this sector. Under the present dispensation, within the priority 
sector, 10 per cent of NBC is earmarked for lending to weaker sections. The 
Committee recommended that given the special needs of this sector, the current 
practice may continue. The Committee also proposed that given the importance and 
needs of employment-oriented sectors (like food processing and related service 
activities in agriculture, fisheries, poultry and dairying), these sectors should also be 
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covered under the scope of priority sector lending. It, however, recommended for the 
removal of concessionzil rates of interest on loans up to Rs. 2 lakhs and a phased 
moving away from overall priority sector targets and sub-sector targets. The 
Committee also recognized that enhancement of credit to these sectors is critically 
dependent on the availability of adequate infrastructure in these areas (RBI, 2003)". 
Table-2: Priority Sector Lending by Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) 
(% to Net Bank Credh) 
SCB 
Public 
Sector 
Banks 
Private 
Sector 
Banks 
Target 
Priority 
Sector 
SSI 
Priority 
Sector 
SSI 
1995 
36.6 
15.3 
NA 
NA 
1996 
37.8 
16 
34 
18.8 
1997 
41.7 
16.6 
41.2 
22.2 
1998 
41.8 
17.5 
40.9 
20.6 
1999 
39.2 
16.1 
38 
16.5 
2000 
40.2 
14.6 
38.2 
14.4 
2001 
43.7 
14.2 
40.9 
13.7 
2002 
43.1 
12.5 
40.9 
13.7 
2003 
41.2 
10.8 
44.4 
8.2 
2004 
43.6 
10.4 
47.3 
7.3 
2005 
42.8 
9.5 
43.6 
5.4 
2006 
40.3 
8.1 
42.8 
4.2 
Source: RBI, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, Various Issues. 
5.2 Non-Performing Assets (NPAs): 
It is observed that 73 percent of the member coimtries of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have experienced serious banking problems but most of these 
member coimtries are developing nations. One of the prominent reasons for the crisis 
in the world is building up of non - performing assets in the banking and financial 
sector. India has also experienced the problem of rising NPAs. 
Baking as institution, deals with lending and collection of money. It followed 
the basic law of demand and supply where persons having excess money lent to 
persons who needed it for more productive purposes and were willing to pay a price 
for this. As long as asset generates the income expected from it and does not disclose 
any unusual risk other than normal commercial risk, it is treated as performing asset, 
and when it fails to generate the expected income, it becomes a non-performing asset 
(NPA). In other words, a loan asset becomes a non-performing asset when it ceases to 
generate income, i.e., interest, fees, commission, or any otiier dues for the bank for 
more than 90 days. Thus, NPAs are those loans given by a bank or financial 
institution where the borrower defaults or delays interest of principal payments. Banks 
are not allowed to book any income from NPAs, They have to make provision for the 
NPAs or keep money aside in case they can't collect from the borrower, which affects 
profitability adversely. 
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(i) Classification of NPAs: 
Loan assets of the banks are broadly classified as performing and non-
performing, while non-performing asset is fixrther classified into substandard, 
doubtful and loss assets. 
Loan Assets 
X 1 
Performiiig Assets Non-Performiiig Assets 
r Substandard 
Donbtful ^ 
/' Loss ^ 
J 
(a) Substandard Asset: 
Substandard asset is a credit facility, which has been classified as NPA for 
period not exceeding two years. However, with effect form March 31, 2001, an asset 
may remain in substandard category for 18 months. This period has further been 
reduced to 12 months with effect from 31" March, 2005. An asset where the terms of 
the loan agreement regarding interest and principal have been renegotiated or 
rescheduled after commencement of production, should be classified as substandard 
and should remain in such category for at least two years of satisfactory performance 
under the renegotiated or rescheduled terms. However, the period of two years has 
been reduced to one year with effect fi-om the year ended March 31,1999. 
(b) Doubtful Assets: 
An NPA account, where there are potential threats to recovery on account of 
erosion in the value of security or non-availability of security and existence of other 
factors, such as, fi-auds committed by the borrower, should be straightaway classified 
as doubtfiil or loss asset. In the mid-term review of monetary and credit policy for 
1998-99, RBI has decided that an asset should be classified as doubtful, if h has been 
remained in the substandard category for 18 months instead of 24 months, by March 
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31, 2001. A loan classified as doubtful has all the weakness inherent in a substandard 
account with the added characteristic that the weakness make collection or liquidation 
in full highly questionable on the basis of currently known facts, conditions, and 
value. A term loan which deserves to be classified as doubtful can not be upgraded to 
a standard asset by just reschedulement of principal and interest and thereby 
notionally wiping out the over dues. After reschedulement, the account will continue 
to be classified as doubtful asset for at least one year. 
(c) Loss Asset: 
A loss asset is a credit facility where the bank's internal or external auditors or 
the RBI inspectors have identified as loss biit the amount has not been written off, 
wholly or partly. In other words, such an asset is considered un-collectible and of such 
little value that it is continuance as a bankable asset is not warranted although there 
may be some salvage or recovery value. Accounts, where guarantee from 
DICGC/ECGC is available, they should not be classified as loss assets, unless the 
claims are not enforceable, 
(ii) Incidence of NPAs: 
According to the Reserve Bank of India study on issues relating to NPAs in 
commercial banks there is huge NPAs base of more than Rs. 45,000 crores. NPAs 
affecting the system go beyond the normal lending risks taken by bankers and as of 
March 31, 1998, the gross NPAs stood at 16.02 percent vwth net NPAs at 8.2 percent 
of the net advances. As many as 10 out of the 27 public sector banks continued to 
have non-performing assets above per of their net advances in 1998 just as in 1997, 
out of that, one bank had NPAs levels of above 20 percent. Against this, none of the 9 
new private sector banks had NPAs above 10 per cent, while only four of the 25 old 
private banks had NPAs portfolio above 10 percent The banks have been divided in 
three categories accordmg to then- NPAs levels. The three categories are up to 10 
percent, above 10 percent and up to 20 percent and above 20 percent. The average 
gross NPAs level in the banking sector still remains above 15 percent which is very 
high when compared to the target of 5 percent by 2001 (Banerjee, A. and Singh S. K. 
2001)^ 
A glance through the statistics on the movement of NPAs of public sector 
banks will help to understand the extent to which they are standing. The table-3 gives 
a clear picture about the NPAs in public sector banks. Since introduction of prudential 
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norms in 1992-93, the gross NPAs are to the time of Rs. 39253 crores in 1992-93 
which is increied to Rs. 51816 crores in 2005-06. The net NPAs has also moved up 
from Rs. 19691 crores in 1993-94 to 18529 crores in 2005-2006. The magnitude of 
gross NPAs and net NPAs have sliding down from 23.18 percent in 1992-93 to 3.3 
percent in 2005-2006 whereas the net NPAs has gone down to 1.2 percent from 14.46 
percent for the same period. 
Table-3: NPAs in Public Sector Banks in India 
Year 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Non-
performing 
assets 
(Rs. Lakhs) 
39253 
41041 
38385 
4I66I 
47300 
50815 
58720 
60408 
63741 
70861 
68717 
61785 
85300 
51816 
% 
age 
23.18 
24.78 
19.45 
18.01 
15.7 
14.4 
14.7 
12.7 
11.4 
10.4 
8.8 
7.2 
5.2 
3.3 
Net Non-performing 
assets (Rs. Lakhs) 
Nil 
19691 
17566 
18297 
22340 
23761 
28020 
30073 
32461 
35554 
29692 
• 24396 
21441 
18529 
%age 
14.46 
10.67 
8.9 
8.1 
7.3 
7.6 
6.8 
6.2 
5.5 
4 
2.8 , 
2.6 
1.2 
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, RBI, Various Issues. 
However, the foreign banks in India showed great extremes. In 1998,14 out of 
the 42 foreign banks had no NPAs, 20 banks had NPAs below 10 percent, 06 had 
NPAs above 10 but below 20 percent, while were two banks with NPAs above 20 
percent. In 1997, there were 36 banks in the below 10 percent category with 16 banks 
having nil NPAs, and there was only one bank in the 10-20 per cent category. 
The share of priority sector NPAs in gross NPAs of public sector banks, reduced from 
48.27 percent in March 1996 to 46.40 percent in March 1998, was significantly higher 
than the proportion of priority sector advances to total advances, which ranges 
between 30-32 percent. The percentage of gross NPAs in priority sector advances. 
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though it came down from 27.45 percent in March 1996 to 23.2 percent in March 
1998, was still almost twice the NPAs in non-priority sector advances, which ranges 
between 12.8 tol3.8 percent during these two years. The higher NPAs in priority 
sector advances have pushed up the overall proportion of NPAs by three to four 
percent. The higher proportion of NPAs in priority sector advances was a result of 
the directed and pre-approved nature of loans sanctioned under sponsored 
programmers, the absence of any security, lack of effective follow-up due to large 
number of account, legal recovery measures being considered not cost-effective, 
vitiation of the repayment culture consequent to loan waiver schemes etc. 
(iii) Consequences of NPAs: 
The NPAs in the public sector banks are well above the normal level. The 
consequences envisaged during the past several years are many. It has become a 
difficult task for the banks to reduce the lending rate due to the presence of large 
NPAs. Ultimately this is affecting the competitiveness of the Indian banks. When the 
bank does not enjoy the market competitiveness naturally the credit expansion would 
be slumped and when it happens, the profitability gets a set back. In this way the 
vicious circle will go on and on. Another important one is the reduction in the 
availability of funds for further expansion due to the unproductiveness of the existing 
portfolio. Sometimes it is found that the presence of large NPAs discourages banks to 
accept profitable but risky proposal loan from the customers. The NPAs also affect 
the risk taking ability of the banks. On the whole it affects the credibility of the bank 
and faces difficulty in raising fresh capital from the market for future requirements. 
The efficiency of a bank is not reflected only by the size of its balance sheet 
but also the level of return on its assets. The NPAs do not generate interest income for 
banks but at the same time banks are required to provide provisions for NPAs from 
their current profits. The NPAs have deleterious impact on the return on assets m the 
following ways. 
The interest income of banks will fall and it is to be accounted only on receipt 
basis. Banks profitability is affected adversely because of the providing of doubtful 
debts and consequent to writing it off as bad debts. Return on investments (ROT) is 
reduced. The capital adequacy ratio is disturbed as NPAs are entering into its 
calculation. The cost of capital will go up. The assets and liability mismatch will 
widen. The economic value addition (EVA) by banks gets upset because EVA is 
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equal to the net operating profit minus cost of Capital and it limits recycling of the 
funds. 
(iv) Reasons for Rising NPAs: 
The RBI study states that diversion of funds by promoters and time/cost 
overruns are among the main reasons of non-performing assets in the Indian banking 
system. The diversion of funds, mostly for expansion, diversification, modernization, 
taking up new projects and for helping/promoting associated concerns, is the single 
most prominent reason (Banerjee, A. and Singh S. K. 2001) .^ 
Internal factors like business failure, inefficient management, strained labour 
relations; inappropriate technology and product obsolescence have also contributed to 
the rise in NPAs. External factors like raw mate^al shortage, price escalation, power 
shortage, industrial recession, excess capacities and the natural calamities like floods 
and accidents have also contributed the rise in NPAs on the books of banks. 
The RBI study of about 800 top NPA accounts in 17 banks reveals that the 
single-most important reason for units becoming sick and rising NPAs is the diversion 
of funds by promoters. According to the Reserve Bank of India, non-performing 
assets in the Indian banking sector is a historic legacy due to lacunae in credit 
recovery, largely arising from inadequate legal provisions on foreclosure and 
bankruptcy, long drawn legal procedures and difBculties m execution of the decrees 
awarded by the court. 
In addition to internal factors such as weak credit appraisal, non-compliance 
and willful default, there are several external factors such as preponderance of certain 
traditional industries in the credit portfolio of certain banks, majority of which are 
suffering from serious inherent operational problems, natural calamities, policy and 
technological changes which increase the incidence of sickness and non-availability 
of raw materials and other factors which are not within the control of the banks. 
Diversion of funds has been identified as the number one factor leading to 
increased defaults by the industrial sector. Diversification of fimds, mostly for 
expansion/diversification/modemization, taking up new projects and for helping/ 
promoting.associate concerns, is the single most prominent reason. External factors 
comprise of recession, inputs/power shortage, price escalation and accidents. 
Time/cost overruns during the project implementation stage leading to liquidity strain 
and turning into NPAs is another factor. Some other reasons are- changes in 
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excise/import duties, pollution control orders, willful default, siphoning-off of funds, 
fraud/misappropriation, promoters, directors disputes, government policies like 
changes in excise duties, pollution control, poor credit decisions, priority sector 
lending and outdated legal systems, delay in finalization of rehabilitation package by 
the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), absence of written 
policies, the absence of portfolio concentration limits, poor industry analysis, cursory 
financial euialysis of borrowers, inadequate customers contract and the lack of co-
ordination between the financial institutions and conmiercial banks, which provide 
long-term needs of industry that enables the industry to misuse the funds. 
Judicial and legal weaknesses are also a major factor in India's high NPAs. 
Court judgements against defaulters take ten years or more and even then may not be 
enforced. Roughly 1.4 million court cases are pending. In addition, suits for debt 
recovery from a company are designated as a sick unit, under the purview of the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Though the BIFR 
procedure was designed with the idea of quick bankruptcy proceeding, in practice it 
usually takes four years or more even to decide whether a fine is viable. These delays 
favorable treatment for "sick" firms, such as relief fi-om debt service obligations and, 
in the past, access to low cost credits, have led non-sick firms to take advantage of 
"sick status." 
(v) Measures to Solve NPA Problem: 
High level of non-performing assets (NPAs) in the banking sector is the most 
worrisome aspect of the financial sector. NPAs in public sector banks at about 16 
percent of credit portfolio are much in excess of international standards where the 
tolerable levels of NPAs are around 3 to 4 percent Tackling bad debts was necessary 
particularly in the context of the opening up of the economy and the major Indian 
banks starting to look for overseas expansion. Besides NPAs management policy, 
there should be introduction of predisbursement audit and credit-audit system for 
large advances and also systems to tackle potential cases for the Board for Industrial 
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Banks need to have better credit appraisal 
system so as to prevent NPAs from occurring. The following measures have been 
suggested: 
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(a) Filing Suits to Recover Bad Loans: 
Some banks had filed cases which were pending since 15-20 years. The study 
revealed that banks had filed suits only as a last resort. During 1996, the amounts 
involved in suits filed accounted for 26.2 percent of these bank's NPAs. In 1997 and 
1998, this fiirther increased to 33.9 percent and 46.4 percent respectively. Over the 
last three years, the recoveries made by banks were 7.3 percent, 4.7 per cent and 4.3 
percent respectively for the filed amounts. In view of the cost-benefit implications and 
time factor in filling suits, banks consider legal measures only in the case of 
'doubtful' account. It was mentioned in the study that as many as 14, 36, 739 suits 
filed were pending disposal as on March 31,1998 for Rs. 21, 824.92 crores. It is also 
observed that the legal process becomes complicated when the matter comes under 
the purview of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and the 
Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR). 
(b) Amendment of laws: 
The RBI emphasized that laws needed to be amended to allow for the 
publication of defaults' means. The RBI has fiirther added that there is an urgent need 
for amending laws to enable repossession of collateral, foreclosure and bankruptcy of 
defaulting borrowers through changes in the Banking Regulation Act and other bank 
related laws. However, it is very difficult to publish defaulters' names. 
(c) New Strategy Adopted by Financial Institutions: 
The financial institutions (FIs) have adopted new strategy to contain the rising 
NPAs. The strategy separates the borrowers on the basis of the viability of their 
projects. In case where the projects are considered viable, the institutions will go for 
restructuring of the liabilities exposed in such projects. If the projects are considered 
unviable, the FIs would resort to recalling loans. Finally, in the case of willfiil 
defaulters based on past records, the institutions will not only recall loans, but will 
also resort to change of management. If FIs will adopt this strategy successfiilly, then 
the proportion of NPAs can be reduced to some extent. 
The Reserve Bank has suggested resorting to the Debt Settiement Tribunals 
(DSTs) that will make up for the previous system's shortcomings: as the system 
provide for the appointment of a recovery office by the bank itself who will issue the 
demand notice and pass tiie award. There is the common tiick adopted by borrowers 
of referring themselves to the BIFR. Since no recovery proceedings can be started till 
such a case has been resolved by the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial 
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Reconstruction (AAIFR), this is exploited by the borrowers. Borrowers of fudging 
accounts in order to come under the purview of BIFR stall the recovery action by 
banks. 
The RBI has suggested that banks should act as counselors to corporate 
borrowers and advise them on when to exit a business and how to better manage their 
portfolio. Banks should start playing the role of friend, philosopher and guide by 
counseling corporate borrowers to self-off assets not necessary for their core area of 
production or competence. 
Banks need to act fast for timely action of filling recovery suits. Banks should 
lay down specific guidelines duly approved by their Board of Directors for filing 
recovery suits and it should be made a part of their Loan Recovery Policy. 
The Estimate Committee (1998) of Lok Sabha has made the following 
recommendations to recover/reduce/contain NPAs in the public sector banks: 
• To recover dues by entering into settlement /compromise proposals with 
borrowers on mutually acceptable terms. Bank should be very carefiil in 
considering settlement /compromise proposals. Instead RBI/banks should 
examine the necessity of consulting of renowned bankers under the 
Chairmanship of retired High Court Judges to consider proposals of 
compromise /write offs as per laid down norms for speedy recovery of assets 
in cases of large default with a view to bringing down their NPAs; 
• Bank should also consider the feasibility of introducing a system for internal 
audit of sanction of loans before disbursement for larger advances; 
• Placing the right people for the work of credit portfolio management who 
have training and greater awareness at operational level for credit risk 
assessment and can render honest and diligent service in the discharge of their 
responsibilities; 
• Non-performance by lenders in not making tunely sanction/disbursement of 
loans sometimes converts potentially profitable enterprises to loss-making 
ones. Main industries suffer decline because of delays m disbursement of 
loans by banks. This may contribute to NPAs. This aspect also needs to be 
closely monitored; 
• A doubtful asset normally takes a minimum of two years to surface. It would, 
therefore, be careful on the part of the management not to post bank offices for 
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credit portfolio work during the three years preceding their retirement so as to 
enable them to retirement honorably and gracefully; and 
• A review of the performance of the officer belonging to credit portfolio 
management should be made regularly and necessarily at least one year before 
hisiretirement to assess whether he had not acted prudently while sanctioning 
of advances, whether he had observed the normal procedure followed in the 
bank in sanctioning the applications and whether any serious irregularities in 
the conduct of the portfolio or in other accounts had been observed. 
Obviously government has to provide effective tools to banks so that they can 
recover the bad loans and make fresh finance without any fear of action from their 
controlling bosses. Government has to understand that any lending by banks has to be 
repaid by borrower and those who fail to do so should be freated as criminal and 
treated accordingly in quickest time. When borrowers are serioiis in making 
repayment of loan they avail from banks, bank will surely become liberal in lending 
and there will be definite and solid growth in bank's lending (Jain, Danendra, 2009) .^ 
(vi) Prevention of Non-Performing Assets: 
The high share of NPAs in the credit portfolio of a bank, particularly the 
public sector banks, has become a matter of grave concern for the mandarins of the 
financial system. The reasons are obvious: NPAs don't yield any return while they 
incur a cost; they eat into earnings made elsewhere by way of demand for provisions 
for these NPAs. In the ultimate analysis, mounting NPAs can pose a great threat to the 
very fabric of the financial system of the country, as witnessed in some of the South-
east Asian countries and hence prevention of NPAs has assumed a significance role. 
Deficiencies in surveillance and governance of credit portfolio, besides weak 
appraisal, have been identified as the prime contributory factors for the alarming 
situation. The process to arrest the growth of NPAs should, therefore, start with 
eamest evaluation of risks in the proposal, effective monitoring of loan accounts and 
initiation of timely remedial measures at the branch level. The management saying, 'if 
the problem is well-defined, half the problem is solved,' applies to the banker-
customer relationship too. If the risks, in specific advance, are properly measured, 
much of the problem with respect to NPAs will ease. 
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The inability of a borrower to discharge a repayment liability has two distinct 
facets: one, risk from externalities that are beyond the control of the borrowing unit 
and second, internal to the unit. Banks are, no doubt, appraising these risks ab initio 
but the fact remains that they are mere assimiption. Conventional wisdom often 
reveals that the happenings of the post-sanction stage do not necessarily go in tandem 
with the presentation assumptions. The imcertainly makes management of NPAs a 
challenging task and that is where the ingenuity of the management of a bank is called 
for. Hence, any lending decision should always be preceded by a detailed risk analysis 
and the outcome should act as a guide for the credit decision. The above is easier said 
than done, for the risk of default is congenital the very sanctioning of a loan. "Ability 
to gauge the risk and take appropriate position will be the key to success. It can be 
said that risk takers can survive, effective risk mangers will prosper and risk averse 
are likely to perish. 
The objective of the risk management is not to prevent risk taking, but to 
ensure that the risks are consciously taken with full knowledge, and understanding so 
that they can be mitigated. The purpose of managing risk is to prevent an institution to 
fail or materially damage its competitive position. Functions of risk management 
should actually be bank-specific dictated by the size and quality of balance sheet, 
complexity of functions, technical/ professional manpower and the status of 
management information system (MIS) in place. There may not be one-size fits-all 
risk management module for all the banks to be made applicable uniformly. As in 
international practice, a committee approach has been introduced in India too, to 
manage various risks. Risk Management Committee, Credit Policy Committee, Asset 
Liability Management Committee, etc., are some such committees that handle the risk 
management aspects. 
The effectiveness of risk measurement depends on efficient management 
information system, computerization, and net working of the branch activities. An 
objective and reliable data base has to be built for which the bank has to analyze its 
past performance data relating to loan default, trading losses, operational losses, etc., 
and come out with benchmarks. 
(vii) Management of NPAs: 
It is proved beyond doubt that NPAs in bank ought to be kept at the lowest 
level. Two pronged approaches viz., Preventive management, and Curative 
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management would be necessary for controlling NPAs. Preventive management 
includes following measures. 
(a) Credit Assessment and Risk Management Mechanism: 
A lasting solution to the problem of NPAs can be achieved only with proper 
credit assessment and risk management mechanism. The documentation of credit 
policy and; credit auditing immediately after the sanction is necessary to upgrade the 
quality of credit appraisal in banks. In a situation of liquidity overhang the enthusiasm 
of the banking system is to increase lending with compromise on asset quality, raising 
concern about adverse selection and potential danger of addition to the NPAs stock. It 
is necessary that the banking system is equipped with prudential norms to minimize if 
not completely avoid the problem of credit risk. 
(b)Organizati0nal Restructuring: 
With regard to internal factors leading to NPAs the onus for containing the 
same rest with the bank themselves. These will necessiates organizational 
restructuring improvement in the managerial efficiency, skill upgradation for proper 
assessment of credit worthiness and a change in the attitude of the banks towards legal 
action, which is traditionally viewed as a measure of the last resort. 
(c) Reduce Dependence on Interest: 
The Indian banks are largely depending upon lending and investments. The 
banks in the developed countries do not depend upon this income whereas 86 percent 
of income of Indian banks is accounted from interest and the rest of the income is fee 
based. The banker can earn sufficient net margin by investing in safer securities 
though not at high rate of interest. It facilitates for limiting of high level of NPAs 
gradually. It is possible that average yield on loans and advances net default 
provisions and services costs do not exceed the average yield on safety securities 
because of the absence of risk and service cost. 
(d) Potential and Borderline NPAs under Check: 
The potential and borderline accounts require quick diagnosis and remedial 
measures so that they do not step into NPAs categories. The auditors of the banking 
companies mvist monitor all outstanding accounts in respect of accounts enjoying 
credit limits beyond cut - off points, so that new sub-standard assets can be kept 
under check. 
The curative measures are designed to maximize recoveries so that banks 
funds locked up in NPAs are released for recycling (Arya, P.P. and Tandon, B. B., 
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2003)^ The central government and RBI have tsken steps for arresting incidence of 
fresh NPAs and creating legal and regulatory environment to facilitate the recovery of 
existing NPAs of banks. They are: 
(a) Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRT): 
In order to expedite speedy disposal of high value claims of banks Debt 
Recovery Tribunals were setup. The Central Government has amended the recovery 
of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act in January 2000 for enhancing 
the effectiveness of DRTs. The provisions for placement of more than one recovery 
officer, power to attach dependents property before judgment, penal provision for 
disobedience of Tribunals order and £q)pointment of receiver with powers of 
realization, management, protection and preservation of property are expected to 
provide necessary teeth to the DRTs and speed up the recovery of NPAs in times to 
come (Jain, V., 2007)'. 
(b) Lok Adalats: 
The Lok adalats institutions help banks to settle disputes involving accounts in 
doubtful and loss categories. These are proved to be an effective institution for 
settlement of dues in respect of smaller loans. The Lok adalats and Debt Recovery 
Tribunals have been empowered to organize Lok adalats to decide for NPAs of Rs. 10 
lakhs and above. 
(c) Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC): 
Given the large fiscal deficits, there will be a problem of financing the ARF. 
Subsequently, the Narasimham Committee on banking sector reforms has 
recommended for transfer of sticky assets of banks to the ARC. Thereafter the Verma 
Committee on restructuring of weak public sector banks has also viewed the 
separation of NPAs and its transfer thereafler to the ARF is an important element in a 
comprehensive restructuring strategy for weak banks. In recognition of the same ARC 
Bill was passed to regulate securitization and reconstruction of financial assets and 
enforcement of security interest. The ICICI banlcs. State Bank of India and IDBI have 
promoted the country's first Asset Reconstruction Company. The company is 
specialized in recovery and liquidation of assets. The NPAs can be assigned to ARC 
by banks at a discounted price. The objective of ARC is floating of bonds and making 
necessary steps for recovery of NPAs from the borrowers directly. This enables a one 
time clearing of balance sheet of banks by sticky loans. 
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(d) Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR): 
The corporate debt restructuring is one of the methods suggested for the 
reduction of NPAs. Its objective is to ensure a timely and transparent mechanism for 
restructuring of corporate debts of viable corporate entities affected by the 
contributing factors outside the purview of BIFR, DRT and other legal proceedmgs. 
The CDR has three tier structure viz., CDR standing forum, CDR empowered group, 
and CDR cell. 
(e) The Mechanism of the CDR: 
It is a voluntary system based on debtors and creditors agreement. It will not 
apply to accounts involving one financial institution or one bank instead it covers 
multiple banking accounts, syndication, consortium accounts with outstanding 
exposure of Rs. 20 crores and above by banks and institutions. The CDR system is 
applicable to standard and sub - standard accounts vnth potential cases of NPAs 
getting a priority. 
if) Circulation of Information of Defaulters: 
The RBI has put in place a system for periodical circulation of details of 
willful defaulters of banks and financial institutions. The RBI also publishes a list of 
borrowers (with outstanding aggregate rupees one crores and above) against whom 
banks and financial institutions in recovery of funds have filed suits as on 31st March 
every year. It will serve as a caution list while considering a request for new or 
additional credit limits from defaulting borrowing units and also from the directors, 
proprietors and partners of these entities (Arya, P.P. and Tandon, B. B., 2003)°'' "'^ . 
(g) Recovery Action Against Large NPAs: 
The RBI has directed the PSBs to examine all cases of willful default of Rs. 
one crore and above and file criminal cases against willful defaulters. The board of 
directors are requested to review NPAs accounts of one crore and above with special 
reference to fix staff accountability individually. It is observed from the above table-3 
that the gross NPAs of the banks is gradually declining from Rs. 68717 crores in 
2002-03 to Rs. 50552 crores in 2006-07 whereas the net recovery of NPAs is 
increasing from Rs. 23183 crores in 2002-03 to Rs.27176 crores in 2006-07. It shows 
that the banks have taken strenuous efforts to contain the NPAs. Moreover, the 
percentage of recovery to gross NPAs is also in the increasing trend. 
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(h) Credit Information Bureau: 
The institutionalization of information sharing arrangement is now possible 
through th? newly formed Credit Information Bureau of India Limited (CIBIL). It was 
set up in January 2001, by SBI, HDFC, and two foreign technology partners. This will 
prevent those who take advantage of lack of information sharing system amongst 
leading institutions to borrow large amount against same assets and property, which 
has contributed to the incremental of NPAs of banks (Karunakar, M., Vasuki K. and 
Saravanan S. 2008)'^ 
Thus, the level of NPAs in the Indian banking industry is a greater concem 
and thus urgent cleaning up of bank balance sheet has become a crucial issue. 
Although, the ratio of net NPAs to net advances is reduced to some extent but still 
very high in absolute terms (Dong He, 2002)". So, NPAs will have to be reduced 
drastically and for the same purpose, the following reforms are suggested: 
• reducing the existing NPAs and curbing their further build up; 
• don't consider projects with old technology for finance; 
• don't consider financing term loans for maturities longer than 5 year except in 
case of agriculture, infi-astructure and SSI; 
• increasing the number of Debt Recovery Tribunals; 
• complete ban on generalized loan waives; 
• provide financial help to form ARF to banks at individual level; 
• collect interest firom client on monthly basis instead of quarterly collection; 
• compulsory annual review of borrower accounts with sufBcient disclosure in 
balance sheet. For this purpose, change the review to analyze both quantitative 
and qualitative data; 
• trained the staff for close monitoring of creditworthiness of borrowers and the 
end use of bank loans to avoid major post-defaults, so finance only for the 
productive projects; 
• at the time of credit appraisal, observe and consider the list of defaulters 
produced by RBI and suit-filled cases thoroughly; 
• regional management should be visiting the branches periodically to monitor 
timely and preventive action taken by the branches; 
• separate credit monitoring and audit cells should be installed in the banks; and 
• eliminate political interference in disbursing loans. 
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5.3 Capital Adequacy Norms: 
Capital adequacy is an indicator of the financial health of the banking system. 
Capital adequacy refers to the amount of capital of a bank ability to maintain equity 
capital sufficient to pay depositors whenever they demand their money and still have 
enough funds to increase the bank's assets through additional lending. It is measured 
by the capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR), defined as the ratio of a bank's 
capital to its total risk-weighted assets. CRAR is also called capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR). Financial regulators generally impose a capital adequacy norm on their 
banking and financial systems in order to provide for a buffer to absorb unforeseen 
losses due to risky mvestments. Capital should be adequate to absorb unexpected 
losses or risk involved. If there is higher risk, then it would be needed to back up with 
the capital and vice versa. 
(i) Basel Norms and Challenges for India: 
Over the past 20 years, there have been several examples of banking crises 
that have threatened wider systemic damage. Instances of Mexico (1982), the other 
Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, Mexico again in 1994 and 1995, and then the 
east in 1999, Asia's debt problems of 1997 and 1998, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 
1999-are all sad reminders of how banking sector weaknesses can result in huge 
economic losses involving sometimes massive costs of banking sector restructuring. 
Actually, the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) of 1998 was evolved by the Basel 
Committee to prevent major bank failures. It primarily comprised principles for able 
risk management, capital adequacy, sound supervision and regulation, and 
transparency of operations. It introduced for the jSrst time an internationally accepted 
definition of bank capital and prescribed a mmimum acceptable level of capital for 
banks. This framework was progressively introduced not only in member countries 
but also in the more than 100 other countries that have active global banks. The 
reason for its unquestioned acceptance by advanced as well as less developed 
coimtries lay largely in the fact that it arrived on the scene precisely when many 
countries were reforming their financial sectors (Nachane, D. M2003)^ .^ India was no 
exception to this. The Narasimham Committee Reports I and II had heavily relied on 
Basel I for their entire agenda for the banking sector reforms in India. 
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However, the banking industry world over has undergone a major 
transformation since Basel I was implemented in 1988. Two specific changes-the 
expanded use of securitization and derivative in secondary markets and vastly 
improved risk- management systems had significant implications for Basel I. For 
banks that operate on a global scale in virtually all financial markets, Basel I has 
become outdated. 
In recognition of these trends, the Basel Committee proposed a new "Capital 
Adequacy' fi-amework (II) in June 1999, which recommends more risk-sensitive 
minimum capital requirements for banking organizations. The new framework was 
widely debated and discussed by regulators of different countries and members of the 
banking industry before the Basel Committee endorsed its final document on June 26, 
2004. The new fi-amework will be available for implementation m member 
jurisdictions as of year-end 2006. The most advanced approaches to risk measurement 
will be available for implementation as of year end 2007. The G-10 governors and 
supervisors have encouraged authorities in other jurisdictions to consider the 
readmess of their supervisory structures for the Basel II framework and recommended 
that they proceed at their own pace, based on their own priorities (BIS, 2004)* .^ 
(a) Difference between Basel I and 11: 
As stated earlier, advances in risk management practices, technology, and 
banking markets have made the simple qiproach of Basel I less meaningful for many 
organizations. For example, Basel I set capital requirements based on broad classes of 
exposures and does not distinguish between relative degrees of credit worthiness 
among individual borrowers. 
The Basel II framework is more reflective of the underlying risks in banking 
and provides stronger incentives for improved risk management. It builds on the basic 
structure of the Basel I for setting capital requirements and improves the capital 
framework's sensitivity to the risks that banks actually face. This is deemed to be 
achieved in part by aligning capital requirements more closely to the risk of credit loss 
and by introducing a new capital charge for risk exposures caused by operational 
failures. 
To accomplish the goal of adequate capitalization of banks, the Basel II 
framework has introduced three 'pillars' that reinforce each other and enhance the 
quality of banks' confrol processes. 
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Under 'Pillar I', the Basel II improves capital adequacy for banks by requiring 
higher levels of capital for high credit-risk borrowers and vice versa. Here, three 
options are available for banks to choose an appropriate approach for credit risk 
assessment. Under the 'standardized approach' to credit risk, the relatively less 
sophisticated banks are supposed to use the ratings given by external credit rating 
agencies to assess the credit quality of their borrowers for regulatory capital purposes. 
Banks that possess sophisticated risk measurement systems may with the approval of 
their supervisors, select from one of two 'internal ratings-based' (IRB) £^proaches to 
credit risk. Under these options, banks rely partly on their own measures of 
borrowers' credit risk to determine their capital requirements, subject to strict data, 
validation, and operational requirements. Under the 'Foundation IRB Approach', the 
banks can use default probabilities for credit risk based on their own internal risk 
calculations. However, the 'Advanced IRB Approach' also lets them supply key 
variables such as loss given default and other risk measures. In addition to the credit 
and market risk covered by the Basel I framework, Basel II establishes an explicit 
capital charge for a bank's exposure to operational risks, i.e. the risk of losses caused 
by failures in systems, processes or staff or that caused by external events, such as 
natural disasters. Sunilar to the range of options provided for assessmg credit risk 
exposures, banks will choose one of the three options for measuring operational risks' 
exposures. These are- the 'Basic Indicators Approach' that employs a single proxy for 
the entire bank such as trading volumes, the 'Business Line Approach' that uses the 
committee imposed coital ratios for different' business lines and the 'Advanced 
Measurement Approach' that uses a banks own data within a supervisory specified 
framework. 'Pillar 2' is represented by the effective supervisory review of 'Pillar 1', 
whereby bank supervisors are expected to evaluate the activities and risk profiles of 
individual banks in order to determine whether those banks have provided adequate 
capital under 'Pillar 1' and suggest ways to set right the discrepancies, if any. 'Pillar 
3' is represented by the market disciplme to ensure prudent management by banks by 
enhancing the degree of transparency in banks' public reporting. IT sets out the public 
disclosures that banks must undertake to make adequacy of their 'capitalization' more 
transparent. Keeping in mind the growing complexities of banking operations, the 
Basel II framework covers not just banks out also securities firms, asset managers, 
insurance companies, etc. with any mvolvement in baking, fund or asset management, 
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securitization, long-terai equity holdings, etc. The qualitative difference between 
Basel I and II is summarized in Table-1. 
Table-4: Basel I verses Basel II 
Basel I 
1. Focus on single risk measure 
2. One size files all 
3, Broad brush structure 
Basel n 
1. More emphasis on bank's own internal 
risk management methodologies, 
supervisory review, and market 
discipline. 
2. Flexibility, menu of approaches, capital 
incentives for better risk management, 
granularity in the valuation of assets and 
type of businesses and in the risk profiles 
of their systems and operations. 
3. More risk sensitivity by business class 
and asset class, multidimensional, focus 
on all operational components of a bank. 
Source: "The New Basel Capital Accord: An Explanatory Note", BIS, January 
2001 Implications of Basel 11 for Emerging Economies. 
(b) Challenges ahead for India: 
As is the case with other developing countries, Basel II has posed enormous 
challenges for the Indian banking and regulatory system. There have been active 
efforts in diagnosing the adequacy of our present system and RBI has been playing a 
lead role in training its personnel in new supervisory practices. It has been playing a 
lead role in training its personnel in new supervisory practices. It has been issuing 
policy guidance to banks in terms of buildmg credit information, data poolmg, and 
information technology systems. The magnitude of this task is daunting given the fact 
that in India we have large of banks and we have to complete the task with in the 
specified time. 
The major issue for Indian banks is relating to the aligning and upgrading data 
in existing IT systems for consistency and integrity across the organization. Given the 
magnitude of investment involved in this effort, banks must focus on the ultimate goal 
of achieving the advanced ERB and advanced measurement approaches for credit and 
operational risk respectively. Basel II's 'Advanced Measurement Approach' (AMA) 
for operational risk requires banks to develop their own methodologies to minimize 
the amount of capital that needs to be set aside. Scorecards that comprise forward 
looking indicators based on answered questions as diverse as fraud, business 
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continuity,, staff absence, etc., are increasingly a preferred method for AMA. IT 
architecture, therefore, has to be designed in such a way that it would provide suitable 
reporting facilities and facilities of internal credit risk ratings and scorecards for 
operational risk measurement. 
Furthermore, banks need to imdertake massive investments in upgrading risk-
management skills of their staff covering both quantitative and managerial skills. 
Basel II is set to influence all areas ranging fiom business process/systems to 
organizational structure/ strategies. As such, banks will have to establish enterprise-
wise risk management methodology, a senior management audit and overview 
process, data collection, IT systems, disclosure processes, etc. all of which are 
underpinned by the overall integration of risk into core business processes. 
Basel II also warrants another major change in the organizational structure of 
banks. In today's context, risk reporting is a major hurdle in many Indian banks. To 
facilitate effective implementation of Basel 11, the risk managers in our banks need to 
be empowered and entrusted with the responsibility to short-circuit the system before 
a problem crops up. To facilitate this, risk managers must have a higher profile and 
more visibility within banks. This, to some extent, may happen automatically, as with 
the implementation of Basel II the competition will shift to high-risk versus low-risk 
banks instead of the present big versus small banks. Still the top managements of 
Indian banks have to consciously ensure this change. 
From the regulatory point of view also, there are going to be profound 
challenges. There will probably be increased 'mergers and acquisitions' activity in the 
banking industry as the new regulatory landscape raises the stakes for 'economies of 
scale'. Thus, there will be a new round of consolidation. The acquiring institution will 
certainly have a regulatory capital benefit. But the creation of new large financial 
conglomerates would also pose a systemic risk and the 'supervisor' will have to 
address this completely. 
There will be some problems specific to foreign banks operating in India. In 
India, foreign banks are statutorily required to maintain local capital and this gives 
rise to the following issues-whether the internal models approved by their head offices 
and home country supervisors and adopted by their Indian branches need to be 
validated agam by the RBI, whether these banks should maintain distinct data 
histories for their Indian operations, whether capital for operational risk should be 
maintamed separately for the Indian branches of these banks, whether these banks can 
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be mandated to maintain capital as per standardized/ basic indicators' approach in 
India irrespective of the approach adopted by their head office, etc. These issues will 
have to be resolved by the RBI. 
The RBI will have to see whether too much regulation will stifle the growth of 
bank credit- especially to sector like agriculture, SMEs and infrastructure. As 
recommended by the Basel Committee, we need to adopt the new framework at our 
own pace, dictated by our own development priorities. Currently, India has three 
estabhshed rating agencies are stakeholders and they also provide technical support. 
However, the level of rating penetration is not very high and ratings are restricted to 
issues rather than issuers. So, eventually our system will have to move to ratings of 
issuers and encouraging this will be a big challenge for the regulators of financial 
sector. 
Thus, the common objective of all official supervisors is to maintain a strong 
and vibrant financial system and to achieve this, it is necessary that banks, banking 
supervisors and other market participants become more discriminating in their 
approaches to risks and better equipped to anticipate problems before they turn into 
crises. As Basel II precisely tries to achieve this, it is perceived as a logical and 
appropriate successor to Basel I. 
India represents a special case among emerging economies. As a result of 
economic liberalization that was set into motion in 1991-92, the country has restored 
the higher growth momentum of the decade of 1980s since the year 1993-94, and 
managed to reduce sharply the volatility in its GDP growth. Its banking system is 
stable and has been assessed to be in high compliance with the relevant core 
principles by the FSAP of the IMF. The RBI's approach to prudential regulation has 
always been one of gradual convergence with international standard with suitable 
country specific adaptations. During the 1990s, when there were too many 
occurrences of banking crises in emerging economies, the Indian banking system 
displayed ample resilience to exogenous shocks. 
As regards the implementation of Basel II framework, the question before 
India is not 'whether to implement' but 'how and when'. The RBI has actively 
participated in the deliberations on the Basel II accord and had the privilege of leading 
a group of six major non-G-10 supervisors, which presented a proposal on a 
simplified approach for Basel II. 
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The RBI has accepted in principle the New Capital Accord (Basel II) in April 
2003. To begin with, banks in India will adopt standardized approach for credit risk 
and basin indicators approach for operational risk. But eventually the system as a 
whole will migrate to the RBI jq)proach. The preparation at the bank level is being 
influenced by a number of factors such as the state of existing data. IT, architecture 
and risk management systems, degree of pressure exerted by the RBI, competitor 
banks' actions, and the possibilities of 'mergers and acquisitions' within the system. 
The RBI is trying to resolve a number of regulatory issues keeping in mind 
development priorities, readiness of the system in terms of the legal and regulatory 
framework, accounting standards, soundness of corporate governance, market 
discipline and most importantly, a competitive or level playing field issues among 
banks of different strengths. 
Given tiie monolithic scale of the task involved, it will be best for the RBI and 
the banks to move at a measured pace- to commit to a time table that is appropriate 
given our specific set of circumstances. However, at the bank level, the entire effort 
should be i directed towards the ultimate goal of achieving the advanced IRB and 
advanced measurement approaches to credit and operational risks. The 'standardized 
approach' has to be treated as the transitional solution, otherwise the 'risk-sensitivity' 
aspect for our banks will be affected if migration to IRB is not achieved at the earliest. 
Instead of looking at Basel II as a G-10 initiative or a global initiative, we 
should look upon it as the great opportunity to keep our house in order. It is a 
necessary framework to improve the stability and resilience of India's rapidly 
evolving banking industry, which is currently placed at a critical phase in its growth 
cycle. However, it is unfortunate that current Basel proposals do not explicitly 
incorporate the mutual benefits of lendmg by advanced countries to developing 
countries. There is also a fear that too much regulation under Basel II will adversely 
affect the risk appetite of our banks and then- lending to credit- starved sectors. It will 
be a major challenge for the RBI to maintain healthy credit momentum amid this 
tighter risk-sensitive framework. 
Our policy-makers, therefore, need to negotiate strongly for the interests of 
emerging economies in every possible international forum on regulation. We can not 
afford to forget the basic fact that Basel II can be effectively implemented only if our 
economy and markets have strong fundamentals. 
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(ii) Capital Adequacy Standard in India: 
In India, there is a 'three track' approach for Basel compliance - the 
commercial banks are Basel I compliant with respect to credit and market risks; the 
urban cooperative banks maintain capital for credit risk as per Basel-I (Reddy Y. V., 
2006)''*. India adopted Basel I norms for scheduled commercial banks in April 1992, 
and its implementation was spreaded over the next three years. It was stipulated that 
foreign banks operating in India should achieve a CRAR of 8 per cent by March 1993 
while Indian banks with branches abroad should achieve the 8 per cent norm by 
March 1995. All other banks were to achieve a capital adequacy norm of 4 per cent by 
March 1993 and the 8 per cent norm by March 1996. In its mid-term review of 
Monetary and Credit Policy in October 1998, the Reserve Bank of India raised the 
minimum regulatory CRAR requirement to 9 pfer cent, and banks were advised to 
achieve this 9 per cent CRAR level by March 31, 2000. The capital adequacy norm 
for India's commercial banks is higher than the internationally accepted level of 8 per 
cent. The RBI responded to the market risk amendment of Basel I in 1996 by initially 
prescribmg various surrogate capital charges such as investment fluctuation reserve of 
5 per cent of the bank's portfolio and a 2.5 per cent risk weight on the entire portfolio 
for these risks between 2000 and 2002. 
Table-5 provides yearly frequency distribution of different bank groups by 
their CRAR levels for the period 1996-2006. As shown in the table, by the end of 
March 1997, all but 2 nationalized banks and 4 private banks were short of meeting 
the capital adequacy norm. The SBI group and the foreign banks had achieved the 
mimmum regulatory norm by March 1997. Although a few banks were havmg 
negative CRAR during 2000-02, all banks achieved the mimmum regulatory level by 
2006. As shown in the table-5, majority of the banks in all bank categories have 
achieved a CRAR level of more than 10 per cent by March 2006, indicating good 
financial health of the banking industry, in terms of csqjital adequacy norms over the 
recent years. The average level of CRAR for the Indian banking groups for the period 
1999-2006 is presented in the table-6. As shown in this table, the average CRAR level 
for the banking industry has stood consistently between 11 and 12 per cent during 
1999-2006, which is much higher than the current minimum regulatory requirement 
of 9 per cent and the international minimum requirement of 8 per cent. 
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As may be seen in table-6, overall CRAR for the banking system has marginally 
declined since 2005. Between 2004 and 2005, the overall CRAR declined by 0.1 
percentage points and between 2005 and 2006, this decline was by 0.5 percentage 
points. Bank group-wise, between 2004 and 2005, old private banks recorded the 
highest decline of 1.2 percentage points in CRAR followed by a 1 percentage point 
fall for SBI group and the foreign bank group each. The new private banks recorded a 
rise of 1.9 percentage points in CRAR and the nationalized banks recorded a rise of 
0.1 percentage points. The net result was a marginal decline in CRAR for the banking 
system as a whole. RBI attributed this decline to the increase in total risk-weighted 
assets relative to the capital, for the first time since March 2000. The increase in risk-
weighted assets was due to a higher growth in the loan portfolio of banks and higher 
risk weights made applicable for housing loans, the most rs^idly increasing 
component of retail loans for banks. CRAR levels for all but one banking group 
recorded a decline between 2005 and 2006, The highest decline of 1 percentage point 
was observed for foreign banks, followed by a decline of 0.8 percentage points for 
nationalized and old private banks, and 0.7 percentage points for other public sector 
bank (IDBI being the sole member of this group) and a decline of 0.5 percentage 
points for the SBI group. During this period new private banks showed a rise of 0.5 
percentage point in CRAR. The resultant change in CRAR for the banking system as 
a whole was a decline of 0.5 percentage pomts. This overall decline in CRAR could 
be attributed to two factors -
• higher growth in loan portfolio of banks as compared to investment in 
government securities; and 
• increase in risk weights for personal loans, real estate and capital market 
exposure (RBI, 2006)•^ 
Notwithstanding the overall decline in CRAR recorded successively for the 
last two years, the CRAR level remains at a satisfactory level of 12.3 per cent at the 
end of March 2006. As far as the individual banking groups are concerned, IDBI bank 
had the highest CRAR at 14.8 per cent at the end of March 2006, followed by the 
foreign banks with a CRAR level of 13 per cent, the new domestic private banks with 
12.6 percent, and the nationalized banks at 12.4 percent during the same period. At 
the end of March 2006, the SBI group has an average CRAR of 11.9 per cent and the 
old domestic private bank has an average CRAR of 11.7 per cent. Table-7 provides a 
comparative picture of the capital adequacy ratios of different countries vis-^-vis 
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India's. As shown by this table, CRAR of Indian banking system compares well with 
many emerging countries such as Korea, Malaysia and South Africa. Countries such 
as Brazil, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Smgapore, and Thailand have higher CRAR level 
than India in 2005 while Japan, Taiwan, United States, and the neighbouring countries 
of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have lower CRAR levels than India. In 2005, China's 
banking system had a CRAR level of less than 8 per cent. According to the official 
website of the Chinese Government, 74 per cent of China's total banking asset could 
meet the 8 per cent level in 2006, compared with 0.56 per cent in 2003 when only 
eight banks complied. Thus, when compared with China, India is at a much better 
position with respect to capital adequacy. 
Table-5: CRAR Distribution of Indian Banks (1996-2006) 
Year 
1196-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Year 
1196-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
<4% 
2 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
4%-
MRR 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1 
1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
MRR-
10% 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
NA 
Indian Private banks (old an^ 
3 
2 
2 
2 
-2 
-1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
NA 
1 
I 
NA 
>10% 
11 
12 
14 
14 
15 
15 
18 
18 
18 
20 
Inew) 
8 
8 
5 
3 
5 
3 
3 
NA 
5 
2 
<4% 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
4%-MRR 
MRR-
10% >10% 
SBI group 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
5 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Forei^ banks 
22 
22 
25 
25 
23 
25 
25 
28 
22 
23 
NA 
NA 
1 
NA 
NA 
-I 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
14 
12 
14 
5 
4 
2 
NA 
NA 
1 
2 
24 
30 
29 
37 
38 
37 
36 
33 
30 
27 
Source: RBI, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, Various Issues 
Note: 1) MRR is Minimum Regulatory Requirement (8% nil 1998-99,9% thweafter). 
2) Nationalised nil includes IDBI Bank from 2004-05. 
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TabIe-6: Average CRAR Level of Indian Banking Group 
Year) 
(end March 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Nationalised 
banks 
10.6 
10.1 
10.2 
10.9 
12.2 
13.1 
13.2 
12.4 
SBI 
group 
12.3 
11.6 
12.7 
13.3 
13.4 
13.4 
12.4 
11.9 
Otlier public 
sector banlcs 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
15.51 
14.8 
Old pvt 
banks 
12.1 
12.4 
11.9 
12.5 
12.8 
13.7 
12.5 
11.7 
New pvt 
banks 
11.8 
13.4 
11.5 
12.5 
11.3 
10.2 
12.1 
13 
Foreign 
banks 
10.8 
11.9 
12.6 
12.9 
15.2 
15 
14 
13 
Ail 
banks 
11.3 
11.1 
11.4 
12 
12.7 
12.9 
12.8 
12.3 
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2005-06, RBI. 
Table-7: C RAR Level in Select Countries 
Country 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
China 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
US 
2005 
7.3 
I8.I 
7.9 
14.9 
12.8 
19.5 
8.9 
13 
13.6 
15.8 
13.3 
10.8 
10.3 
14.2 
10.3 
2006 
NA 
NA 
NA 
15.2 
12.3 
NA 
NA 
13.1 
12.8 
15.4 
NA 
11.5 
10.3 
14.7 
NA 
Source: Central Bank website, NA= Not Available. 
The RBI announced in May 2004 that banks in India should examine the 
options available under Basel II for revised capital adequacy framework. In February 
2005, RBI issued the first draft guidelines on Basel II implementations in which an 
initial target date for Basel II compliance was set for March 2007 for all commercial 
banks, excluding Local Area Banks (LABs) and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs). This 
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deadline was, however, postponed to March 2008 for internationally active banks and 
March 2009 for domestic commercial banks in RBI's mid-year policy announcement 
of October 30, 2006. Although RBI and the commercial banks have been preparing 
for the revised capital adequacy framework since RBI's first intimidation on Basel II 
compliance, the complexity and intense data requirement of Basel II have brought 
about several challenges in its implementation. 
The final RBI guidelines on Basel II implementation were released on April 
27, 2007. According to these guidelines, banks in India will initially adopt SA for 
credit risk and BIA for operational risk. RBI has provided the specifics of these 
approaches in its guidelines. After adequate skills are developed, both by banks and 
RBI, some banks may be allowed to migrate towards more sophisticated approaches 
like IRB. Under the revised regime of Basel II, Indian banks will be required to 
maintain a minimum CRAR of 9 per cent on an ongoing basis. Further, banks are 
encouraged to achieve a tier I CRAR of at least 6 per cent by March 2010. In order to 
ensure a smooth transition to Basel II, RBI has advised the banks to have a parallel 
run of the revised norms along with the currently applicable norms (RBI, 2007a)'^. 
5.4 WTO and Indian Banking System: 
Over the years, the Indian banking and financial system has been gradually 
liberalized. Merest rates have been deregulated, new players, new instruments and 
new institutions have been introduced and at the same time, prudential regulation has 
been expanded and supervision has been strengthened. In the sphere of external 
financial policy, the exchange rate is market driven, there has been a progressive 
liberalization of FDI and FII investment, and there are now only minimum restrictions 
on inflow of capital into the economy, or its repatriation and servicing. There has also 
been a significant liberalization of policy regarding industry's access to foreign equity 
and borrowing through long term debt instruments. The banking sector has been given 
greater fi-eedom with regard to raising funds abroad and managing their external 
liability within prudential limits. The end result of all these and other reforms has 
been the growing integration among various segments of financial markets, 
convergence of Indian financial system with practices prevailing in international 
financial markets. As globalization of banking increases the risk of contagion, 
prudential regulation, risk-based supervision, corporate governance, risk management 
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and transparency in disclosures are some of the issues that have become vital. The 
transparency sub-groups of the Basel Committee on banking supervision identified six 
qualitative characteristics of the information disclosed by banks, namely 
comprehensiveness, relevance, timeliness, reliability, comparability and materiality. 
Consequent to the acceptance of these suggestions and the implementation of 
recommendations of the Narasimham Committee, the standards of disclosures of 
Indian commercial banks have moved closer to international best practices. India is a 
member of the G-20 group of countries, which advises the IMF's Financial Stability 
Forum and is one of the earliest members of the IMF to voluntarily undertake the 
financial sector assessment programme. India has complied with almost all the core 
principles of effective banking supervision of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and is one of the early subscribers to it. The Reserve Bank has constituted 
a Standing Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes to align India's 
standards and practices with evolving international practices and reinforce its efforts 
to create a sound financial architecture. The winds of change sweeping across global 
banking system are impacting India also and the financial sector is set to see even 
greater transformation in the years ahead. India is a signatory to the WTO Financial 
Services Agreement, which came into effect firom March 1, 1999. Accordingly, it will 
have to gradually allow increased market access to international firms in banking, 
insurance and other financial services. As we move towards greater capital account 
convertibility, the banking system will need to be strengthened to handle large, 
volatile and complex capital flows. The face of banking is set to change as banks 
adopt technology to reduce costs, increase products for customer convenience and 
manage risk. The combination of continuing deregulation, heightened competition, 
technological change and increased concern for shareholder value will mean that the 
focus will be not only on the efficiency of banks but also on the safety and stability of 
the financial system(Purwar, A .K., 2003)*'. The Executive Director of Corporation 
Bank, Mr P.K. Gupta, stated that Indian banks should have global presence. Stating 
that WTO norms had positive impact on the banking system, he pointed out that the 
quality of assets had improved considerably. Gross NPAs of public sector banks, 
which were 23.2 per cent during 1992-93, was 9.4 per cent in 2002-03. Better 
disclosure norms have helped in bringing transparency in banking activities (The 
Hindu Bureau, 2004)'*. Liberalization of financial services at a multilateral level is 
largely govemed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO). By the time ofificial negotiations under the 
Uruguay Round were over in 1993, negotiations on financial services remained 
unfinished. These negotiations continued for two more years and an interim 
agreement was reached in 1995. The negotiations again reopened in April 1997 and a 
revised set of commitments in financial services by 70 member countries was agreed 
on December 1997. Under the negotiation, India submitted its revised offers in 
August 2005. 
In the banking sector, India committed to allow establishment of branch 
operations of a foreign bank subject to a license limit of 12 per year. However, India 
retained the option of restricting entry of foreign banks if their market share exceeded 
15 per cent. Apart fi-om this, the foreign banks were also allowed to install ATMs at 
branches and other places. It also allowed licensed foreign bank branches to invest m 
other financial services up to a certain limit. The foreign banks were required to 
constitute a Local Advisory Board, the Chairman and Members of which had to 
compulsorily be Indian nationals. Finally, public sector banks could invest their 
surplus fimds in term deposits only with scheduled commercial banks in India. 
Speaking at BANCON, the RBI's Deputy Governor, Mr. V. Leeladhar, said that 
foreign banks were given licences to open 75 branches between 2003-07 excluding 
offsite Automatic Teller Machines (Shivkumar, C, 2007)*'. In February 2006, India 
received plurilateral requests for liberalizing trade in banking and financial services 
fi-om a number of developed and developing countries. Some of the major demands 
made in the banking sector included: undertaking fiill market access and national 
treatment commitments for all sub-sectors, removal of restrictions on preferred form 
of presence, nimierical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers, use of foreign 
capital and equity ceilings and investment by public sector utilities in foreign banks. 
Foreign service providers also expressed the desire for removal of the priority sector 
lending requirement as well as restrictions on land acquisition by foreigners and 
'discriminatory' regulations affecting income tax, solvency ratios and borrowing 
limits. They have expressed a desire for removal of restrictions on the choice of the 
form of commercial presence and partner for foreign service providers as well as 
limitation on equity participation. They asked for greater transparency in the 
development and application of domestic regula^ons. In the round of talks India has 
offered to fiirther open up this sector provided other WTO Members make substantive 
and satisfactory offers in sectors and modes of supply where India has indicated its 
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interests. Within the banking and financial services, India has requested developed 
countries like Australia, Canada, European Communities and United States to 
liberalize restrictions on market access and national treatment for data processing of 
financial services. India has also made several country/member specific requests. For 
example, India has requested Australia to allow bank branches to accept retail 
deposits and remove the requirement of approval of Australian authorities for setting 
up of bank branches of parent banks where a single shareholder holds 15 per cent or 
more share. In the case of European Community, India has requested that a bank 
subsidiary incorporated in any one of the member states be accepted as incorporated 
within the EC and be authorized to render banking services in entire EC. In United 
States, the form of commercial presence, i.e. bank branch or bank subsidiary, depends 
on individual State regulations and India has requested the removal of such 
restrictions as they restrict provision of financial services. India's conditional revised 
offer for banking services is largely guided by RBFs roadmap for presence for foreign 
banks in India. 
The roadmap has divided further liberalization into two phases. During the 
first phase, between March 2005 to March 2009, foreign banks will be permitted to 
establish presence by way of setting up a wholly-owned banking subsidiary (WOS) or 
conversion of the existing branches into a WOS. Consistent with the roadmap, India 
has offered to allow foreign banks to enter through branch operations or wholly 
ovmed subsidiary of a foreign bank. Given that the number of branches permitted 
each year has been higher than the WTO commitments, India has agreed to offer upto 
twenty licenses per year, both for new entrants and existing banks. The minimum 
start-up capital requirement for these WOS would be Rs 3 billion ($ 73 million) and 
they have to maintain a capital adequacy of 10 per cent. India has also offered to 
allow WOS of foreign banks to hold surplus fimds of public sector utilities as term 
deposits, subject to guidelines by RBI. India has also ^ e e d to allow foreign banks to 
invest in private sector banks through the FDI route subject to foreign equity ceiling 
of 49 per cent. However, the combined foreign equity (through FDI, FII and NRI 
routes) is capped more liberally at 74 per cent. While public and Indian private sector 
banks have to ensure that 40 per cent of their net bank credit goes to the priority 
sector, the limit is only 32 per cent for foreign banks. Finally, India has offered to 
replace the Local Advisory Board requirement with guidelines on the composition of 
the board of directors. India has offered to allow foreign equity up to 26 per cent. This 
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is in concordance with the existing regime in India, although an amendment to 
increase the restriction to 49 per cent is under consideration. In the case of auxiliary 
^ services like consultancy, actuarial and risk assessment, foreign equity up to 51 per 
cent has been allowed. RBI's roadmap envisions foreign banks entering into mergers 
and acquisitions with Indian private sector banks after 2009, subject to the 74 per cent 
investment limit. Another area where pre-conunitment would send a positive signal to 
India's trading partner's would be regarding provision of national treatment to foreign 
banks involving solvency ratios, income tax, borrowing limits etc. These would again 
be consistent with what has been outlined in the roadmap. Such pre-commitments 
would signal direction of future reforms and give domestic service providers and 
regiilators time to prepare themselves for competition and put in place the required 
regulatory regime. Finally, given the move towards greater capital account 
convertibility and the advent of e-commerce in banking services, it would be 
advisable for India to undertake some commitments across most banking and 
financial services. 
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CHAPTER -6 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
«BB!)ikt 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The banks are very important instruments of macro-economic policy to 
stabilize economy. By controlling the volume of credit, they are able to check both 
inflation and deflation effectively in the economy. In fact the central banks depend 
upon the commercial banks for success of its monetary policy, keeping in view of 
different requirements of the economy. It is true that credit policy with regard to 
volume and direction is subject to control by the central banking authority, still 
commercial banks can formulate new ways and means of mobilizing deposits and 
granting loans and thus can be innovative. 
The basis for banking sector reforms in India was provided by Conunittee on 
Financial System (Narasimham Committee) which made recommendations in 
November 1991 regarding Indian banking system which regulated a more market-
oriented system. The major components of banking sector reforms are: 
• Modifying the policy framework; 
• Improving financial soundness of banks; 
• Strengthening institutional firamework; and 
• Strengthening of supervisory mechanism. 
The banking sector reforms based on these specific tasks have two aspects; 
macro-level policy challenges and micro-level policy reforms. The former aims at 
removing external constraints on the banking system as a whole and thus creating a 
climate in which banks could function in tune with reform measures. 
The entire study periods have been divided into three sub-periods namely 
period-l(Pl) 1980-81 to 1991-92, period-2 (P2) 1992-93 to 1998-99, and period-3 
(P3) 1999-00 to 2007-08. In our study, we have to analyze banking sector reforms in 
different phases, and its impacts on banking system before reforms period (PI), in the 
first reforms period (P2), and in the second reforms period (P3). The study in the case 
of branch expansion shows that during 1992-93 to 1998-99 (P2) average branch 
expansion of banks in rural areas is 33623.86 which is higher than 31816.11 of 
period P3 which is greater than 211 Al.62 of period PI. It is meant that branch 
expansion of banks in rural areas before banking reforms was less in comparison to 
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first and second phases of banking reforms periods 1992-1999 and 2000 onward. It is 
also clear from the study that branch expansion in urban areas over the three periods 
has increased. In P3, after second reforms, the expansion of branches in urban areas 
is 11480.11 which is higher than 9156.571 of first reform period (PI) which is more 
than 6813.538 of before reforms period (PI). In other words, impact of banking 
reforms in urban areas has been positive as the reforms have been made by the 
government of India. It is meant that impact of banking reforms over the given 
periods is positive. In other words, impact of banking reforms in India has been found 
higher in developed areas in comparison to less developed areas that is rural areas. 
Indian banking system is predominantly branch-banking system. After nationalization 
of major banks and banking reforms, for nearly two decades there had been massive 
branch expansion, primarily with the objective of covering the unbaked centres in 
rural and semi-rural centres, coupled with intensive branch network in metro-urban 
centres to sustain profitability. But firom the above study, it is clear that the maximum 
benefits of banking reforms reached to urban areas in comparison to other areas. 
It is found that demand deposits, time deposits, and deposits per capita in 
banks enhanced after banking reforms. The impact of banking reforms on bank 
deposits in different areas: rural, semi-urban, urban, and metropolitan reveals that the 
average deposit of urban and metropolitan areas happens to be Rs. 714495.2 crores 
which is more than that of semi-urban deposits, Rs. 176628.80 crores, which is higher 
in comparison to average deposits of rural areas, Rs.130013.6 crores because less 
branches of banks have been opened in the areas and still now, most of the people are 
not banking habitual. 
The results of deposits in the form of current, saving, and term show that the 
current deposits increased firom Rs. 30334.66 crores in 1990-91 to Rs. 79770.2 crores 
in 1997-98, and further to Rs. 321834 crores in 2006-07. So far as saving deposit is 
concerned, it too enhanced from Rs. 56151.9 crores in the first phase of banking 
reforms in 1990-91 to Rs. 142412 crores in 1997-98. After the second period reforms, 
the amoxmt reached to Rs. 679070.8 crores in 2006-07. Term deposit amount is more 
than three times of each deposit. Term deposit was Rs. 114081.79 crores in 1990-91 
and boosted to Rs. 374286.4 crores in 1997-98. After passing 8 years it increased to 
Rs. 1596139.7 crores in 2006-07. 
There have been fluctuations in the credit of SBI and its associate banks but 
the rate of credit is increasing at decreasing rate. So far as credit of nationalized 
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banks is concerned, it was Rs. 71402.38 crores in 1990-91 which enhanced to Rs. 
188109 crores in 1998-99 and reached to Rs. 925965.3 crores in 2006-07. The 
amount of credit in nationalized banks was one and half folds higher than that of SBI 
and its associate banks over the same periods. Credit of foreign banks in 1990-91 was 
Rs. 9358.88 crores. After that period, credit of foreign banks improved substantially 
to Rs. 29767.2 crores in 1998-99. The second phase of banking reforms enhanced the 
bank credit to Rs. 134853.2 crores in 2006-07. No doubt there is increment in the 
amount of credit of foreign banks but its quantity is less than that of both nationalized 
and SBI and its associate banks. In the case of regional rural banks, the amount of 
credit without any hurdle goes up and it was Rs. 3750.59 crores, Rs. 11278.6 crores, 
and Rs. 47855.1 crores in 1990-91, 1998-99, and 2006-07 respectively, but credit 
provided by the banks was about three times less in comparison to discussed banks 
credit. Credit offered by other scheduled conunercial banks was Rs. 4975.1 crores 
which was increased to Rs. 35061.6 crores in 1998-99. The credit offered by the 
banks was Rs. 390064 crores in 2006-07. 
Impact of banking reforms over credit in different states of India indicates 
that credits provided by banks for different states in India have been increasing during 
1990-91 to 2006-07. The highest average credit is observed in Mahrashtra, i.e. Rs. 
149424.43 crores and then it was Rs. 93218.27 crores in Delhi, Rs. 59884.95 crores in 
Tamil Nadu, Rs.43588 crores in Kamataka, Rs. 39829.35 crores in Andhra Pradesh, 
Rs. 33523.72 crores in West Bengal, Rs. 31730. 57 crores in Uttar Pradesh, Rs. 
26410.32 crores in Gujarat, Rs. 20235.21 crores in Kerala, Rs. 18316.42 crores in 
Punjab, Rs. 16195.29 crores in Madhya Pradesh, Rs. 15817.62 crores in Rajasthan, 
Rs. 12264.94 crores in Haryana, Rs. 9063.66 crores in Bihar, Rs. 8805.73 crores in 
Orissa, Rs. 8432.55 crores Chandigarh, Rs. 7762.98 crores in Assam, Rs. 7699.90 
crores m Jharkand, and lowest average of credit is provided by Lakshadweep of Rs. 
15.87 crores. It is also found that credit provided by banks to backward areas has been 
declining and for controlling it different steps were taken diiring 1990-91 to 2006-07. 
The study also indicates that food credit, non-food credit, and per capita credit 
provided by scheduled commercial banks has been affected by banking reforms in 
India. Before banking reforms, in period PI, average credits to priority sector was Rs. 
25286.50 crores. After the reforms, the average credits to priority sector were 
increased to Rs.233886.6 crores. The average credit was Rs. 77171.43 crores and Rs. 
355776.1 crores in P2 and P3 respectively. Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
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credit to agriculture is 15.16 percent which is higher than that of small scale industry 
i.e., 13.99 percent over the given periods. It is obvious that credit provided by Indian 
banks improved a lot after introduction of banking sector reforms in India. Credit 
provided by banks in India to medium and large industry is higher during banking 
sector reforms in comparison to that of before banking reforms period. The average 
credit of the wholesale trade in PI is Rs. 9752.75 crores which is less than Rs. 
43841.14 crores of P2, which is also lower than Rs. 276776.2 crores of P3. It is 
obvious that impact of banking reforms has been more effective. But CAGR of 
wholesale trade is appeared less than that of other discussed sectors. 
The analysis of public sector banks at. branch level reveals that business 
operating expenses and profits on an average have increased at a faster rate during the 
period under study. The increase is significant especially in the case of business and 
operating expenses. Inter-group analysis indicates that the performance of State Bank 
of India and its associate banks, on average is better than that of nationalized banks in 
business and profit but they could not control their operating expenses. The 
performance of nationalized banks on profit front is weak when compared to other 
two groups. 
Performance of public sector banks on profitability front is good both in terms 
of mean values and growth rates, especially in return on assets. The spread has 
declined during the first three years due to slashing down of interest rates. 
Development of resources by way of loans and advances is rather weak. Period-wise 
analysis of public sector banks shows that the reform measures have improved its 
performance as a whole. Analysis of the study shows that by and large immediately 
after introduction of banking sector reforms (Period-I) most of the banks struggled to 
adjust the new enviroiunent. It appears that all public sector banks have not responded 
to the process of reforms in the same degree and spirit. Some of them, for instance, 
Oriental Bank of Commerce, State Bank of Hyderabad and State Bank of Patiala, etc. 
recorded a marked improvement, while other banks like UCO Bank, United Bank of 
India, Central Bank of India, Indian Overseas Bank and Punjab and Sind Bank failed 
to show any significant improvement. 
It is found that interest expended as percentage of total assets of public sector 
banks in 1991-92 was 6.96 percent which declmed to 4.24 percent in 2006-07. The 
average of percentage of interest expended is 5.71 percent. But the compound annual 
growth rate of public sector banks is -3.42 percent. While the compound annual 
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growth rate of individual bank in public sector is negative. Average interest expended 
as percentage of total assets of all public sector banks varies between 5 percent to 6.5 
percent. Average interest expended as percentage of total assets of Allahabad Bank is 
6.10 percent, Bank of Baroda 5.64 percent, Canara Bank 5.7 percent, Punjab National 
Bank 5.69 percent etc. Coefficient of variance of the described banks varies between 
11.76 to 28.37. 
The study also reveals that the average of interest income as percentage of 
total assets of public sector banks fluctuated from 5.15 percent to 9.30 percent. The 
average percentage of Bank of Maharashtra is 8.67 percent, Allahabad Bank 8.75 
percent. Oriental Bank of Commerce 9.30 percent, Dena Bank 8.90 percent, State 
Bank of India 8.44 percent, and State Bank of Saurashtra 9.14 percent etc. 
Consequent upon the introduction of prudential norms relating to asset 
classification, income recognition and provisioning, the most visible structural 
changes in the banking sector was improvement in asset quality. The share of non-
performing assets in gross and net terms declmed significantly across all bank groups. 
The incidence of NPAs is higher in the case of piiblic sector banks than other groups. 
It is found that doubtflil asset increased over the period of times. A public 
sector bank has got the highest average of doubtful assets, that is, Rs. 2895.5 crores. 
The average in other scheduled commercial banks is Rs. 4173.5 crores. The lowest 
average is seen in foreign banks of Rs. 811.4 crores. The lowest coefficient of 
variance of doubtful assets, 14.9 percent, is appeared in public sector banks and then 
in foreign banks i.e., 36.99 percent and it is the highest in other scheduled commercial 
banks, 50.30 percent. It is clear that in public sector banks there is more stability of 
doubtful assets in comparison to other remaining banks. Loss assets have increased 
over the same years. The average of public sector, Rs. 6090.6 crores, is higher in 
comparison to foreign banks' average i.e., Rs. 714.1 crores. The lowest average of the 
groups, Rs. 676.7 crores, is foimd in other scheduled commercial banks. The mean of 
public sector total NPAs is Rs. 49646.4 crores which is greater than Rs. 7871.5 crores 
of other scheduled banks in India. The mean of foreign banks is the smallest of the 
group of Rs. 2554.1 crores. 
The level of non-performing assets (NPAs) of public sector banks shows 
significant reduction in relation to net advances in recent years. Non-performing 
assets are not confined to public sector banks alone but are present in private sector 
banks as well. The incidence of non-performing assets is higher in the case of public 
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sector banks than other bank groups. The increased NPAs forced the banking sector to 
come up with innovative ideas for deployment of funds with least credit and risk. The 
financial health of banks improved due to prescribed prudential norms. Ahnost all 
banks improved their capital adequacy and asset quality, measured by the net NPAs as 
a percentage of net advances, during the period of the study. 
The expectations of customer have been growing. Broadly, these expectations 
are swift service with minimal response time, efficient service delivery, tailor-made 
and value-added products to suit specific needs, hasUe-firee procedures and minimum 
transactions costs, and pleasant and personalized service. 
After introduction of reforms, the PSBs have registered negative returns in 
United Banks of India, Punjab Sind Bank, Indian Bank, Central Bank of India, UCO 
Bank, and Bank of Maharashtra. It is so because of net losses registered by the banks. 
However, in other remaining banks situation has changed for the better. There were 
fluctuations in the year to year percentages but in Punjab National Bank, Oriental 
Bank of Conmierce, Corporation Banks, and Union Bank of India, average returns on 
assets boosted by 7.81 percent, 1.13 percent, 1.22 percent, and 0.92 percent 
respectively. Average returns on assets of public sector banks ranges between -0.75 
percent to 7.81 percent during the given periods. 
The business per employee for all PSBs taken together increased from Rs. 
1203.95 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 15637.76 lakhs in 2007-08, an improvement of about 
11 times. State Bank of India and its associate banks have been able to improve 
average business per employee within the range of Rs. 144.63 lakhs to Rs. 232.82 
lakhs over the given period. It appears from the data that State Bank of Patiala has 
made remarkable progress in area of average business per employee. The average 
business per employee of public sector banks ranges between Rs.l 14.63 lakhs in State 
Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur to Rs. 313.78 lakhs in Oriental Bank of Commerce and it 
declined to Rs. 230.85 lakhs in Union Bank of India and further it reduced to Rs. 
236.56 lakhs in Bank of Baroda etc. Average percentage of interest income as margin 
to total assets of public sector banks, changed from 0.43 percent to 3,59 percent over 
the given periods. The aggregate of public sector banks average in terms of margin 
percentage is 2.84 percent. Nationalized banks is having 2.76 percent margin to total 
assets of public sector banks. The average of State Banks group is 3.02 percent and 
other public sector bank is 0.43 percent. The coefficient of variance of whole public 
sector banks is 8.37 while in nationalized banks it is found 10.04. 
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Operating expenses per branch of public sector banks rose at a faster rate since 
1998-99. In the five years of the study period, the rate of growth was higher. It is 
observed that these expenses of branches have increased three-fold during the 11 
years period. It appears that by and large the banks with small business per branch 
incurred the lowest operating expenses per branch, while the banks whose branches 
did more business incurred relatively more operating expenses, justifying such 
increase. It is observed that the .average of operating expenses in public sector banks 
is 2.43 percent while in nationalized banks it is more, i.e., 2.44 percent. The highest 
average of operating expenses, 3.13 percent, is noticed in State Bank of Mysore which 
declined to 2.99 percent in Syndicate Bank then reduced to 2.77 percent in Central 
Bank of India and again lowered to 2.66 percent in Allahabad Bank etc. 
The average profit per branch of State Bank of India and its associate banks 
has been positive throughout tiie period. When the State Bank of India is compared 
with its associate banks, the growth rate of profit per branch is higher m the case of 
associate banks. The performance on the profit front of nationalized banks on the 
whole makes a dismal reading. During the entire period, SBI and its associate banks 
(during 1992-93 to 2007-08) generated profits. Their total profits per employee 
increased fi-om Rs. 79.94 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 88.19 lakhs in 2007-08. The average 
of total profits of SBI and its associate banks per employee is Rs. 9.62 lakhs over the 
given period. Individually, average profit of bank ranges fi-om Rs. 0.55 lakhs to Rs. 
1.S8 lakhs in SBI and its associate banks. Nationalized banks show somewhat 
different picture. The nationalized banks faced loss of Rs. -0.63 lakhs in 1992-93, Rs. 
-0.81 lakhs in 1993-94, and -0.2 lakhs per employee and other years show positive 
gain per employee. So far as public sector banks are concerned, they incurred loss in 
first two years of given period, i.e., Rs. -0.38 lakhs per employee in 1992-93, and Rs. 
-049 lakhs in 1993-94. 
It is found in the study that the average net profit/loss as percentage of total 
assets of public sector banks ^ gregate is 0.4 percent. There are many banks for which 
average of net profit/loss percentage is obtained such as Bank of Maharashtra, Central 
Bank of India, Punjab and Sind Bank, Syndicate Bank, UCO Bank and United Bank 
of India and their coefficient of variance of net profit^oss is negative. The highest 
average of percentage in Corporation Bank is 1.15 percent which declined to 1.12 
percent in Oriental Bank of Commerce. The rest banks average ranges between 1 and 
0. Average of capital adequacy ratio in all scheduled commercial banks is 12.34 
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percent, in public sector banks it is 12.32 percent, while in nationalized banks it is 
12.03 percent. Thus, average of scheduled commercial banks, public sector banks as 
well as nationalized banks is near about the same. In Corporation Bank of India, the 
average of capital adequacy ratio is 14.85 percent which is the highest among given 
banks. Indian Bank has the lowest average of the capital adequacy ratio of 6.18 
percent. There are many banks for which average of capital adequacy is more than 12 
percent such as Andhra Bank, Bank of Baroda, State Bank group. State Bank of 
Saurashtra etc. 
When viewed from the efficiency at employee level, it is found that the 
average business per employee of all public sector banks taken together increased 
from Rs. 47.84 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 215.60 lakhs in 2002-03 registering an 
improvement of 4.5 times. Inter-group comparison reveals that the performance of 
nationalized banks in doing business per employee is higher than that of State Bank of 
India and its associate banks. 
Thus, the Indian banking system has witnessed a significant transformation in 
recent years. The Narasimham Committee Report provided the blue print for banking 
reforms in India. The reforms process did open the window of opportunities for Indian 
banks, however, there are a host of challenges emanating from it. To large extent the 
banking industry in India had been able to meet the role envisaged for it by these 
reforms. Indian banking is fundamentally different from banking else where it is 
marked by features like imperatives of social banking, low degree of technological 
sophistication, a highly unionized workforce and a cumbersome legal system. The 
inference is clear that banks, if not all, at least public sector banks must develop its 
own body of concepts and principles revolving around distinctive characteristics of 
services marketing and tempered with the imperatives of the Indian situation. 
Based on the findings of the study and in the light of the observations several 
suggestions are made for improving commercial banks performance in terms of 
efficiency, profitability and overall performance. Indian banking needs to focus on the 
following aspects and build required capabilities to cope up with challenges of the 
dynamic banking environment. 
Without adversely affecting the quality of services, the banks should device 
the strategies to cut down and control the costs. The cost should be kept at a minimum 
possible level. A cautious approach to the branch expansion policy, reducing the level 
of establishment expenses, optimum use of technology that 1nini1ni7.es the costs, 
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centralized bulk purchases, etc. can help the banks to cut down and control the 
expenses. Cost planning and control strategies should be incorporated into the banks' 
administration. A point of worry to the customer and management of banks especially 
public sector bank is behaviour of the staffs. There may be several reasons for this 
indifferent behaviour like less number of staffs, too much of work, lack of training 
and orientation, etc. Whatever may the reason, it is certain that behaviour of the staffs 
with the cxistomer needs improvement. For that they should adopt strategies like 
arranging periodic training of staffs in behavioural science, providing some incentives 
in terms of gifts to the staff for good behaviour and implementing code of conduct 
and discipline strictly in the branches. 
There is the need for modernization and technology up-gradation through 
accelerating the pace of computerization and the need for enduring greater operational 
flexibility to the public sector banks which is closely related to their functional 
autonomy. There should be depoliticization to the Boards of banks and their 
Chairmen and preferred encouragement of professionalism and function of bank 
management. In the post-era of IT Act, global environment is continuously changing 
and creating new direction, dimensions and immense opportunities for the banking 
industry. Keeping in mind all the changes, RBI should appoint another committee to 
evaluate the on-going banking sector reforms and suggest third phase of the banking 
sector reforms. 
RBI should liberalize various policies for the merger of weak banks and other 
banks should also merge with each other to compete in the global market. The banks 
should also go for merging their particular activities under core competition rather 
than to merge the whole business. Particular branches of the banks should also be 
allowed to merge with each other. Rationalization of the branch network is a vital 
question to reduce the burden and increase the efficiency. All the banks should be 
motivated to set up specialization committees like Audit Committee, Risk 
Management Committee, Compensatory Committee etc. which will strengthen the 
corporate governance. In the deregulated environment the banks should enter retail 
banking with some attractive policies. It will help to increase their fee-based income. 
Also, enter universal banking with three-tier structure. RBI should give more 
autonomy to the public sector banks to access capital marker. Banking is a service 
industry. They should create friendly environment. It will also help in implementing 
Basel II Accord. 
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Majority of the customers especially from public sector banks strongly feel 
that the system followed in the banks need a review in terms of simplifying various 
forms used and procedures followed for sanctioning loan. Some of the customers of 
public sector banks advice their banks to adopt the procedure followed by private and 
foreign banks in this regard. 
The reform measures laid the basis for sound banking system and considered 
progress has been made in implementing the reforms. The response of the banks to 
the reforms has been impressive. The banks have been adjusting very well to the new 
environment, though gradually. The reforms have enhanced the opportunities and 
challenges for the commercial banks making them operate in a market-led 
competitive enviroimient. 
As a result of entry of new generation private sector banks, the competitive 
pressures are constantly on the increase. This lias led to the increased customer-
orientation and customer focus on the part of banks in post-reform period. Banks are 
now competing in providing anywhere banking, net banking, phone banking, ATM 
facility, etc. Product innovation is given a lot of importance. 
In the case of the growing competition, the policy changes and the operational 
environment in respect of the Indian banking system there has been an increased 
focus on profitability, although social objectives continue to be important. 
Consequently, most of banks in the public sector have shown a significant 
improvement in their profit performance. 
The reforms initiated in the banking sector have now reached a crucial stage. 
Government's stake in some PSBs is reduced and as a consequence public equity in 
these PSBs is enlarged. This led to greater responsibility on the bank management 
since the level of accoimtability has increased. Pressures of performance and 
profitability will keep them on their toes all the time as the public shareholders expect 
good performance along with good returns on their equity. 
New challenges in the banking sector and new issues have started cropping up 
which is going to pose certain problems in the near fiiture. The new entrants in the 
banking are with computer background. However, over a period of time they would 
acquire banking experience. Whereas the middle and senior level people have rich 
banking experience but their computer literacy is at a low level. Therefore, they feel 
handicapped in this regard since technology has become an indispensable tool in 
banking. So, the new mantra for Indian banks' is to go global in search of new 
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markets, customers and profits. Let lis not forget that the competition is not only on 
foreign turf but also in the domestic field as well firom foreign banks operating in 
India. 
Banking services require a high level of customer engagement and 
understanding of the requirements for a quality value proposition, These factors can 
be sustained in long-term by adopting a customer-centric business strategy. Similarly, 
transparency and accountability from regulation and compliance are also growing; 
banks dealing with the US customers need to C9mply with international regulations 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Indian ones from RBI and Clause 49. By 2015, we 
will live in an intensely customer-centric market dominated by global mega banks and 
densely populated by specialist financial services providers. Technology will also 
drive fundamental changes in workforce disposition, which will have substantial 
follow-on effects for productivity, efficiency and profitability. These trends are 
ab-eady evident but asthey become entrenched, there will be profound changes in the 
competitive drivers of global banking. 
A national priority status shotild be given to banking sector reforms because 
banking sector development is heart of any national economic development policy. 
The government should make some effective policies for banking sector, particularly 
for public sector banks. There are so many new challenges throvm by globalization, 
and liberalpolicies of RBI. If banking sector is improved accordingly, then challenges 
can be converted into opportunities which fiirther strengthen the national economic 
development policy. 
The performance of economy, to a large extent, is dependent on the 
performance of banks. It is the mirror reflection of an economy. However, the 
banking sector reforms in India has provided necessary platform to the banking sector 
to operate on the basis of operational flexibility and fimctional autonomy, thereby 
enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability. The reforms brought out 
structural changes in the financial sector, eased external constraints in their working, 
introduced transparency in reporting procedures,, restructuring and recapitalization of 
banks and: have increased competitive element in the market. In fact, the reform 
currently underway in the banking sector represents a major structural overhaul of the 
financial system. 
After the introduction of reforms, the banks have significantly improved their 
profitability and started cleaning their balance sheet and the most critical area in the 
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improvement in profitability of banks continues to be the reduction of NPAs. In fact, 
the issue is intimately connected with the overall stability of the financial system. The 
financial sector reforms are directed towards making the Indian banking system 
stronger, more resilient and geared to meet the challenges of globalization 
A key achievement of the banking sector reforms has been the sharp 
improvement in the financial health of banks, reflected in significant improvement in 
capital adequacy and improved asset quality. There have also been substantial 
improvements in the competitiveness and efficiency of the Indian banking sector 
reflected inter alia in the reduction in interest spread, operating expenditure and cost 
of intermediation in general. Also, direct lending to disadvantaged segments of the 
economy under priority sector advances remained high during the reform period. 
Thus, the Indian banking system has stood the test of time and it has the inherent 
strength to adopt itself to the changing environment. 
Major findings of the study can besummarized as follows: 
1. The business per employee for all PSBs taken together increased firom Rs. 
1203.95 lakhs in 1992-93 to Rs. 15637.76 lakhs m 2007-08, an improvement of 
about 11 times. On the other hand, SBI and its associate banks have been able to 
improve average business per employee firom Rs. 144.63 lakhs to Rs. 232.82 
lakhs over the given period. 
2. State-wise distribution of credits by the PSBs reveal that the highest average 
credit is observed in Maharashtra (Rs. 149424.43 crores) during 1990-91 to 
2006-07 followed by Delhi (Rs. 93218.27 crores), Tamil Nadu (Rs. 59884.95 
crores), Kamataka. (Rs. 43588 .crores), Andhra Pradesh (Rs. 39829.35 crores). 
West Bengal (Rs. 33523.72 crores), Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 31730.50 crores) etc; and 
the lowest average of credit is provided by Lakshadeweep (Rs. 15.87 crores). 
3. The average profit per branch of SBI and its associate banks has been positive 
through out the period. However, when the SBI is compared with its associate 
banks, the growth rate of profit per branch is higher in the case of associate 
banks. During the entire period, SBI and its associate banks generated profits, 
and their total profits per employee increased firom Rs. 79.94 lakhs in 1992-93 to 
Rs. 88.19 lakhs in 2007-08. Nationalized banks, on the other hand, show 
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somewhat different picture. They faced loss of Rs. 0.63 lakhs in 1992-93, Rs. 
0.81 lakhs in 1993-94, and Rs. 0.2 lakhs per employee while other years show 
positive gain per employee. Average net / profit loss as percentage of total assets 
of public sector banks aggregate is 0.4 percent. 
4. It is found that interest expended as percentage of total assets of public sector 
banks in 1991-92 was 6.96 percent which declined to 4.24 percent in 2006-07. 
5. The analysis of public sector banks at branch level reveals that the business 
operating expenses and profit as an average have increased at a faster rate during 
the period under study. Inter-group analysis shows that the performance of SBI 
& its associate banks on average is better than that of Nationalized banks in 
business and profit but they could not control their operating expenses. 
6. Average of capital adequacy ratio in SCBs is 12.34 percent, in public sector 
bank it is 12.32 percent, while in Nationalized Banks it is 12.03 percent. They 
show the same trend in the case of capital adequacy ratio over the given period. 
In Corporation Bank of India, the average of capital adequacy ratio is 14.85 
percent which is the highest among given banks. On the other hand, Indian 
Banks has the lowest average of capital adequacy ratio of 6.18 percent. 
7. The incidence of NPAs is higher in the case of public sector banks than other 
groups, and it is the lowest in the case of foreign banks (FBs). The mean of 
public sector total NPAs is Rs. 49646.4 crores which is greater than Rs. 2554.1 
crores of foreign banks. 
8. Finally, it appears that all PSBs have not responded to the process of reforms in 
the same degree and spirit. Some of them, for instance. Oriental Bank of 
Commerce, State Bank of Hyderabad and State Bank of Patiala, etc. recoded a 
marked improvement, while other banks lilce UCO Bank, United Bank of India, 
Central Bank of India, Indian Over Seas Bank and Punjab & Sind Bank failed to 
show any significant improvement. 
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For present banking scenario on the basis of banking sector reforms, following 
suggestions can be given for improving the banking sector: 
1. One of the challenges faced by the banking sector is the high level of NPAs. To 
tackle these critical problems, different options are available, which are: 
• reducing the existing NPAs and curving their future build up; 
• organizing lok adalats for recovering small loans; 
• increasing the number of debt recovery tribunals; 
• eliminating interference of the political parties to waive-up the loans; and 
• setting up of the asset reconstruction fund (ARF) as recommended by 
Narasunham Committee in its first and second Reports. A strategic action 
plan should be initiated for reducing NPAs. 
2. For improving share of banks' low cost deposited action plans should be 
prepared for those centres where there is a potential for deposit mobilization. 
3. In order to involve all members in business development and build team spirits 
at the branch level, regular staff meeting must be organized at least fortnightly 
or monthly. 
4. Indian banking sector should stop copying the western banking models and 
should take special care to understand the local ethos and ciiltural backdrop. 
Indian banker should try to promote irmovations and creativity taking into 
accounts the local ethos. 
5. Strategies of foreign banks and new private sector banks should be created 
among the public sector banks to make them competitive in the global age. 
6. With increasing competition among the bank's customer expectations, banks 
should offer a broader range of deposits, mvestment and credit products through 
diverse distributional channels like ATMs, Debt & Credit Cards, 1-Banking, M-
banking and Telerbanking. The banks should: 
• become more customer-centric, offering a wider range of products through 
multiple e-delivery channels. 
• become proficient in managing assets and liabilities according to risk and 
return. 
• pay greater attention to profitability including cost reduction and 
increasingly fee-based income. 
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7. Domestic banks should be made as competitive as possible. They should also 
increase their productivity and profitability, because at the present day context, 
size is no longer a key indicator in the banking industry. 
8. The banks must look into wider issues and reap the overall economic benefits of 
free-trade environment. 
9. Branch rationalization policy should look into the aspect of bringing down the 
number of loss making branches along with the objective of improving overall 
efficiency of the branches. The loss making branches should mainly focus their 
attention to the recovery of NPAs. 
10. VRS should continue and it should not be one-line affair. 
11. Autonomy in HRM areas such as deciding categorization of branches, 
vacancies, placements should be given to banks. 
12. New private sector banks should allow entering the banking industry to intensify 
the competition. 
13. Transforming the work culture to make banking really a service industry. 
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Table -1: Branch Expansion of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
Year 
1 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
P 
Rural 
2 
15105 
17656 
20401 
22686 
25380 
30185 
29703 
30209 
31114 
33014 
34791 
35206 
35269 
35389 
35329 
33004 
32995 
32915 
32878 
32857 
32734 
32562 
32380 
32303 
32121 
32082 
30579 
30551 
31033 
% 
change 
16.89 
15.55 
11.20 
11.88 
18.93 
-1.60 
1.70 
3.00 
6.11 
5.38 
1.19 
0.18 
0.34 
-0.17 
-6.58 
-0.03 
-0.24 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.37 
-0.53 
-0.56 
-0.24 
-0.56 
-0.12 
-4.68 
-0.09 
1.58 
Semi-
Urban 
3 
8122 
8471 
8809 
9081 
9326 
9816 
10585 
10637 
11132 
11166 
11324 
11344 
11356 
11465 
11890 
13341 
13561 
13766 
13980 
14168 
14407 
14597 
14747 
14859 
15091 
15403 
15556 
16361 
17627 
% 
change 
4.30 
3.99 
3.09 
2.70 
5.25 
7.83 
0.49 
4.65 
0.31 
1.42 
0.18 
0.11 
0.96 
3.71 
12.20 
1.65 
1.51 
1.55 
1.34 
1.69 
1.32 
1.03 
0.76 
1.56 
2.07 
0.99 
5.17 
7.74 
Urban 
4 
5178 
5454 
5693 
5917 
6116 
6578 
7209 
7218 
7322 
7524 
8042 
8046 
8279 
8562 
8745 
8868 
9086 
9340 
9597 
9898 
10052 
10293 
10477 
10693 
11000 
11500 
12032 
12970 
14304 
% 
change 
5.33 
4.38 
3.93 
3.36 
7.55 
9.59 
0.12 
1.44 
2.76 
6.88 
0.05 
2.90 
3.42 
2.14 
1.41 
2.46 
2.80 
2.75 
3.14 
1.56 
2.40 
1.79 
2.06 
2.87 
4.55 
4.63 
7.80 
10.29 
Metropolitan 
5 
4014 
4126 
4274 
4395 
4510 
4806 
5790 
5795 
5842 
5995 
5595 
5624 
5666 
5753 
5839 
7154 
7384 
7529 
7763 
8016 
8219 
8467 
8586 
8680 
8976 
9370 
11304 
11957 
12857 
% 
change 
2.79 
3.59 
2.83 
2.62 
6.56 
20.47 
0.09 
0.81 
2.62 
-6.67 
0.52 
0.75 
1.54 
1.49 
22.52 
3.21 
1.96 
3.11 
3.26 
2.53 
3.02 
1.41 
1.09 
3.41 
4.39 
20.64 
5.78 
7.53 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues and years, Note: P=Provisional 
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Table-IA: Branch Expansion in Rural Areas 
Year 
PI 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Number 
of Banks 
15105 
17656 
20401 
22686 
25380 
30186 
29703 
30209 
31114 
33014 
34791 
35206 
35269 
Count 
13 
7 
9 
SS 
1.82E-K)8 
5.78E+08 
7.6E+08 
Year 
P2 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Number 
of Banks 
35389 
35329 
33004 
32995 
32915 
32878 
32857 
Year 
P3 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008P 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
360719 
235367 
286345 
df 
2 
26 
28 
Average 
27747.62 
33623.86 
31816.11 
MS 
91117091 
22226324 
Variance 
46964406 
1408296 
732721.1 
F 
4.099512 
Number 
of Banks 
32734 
32562 
32380 
32303 
32121 
32082 
30579 
30551 
31033 
P-value 
0.028345 
Fcrit 
3.369016 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between rural areas branches 
over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between rural areas 
branches over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table -IB: Branch Expansion in Semi-Urban Areas 
Year 
PI 
1960 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Number 
of Banks 
8122 
8471 
8809 
9081 
9326 
9816 
10585 
10637 
11132 
11166 
11324 
11344 
11356 
Year 
P2 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Number 
Of Banks 
11465 
11890 
13341 
13561 
13766 
13980 
14168 
Year 
P3 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Number 
of Banks 
14407 
14597 
14747 
14859 
15091 
15403 
15556 
16361 
17627 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUM 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
13 
7 
9 
SS 
1.55E+08 
32385184 
1.87E+08 
Sum 
131169 
92171 
138648 
df 
2 
26 
28 
MARY 
Average 
10089.92 
13167.29 
15405.33 
MS 
77293314 
1245584 
Variance 
1441483 
1122469 
1044071 
F 
62.05387 
P-value 
1.26E-10 
Fcrit 
3.369016 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between semi-urban areas 
branches over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between semi-urban areas 
branches over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table -IC: Branch Expansion in 
Year 
PI 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Number 
of Banks 
5178 
5454 
5693 
5917 
6116 
6578 
7209 
7218 
7322 
7524 
8042 
8046 
8279 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
13 
7 
9 
SS 
1.17E+08 
30576292 
1.47E+08 
Year 
P2 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Number 
of Banks 
8562 
8745 
8868 
9086 
9340 
9597 
9898 
• 
Urban Ai 
Year 
P3 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008P 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
88576 
64096 
103321 
df 
2 
26 
28 
Average 
6813.538 
9156.571 
11480.11 
I^S 
58406830 
1176011 
Variance 
1115307 
231416.6 
1975514 
F 
49.6652 
reas 
Number 
of Banks 
10052 
10293 
10477 
10693 
11000 
11500 
12032 
12970 
14304 
P-value 
1.32E-09 
Fcrit 
3.369016 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between urban areas branches 
over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between urban areas 
branches over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table -ID: Branch Expansion in Metropolitan Areas 
Year 
PI 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Number 
of Banks 
4014 
4126 
4274 
4395 
4510 
4806 
5790 
5795 
5842 
5995 
5595 
5624 
5666 
Year 
P2 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Number 
of Banks 
5753 
5839 
7154 
7384 
7529 
7763 
8016 
Year 
P3 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008P 
Number 
of Banks 
8219 
8467 
8586 
8680 
8976 
9370 
11304 
11957 
12857 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
13 
7 
9 
SS 
1.18E-K)8 
35955453 
1.54E+08 
A N O V A : Single Factor 
SUM] 
Sum 
66432 
49438 
88416 
df 
2 
26 
28 
E I^ARY 
Average 
5110.154 
7062.571 
9824 
MS 
59087452 
1382902 
Variance 
574270 
823493.6 
3015407 
F 
42.72714 
P-value 
6.06E-09 
Fcr'tt 
3.369016 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between metropolitan areas 
branches over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between metropolitan areas 
branches over the three periods. 
Altemative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-2 Deposits of SCBs 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Demand 
Deposits 
(Rs. 
crores) 
7798 
8383 
9984 
11312 
14132 
16303 
19227 
19863 
25274 
33437 
33192 
48893 
49541 
58123 
76903 
80614 
90610 
102513 
117423 
145283 
159407 
153048 
187837 
245943 
254876 
364640 
429731 
524310 
Time 
Deposits 
(Rs. crores) 
30190 
35350 
41374 
49284 
58113 
71585 
83496 
97711 
118651 
140078 
159349 
188672 
225397 
261421 
309956 
353205 
414989 
495972 
596602 
706310 
829734 
950312 
1123924 
1296342 
1453734 
1744409 
2182203 
2672630 
Total 
Deposits 
(Rs. crores) 
37988 
43733 
51358 
60596 
72244 
87887 
102723 
117574 
143925 
173515 
192541 
237566 
274938 
319544 
386859 
433819 
505599 
598485 
714025 
851593 
989140 
1103360 
1311761 
1542285 
1708610 
2109049 
2611933 
3196939 
Demand 
Deposits 
(% 
chanse) 
17.38 
17.5 
19.1 
13.3 
24.93 
15.36 
17.94 
3.31 
27.24 
32.3 
15.03 
47.3 
1.33 
17.32 
32.31 
4.83 
12.4 
13.14 
14.54 
23.73 
9.72 
-3.99 
22.73 
30.93 
3.63 
43.07 
17.85 
22.01 
Time 
Deposits 
(% chanse) 
20.2 
17.09 
17.04 
19.12 
17.91 
23.18 
16.64 
17.02 
21.43 
18.06 
15.38 
18.4 
19.46 
15.98 
18.57 
13.95 
17.49 
19.51 
20.29 
1839 
17.47 
14.43 
18.27 
15.34 
12.14 
20 
25.1 
22.47 
Total 
Deposits 
chanse) 
19.61 
15.12 
17.44 
17.99 
19.22 
21.65 
16.88 
14.46 
22.41 
20.56 
15.32 
23.38 
15.73 
16.22 
21.07 
12.14 
16.55 
18.37 
19.31 
19J27 
16.15 
11.55 
18.89 
17.57 
10.78 
23.44 
23.84 
22.4 
Deposits 
per 
Capita 
(Rs.) 
559 
632 
725 
838 
978 
1164 
1332 
1492 
1788 
2111 
2295 
2775 
3153 
3582 
4251 
4675 
5345 
6208 
7264 
8507 
9707 
10630 
12434 
14387 
15690 
19069 
23279 
28093 
Deposits 
per 
Office 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1.37 
NA 
1.86 
2.08 
2.44 
2.87 
3.12 
3.82 
4.38 
5.04 
6.06 
6..73 
7.77 
9.09 
10.71 
12.7 
4.65 
16.25 
19.27 
22.47 
24.42 
29.8 
35.68 
NA 
Source: CMIE, Various issues, NA=Not available 
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Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Table-2 A: Demand Deposit in SCBs 
Rs. Crore 
7798 
8383 
9984 
11312 
14132 
15612 
19227 
20247 
23342 
28856 
33192 
45088 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Rs. Crore 
46461 
56572 
76903 
80614 
90610 
102513 
117423 
. 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. Crore 
127366 
142552 
153048 
170289 
225022 
248028 
364640 
429731 
524310 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
3.19E+11 
1.67E+11 
4,86E+11 
Sum 
237173 
571096 
2384986 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
19764.42 
81585.14 
264998.4 
MS 
1.6E+11 
6.67E-K)9 
Variance 
1.28E-K)8 
6.14E+08 
2.02E+10 
F 
23.92595 
P-value 
1.56E-06 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between demand deposits over 
the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between demand deposits 
over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table-2 B: Time Deposit in SCBs 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Rs. 
Crore 
30190 
35350 
41374 
49284 
58113 
69792 
83496 
97798 
116808 
138103 
159349 
185670 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Rs. 
Crore 
222111 
258560 
309956 
353205 
414989 
495972 
596602 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. 
Crore 
685978 
820066 
950312 
1110564 
1279394 
1452171 
1744409 
2182203 
2672630 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUM! 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
9.72E+12 
3.63E+12 
1.33E+13 
Sum 
1065327 
2651395 
12897727 
df 
2 
25 
27 
AARY 
Average 
88777.25 
378770.7 
1433081 
MS 
4.86E+12 
1.45E+11 
Variance 
2.64E+09 
1.78E+10 
4.36E+11 
F 
33.52486 
P-value 
8.39E-08 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between time deposits over the 
three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between tune deposits over 
the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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Groups 
Maharashtra 
Delhi 
Tamil Nadu 
Kamataka 
Andhra Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Uttar Pradesh 
Gujarat 
Kerala 
Panjab 
Madhya Pradesh 
Rajasthan 
Haryana 
Bihar 
Orissa 
Chandigarh 
Assam 
Jharkhand 
Chhatiisgarh 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Uttrakhand 
Himachal Pradesh 
Goa 
Puducherry 
Meghalaya 
Tripura 
Dadra &Nagar Havell 
Daman & DIu 
Manipur 
Nagaland 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Sikkim 
Meizoram 
Andaman& Nicobar 
Lakshadweep 
Average(R8.Crore) 
149424.43 
93218.27 
59884.95 
43588.22 
39829.35 
33523.72 
31730.57 
26410.32 
20235.21 
18316.42 
16195.29 
15817.62 
12264.94 
9063.66 
8805.73 
8432.55 
7762.89 
7699.90 
5442.86 
5031.47 
4550.21 
3692.91 
2552.84 
1025.95 
902.26 
828.52 
581.88 
351.35 
322.23 
299.04 
264.57 
246.89 
244.16 
222.56 
15.87 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
Source of 
Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
SS 
11420.92 
83.58742 
11504.5 
df 
34 
397 
431 
MS 
335.9093 
0.210548 
F 
1595.408 
P-value 
0 
Fcrit 
1.459246 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between the credits given by the 
different states. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between the credits given 
by different states. 
As the P value is less than 0.05, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 5 percent level 
of significance. State data have been arranged in terms of decreasing order of 
credits. 
210 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Table-5A: Food Credits 
Rs. Crore 
1759 
2127 
2965 
4022 
5665 
5535 
5104 
2190 
770 
1867 
4506 
4607 
Year 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. Crore 
6788 
9106 
12275 
9791 
7597 
12485 
16816 
24926 
39762 
53978 
49398 
36514 
41553 
40691 
46521 
44399 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between food credits before and 
after reforms. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between food credits 
before and after reforms. 
As the P value is less than 0,05, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 5 percent level 
of significance. More food credit is provided after reforms. 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assumi 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
tStat 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
ing Equal Variances 
Variable 1 
28287.44 
2.98E+08 
16 
1.73E+08 
0 
26 
4.944534 
1.95E-05 
1.705618 
3.89E-05 
2.055529 
Variable 2 
3426.4167 
2807671.4 
12 
211 
Table-SB: Non-Food Credits 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Rs. Crore 
23612 
27555 
32528 
37272 
43288 
54410 
58204 
67899 
86048 
103583 
111795 
126913 
Year 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. Crore 
148050 
157217 
199285 
244224 
270804 
3311594 
352021 
429143 
489510 
535745 
697034 
829080 
1050455 
1466387 
1884668 
2317515 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference in non-food credits before and 
after reforms. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference in non-food credits before 
and after reforms. 
As the P value is less than O.OS, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at S percent level 
of significance. More non- food credit is pro^dded after reforms. 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
tStat 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 
898920.8 
8.29E+11 
16 
4.79E+11 
0 
26 
3.157243 
0.002002 
1.705618 
0.004005 
2.055529 
Variable 2 
64425.58 
1.23E+09 
12 
212 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Source: CMIE, Variou 
Table-5C: Credit per Capita 
Rs. Crore 
374 
429 
501 
571 
662 
794 
821 
889 
1078 
1283 
1386 
1536 
Year 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
• 1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
s Issues. 
Rs. Crore 
1776 
1865 
2325 
2737 
2943 
3362 
3752 
4536 
51.94 
5681 
7075 
8075 
10028 
13626 
17212 
20755 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between credit per capita before 
and after reforms. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; tiiere is a significant difference between credit per capita 
before and after reforms. 
As the P value is less than 0.05, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 5 percent level 
of significance. Credit per capita is more after the reforms. 
t-test Two Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
tStat 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 
6612.496 
35688928 
16 
20652858 
0 
26 
3.314459 
0.001354 
1.705618 
0.002709 
2.055529 
Variable 2 
860.3333 
149125.9 
12 
213 
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ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
Rural 
Semi -Uftan 
Urban 
Metropolitan 
ANOVA 
Source of 
Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
16 
16 
16 
16 
SS 
4.6E+11 
9.52E+11 
1.41E+12 
Sum 
1121362 
1068830 
1491437 
4336412 
df 
3 
60 
63 
Average 
70085.12 
66801.85 
93214.79 
271025.8 
MS 
1.53E+11 
1.59E+10 
Variance 
2.61 E+09 
2.16E+09 
5.41 E+09 
5.33E+10 
F 
9.659609 
P-value 
2.71 E-
05 
Fcrit 
2.758078 
H0-: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between credit in rural, semi-
urban, urban, and metropolitan areas. 
HI-: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between credit in rural, 
semi-urban, urban, and metropolitan areas. 
As the P value is less than 0.05, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 5 percent level 
of significance. 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Tab 
Rs. 
Crore 
8504 
10676 
12322 
14899 
18409 
21566 
25050 
29070 
34219 
40383 
42915 
45425 
e-7A: Priorif 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
y Sector Leni 
Rs. 
Crore 
49832 
53880 
64161 
73329 
84880 
99507 
114611 
iing 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. 
Crore 
131827 
154414 
175259 
211609 
263834 
381476 
510738 
634142 
738686 
215 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
6.04E+11 
4.07E+11 
l.OlE+12 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
303438 
540200 
3201985 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
25286.5 
77171.43 
355776.1 
MS 
3.02E+11 
1.63E+10 
Variance 
1.7E+08 
5.72E-H)8 
5.02E+10 
F 
18.56856 
P-value 
1.14E-05 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference in priority sector lending over 
the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference in priority sector lending 
over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table-7B: Non-Food Gross Bank Credit 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Rs. 
Crore 
23045 
27035 
31527 
36399 
42291 
49678 
57465 
68070 
84959 
100665 
113513 
121335 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Rs. 
Crore 
140396 
145950 
184710 
222069 
251394 
287798 
325196 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. 
Crore 
375127 
429162 
482749 
620055 
728422 
999788 
1404840 
1801239 
2203038 
216 
fltftSll^ 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
4.88E+12 
3.5E+12 
8.37E+12 
Sum 
755982 
1557513 
9044420 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
62998.5 
222501.9 
1004936 
MS 
2.44E+12 
1.4E+11 
Variance 
1.19E+09 
4.95E+09 
4.32E+11 
F 
17.42566 
P-value 
1.82E-05 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference in non-food gross bank credit 
over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference in non-food gross bank 
credit over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Table-7C 
Rs. 
Crore 
2587 
3006 
3576 
4536 
5294 
6624 
7979 
10249 
13788 
16548 
20180 
22666 
' Wholesale Trade Sector Lending 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Rs. 
Crore 
24959 
26875 
36128 
43707 
51570 
57544 
66105 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. 
Crore 
79163 
94066 
114707 
150700 
192611 
233459 
395179 
537530 
693671 
217 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
4.01E+11 
3.81E+11 
7.82E+11 
Sum 
117033 
306888 
2490986 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
9752.75 
43841.14 
276776.2 
• 
MS 
2E+11 
1.53E+10 
Variance 
48475777 
2.41E+08 
4.74E+10 
F 
13.13005 
P-value 
0.000126 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference in wholesale trade sector lending 
over the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference in wholesale trade sector 
lending over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Year 
PI 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Table-7D: Industry Sector Lending 
Rs. 
Crore 
1994 
2198 
2353 
2343 
2649 
3066 
3080 
3598 
4767 
5472 
5910 
6154 
Year 
P2 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Rs. 
Crore 
6969 
7330 
9749 
11980 
12340 
13217 
13964 
Year 
P3 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Rs. 
Crore 
16818 
17845 
20459 
22578 
24867 
32549 
39691 
50113 
54585 
918 
Groups 
PI 
P2 
P3 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
12 
7 
9 
SS 
3.98E+09 
1.67E+09 
5.65E+09 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
43584 
75549 
279505 
df 
2 
25 
27 
Average 
3632 
10792.71 
31056.11 
MS 
1.99E+09 
66663779 
Variance 
2350260 
7906413 
1.99E+08 
F 
29.84062 
P-value 
2.38E-07 
Fcrit 
3.38519 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference in industry sector lending over 
the three periods. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference in industry sector lending 
over the three periods. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table-8: Standard Assets 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Public Sector 
Banks 
239318 
273618 
326783 
387360 
452862 
523724 
610435 
830029 
1092607 
1425519 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
33567 
38394 
53317 
65071 
109272 
134248 
167076 
188789 
309918 
410905 
Foreign Banks 
28996 
28702 
34817 
42285 
47838 
51288 
59619 
74705 
96907 
125453 
(Rs.Crore) 
AU Scheduled 
Commercial Banks 
301881 
340714 
414917 
494716 
609972 
709260 
837130 
1093523 
1499431 
1961877 
219 
Groups 
Public Sector Banks 
Other scheduled 
commercial banks 
Foreign Banks 
All scheduled commercial 
banks 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
4.06E+12 
4.172E+12 
8.232E+12 
Sum 
6162255 
1510557 
590610 
8263421 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
616225.5 
151055.7 
59061 
826342.1 
MS 
1.35347E+12 
1.15889E+11 
Variance 
1.51 E+11 
1.55E+10 
9.g6E+08 
2.96E+11 
F 
11.67896 
P-
value 
1.71E-
05 
Fcrit 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between the standard assets of 
above classification of banks. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between the standard assets 
of above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table-9: Sub-standard Assets 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Source: CMI 
Public Sector 
Banks 
14463 
16033 
16361 
14745 
15788 
14909 
16909 
11068 
11453 
14275 
616225.5 
388512.9 
63.05 
E, Various Issues. 
Other Scheduled 
Commerchtl Banks 
1766 
2657 
2137 
2585 
4738 
4174 
3127 
2233 
2427 
4368 
151055.7 
124681.9 
82.54 
Foreign Banks 
1198 
1238 
1096 
876 
856 
995 
990 
715 
946 
1367 
59061 
31563.7 
53.44 
(Rs. crore) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
17428 
19928 
19594 
18206 
21382 
20078 
21026 
14016 
14826 
20010 
826342.1 
544125.7 
65.85 
220 
Groups 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
2.23E+09 
1.02E+08 
2.34E+09 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
146004 
30212 
10277 
186494 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
14600.4 
3021.2 
1027.7 
18649.4 
MS 
7.45E+08 
2831533 
Variance 
3835218 
1084000 
39162.01 
6367750 
F 
262.9405 
P-value 
1.58E-
24 
Fern 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between sub-standard assets of 
above classification of banks. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between sub-standard 
assets of above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Source: CMIE, Various Issue 
Table-10 Doubtful Assets 
Public Sector 
Banks 
25819 
29252 
30535 
33485 
33658 
32340 
28756 
30779 
25028 
19873 
28952.5 
4317.75 
14.91 
s.
Other 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
1077 
1591 
2355 
3069 
6539 
6447 
6392 
5929 
4406 
3930 
4173.5 
2099.36 
50.30 
Foreign 
Banks 
250 
507 
798 
1202 
1004 
944 
1099 
1035 
670 
605 
811.4 
300.10 
36.99 
(Rs. Crore) 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
27146 
31350 
33688 
37756 
41201 
39731 
36247 
37763 
30105 
24408 
33939.5 
5570.29 
16.41 
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ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
8.56E+09 
4.88E+08 
9.05E+09 
Sum 
289525 
41735 
8114 
339395 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
28952.5 
4173.5 
811.4 
33939.5 
MS 
2.85E+09 
13542134 
Variance 
18643001 
4407305 
90062.27 
31028169 
F 
210.7976 
P-value 
6.93E-23 
FcrU 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between doubtful assets of 
above classification of banks. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between doubtful assets of 
above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Table-11 Loss Assets 
Public Sector 
Banks 
(Rs. crores) 
5371 
6425 
6398 
6544 
7061 
6840 
5876 
5929 
6636 
4826 
6090.6 
692.10 
11.36 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
Other Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
(Rs. crores) 
343 
407 
439 
424 
389 
1177 
825 
883 
939 
941 
676.7 
305.64 
45.17 
Foreign Banks 
(Rs. crores) 
528 
612 
712 
1033 
920 
954 
924 
570 
441 
447 
714.1 
225.45 
31.57 
(Rs. Crore) 
All scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
(Rs. crores) 
6242 
7444 
7558 
8001 
8370 
8971 
7625 
7382 
7016 
6215 
7482.4 
861.05 
11.51 
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Groups 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
3.81 E+08 
12281958 
3.93E+08 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
60906 
6767 
7141 
74824 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
6090.6 
676.7 
714.1 
7482.4 
MS 
1.27E+08 
341165.5 
Variance 
479003.6 
93414.68 
50828.32 
741415.4 
F 
371.9676 
P-value 
3.89E-
27 
Font 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between loss assets of above 
classification of banks. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between loss assets of 
above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table-12 Total NPAs 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C.V. 
Public Sector 
Banks 
45653 
51710 
53294 
54774 
56507 
54098 
51541 
47796 
42117 
38974 
49646.4 
5814.7 
11.71 
Other 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
3186 
4655 
4931 
6078 
11666 
11798 
10344 
9045 
7772 
9240-
7871.5 
3043.2 
38.66 
Foreign 
Banks 
1976 
2357 
2615 
3111 
2780 
2893 
3013 
2320 
2057 
2419 
2554.1 
392.1 
15.35 
All Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
50815 
85722 
60840 
63%3 
70953 
68780 
64898 
59161 
51947 
50633 
62771.2 
10852.3 
17.29 
Source: CMIE. Various Issues. 
(Rs. Crore) 
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ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Groups 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
2.7E+10 
1.45E+09 
2.85E+10 
Sum 
496464 
78715 
25541 
627712 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
49646.4 
7871.5 
2554.1 
62771.2 
MS 
9E+09 
40249211 
Variance 
33810334 
9261294 
153725.7 
1.18E+08 
F 
223.6781 
P-value 
2.52E-23 
Fcrit 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between total NPAs of above 
classification of banks. 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between total NPAs of 
above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Mean 
S.D. 
C V . 
Tab] 
Public Sector 
Banks (Rs. crores) 
284971 
325328 
380077 
442134 
509369 
577813 
661975 
877825 
1134724 
1464493 
665870.9 
384071.43 
57.68 
e-13 Total Advances 
CMher Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks (Rs. crores) 
36753 
43049 
58248 
71149 
120938 • 
146046 
177420 
197834 
317690 
420145 
158927.2 
126095.55 
79.34 
Foreign Banks 
(Rs. crores) 
30972 
31059 
37432 
45396 
50618 
54181 
62632 
77025 
. 98965 
127872 
61615.2 
31482.36 
51.10 
AU Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks (Rs. crores) 
352696 
399436 
475757 
558679 
680925 
778040 
902027 
1152684 
1551378 
2012510 
886413.2 
540928.76 
61.02 
Source: CMIE, Various Issues. 
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Groups 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Count 
10 
10 
10 
10 
SS 
4.72E+12 
4.11E+12 
8.84E+12 
ANOVA: Single Factor 
SUMMARY 
Sum 
6658709 
1589272 
616152 
8864132 
df 
3 
36 
39 
Average 
665870.9 
158927.2 
61615.2 
886413.2 
MS 
1.57E+12 
1.14E+11 
Variance 
1.48E+11 
1.59E+10 
9.91 E+08 
2.93E+11 
F 
13.78357 
P-value 
3.83E-06 
Fcrit 
2.866266 
HO: Null Hypothesis; there is no significant difference between the total advances of 
above classification of banks, 
HI: Alternative Hypothesis; there is a significant difference between the total advances 
of above classification of banks. 
Alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
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